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Minority Political Representation under Demographic Change in the United
States
Albert H Fang
Mass demographic changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the United States since the
1960s are commonly considered a force driving major transformations in contemporary Amer-
ican politics. In political science, there are longstanding research traditions that examine
the political implications of demographic change: how demographic change leads to growing
intergroup political contestation over political power and public policies; how demographic
changes lead to shifts in the group bases of partisan support; how demographic changes are
associated with changes in the demographic composition of politicians and elected o cials;
and how the changing face of America a ects the political responsiveness of elected o cials
to historically underrepresented but increasingly prominent segments of the population. De-
spite the proliferation of empirical studies on these topics, numerous causal claims central to
broader arguments about the political implications of demographic change deserve greater
theoretical and empirical scrutiny. In this dissertation, I make use of novel datasets and
methods for descriptive and causal inference to contribute more credible evidence that test
these claims and develop new avenues of research.
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Mass demographic changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the United States since
the 1960s are commonly considered a force driving major transformations in contemporary
American politics and are cited as a leading cause of growing intergroup political conflict
over the distribution of political power and the content of public policies (e.g., Balz, 2014;
Frey, 2014; Taylor, 2014).
Political scientists have long grappled with questions about how political contestation,
political representation, and policy development are a ected by mass demographic change.
The essays in this dissertation are directly relevant to two major lines of inquiry that exist
in the study of minority politics.1 The first explores the claim that ethnic and racial demo-
graphic changes incite social and political backlash from white Americans, either due to the
perception of group threat or due to the activation of pre-existing prejudices. Empirical work
by scholars argue that the tide of ethnic and racial change does in fact cause a backlash among
white Americans (e.g., Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Enos, 2014; Hopkins, 2010). The second
broadly asks how demographic change a ects levels of minority descriptive representation
and the quality of substantive political representation elected o cials provide underrepre-
sented ethnic groups. With respect to descriptive representation, numerous studies exploit
cross-sectional variation across districts to assess the association between the demographic
composition of a district, specifically the share of the population or electorate comprised by
an ethnic minority group, and the probability there is an ethnic minority candidate or elected
1There are numerous other areas of research on minority politics under demographic change. While
substantively important, they are not directly relevant to the essays in this dissertation. Two important lines
of work outside the scope of this dissertation deserve mention. One examines the impact of demographic
change on shifting electoral fortunes for the Democratic and Republican parties, with some – both academics
and pundits – arguing that the conversion of districts from red to blue is inevitable (e.g., Edsall, 2013; Bowler
and Segura, 2012) and others arguing that this transformation may be stalled by redistricting and low rates of
voter turnout among Hispanics (e.g., de la Garza, 2004; Cohn, 2012, 2013). Another assesses the determinants
of voter turnout among ethnic and racial minorities (e.g., Henderson, Sekhon and Titiunik, 2014; Barreto,
Segura and Woods, 2004; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Gay, 2001).
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o cial from that district (e.g., Fraga, 2014). With respect to substantive representation, a
longstanding debate in American politics asks whether, in the post-1960 era during which
ethnic and racial minorities were more closely associated with the Democratic Party, electing
co-ethnic representatives or Democratic representatives yields better substantive representa-
tion for ethnic minority groups (Swain, 1993; Canon, 1999; Cobb and Jenkins, 2001; Whitby
and Krause, 2001; Tate, 2003; Gri n and Newman, 2007; Grose, 2005; Rouse, 2013).
Answering these questions and adjudicating between competing answers requires credible
empirical facts about the cause-e ect relationships at the heart of common and prolific
narratives. Existing empirical research provides a body of important correlations, but fall
short of providing credible causal inferences. The essays in this dissertation tackle this
problem by revisiting these questions using methods for causal inference, tools that have
been generally underutilized in the scholarly literature on minority politics in the United
States. These essays also make use of new and updated sources of original and public data in
order to test theories and to generate new hypotheses and new avenues of research regarding
the political e ects of demographic change. Insofar as the essays in this dissertation spur
additional data collection and analyses in the future, the substantive findings reported in
this dissertation may be sensitive to these changes.
Contemporary American politics and society has already undergone seismic demographic
changes since the 1960s. To the extent that the tides of demographic change are expected
to continue well into the future, this dissertation makes a key contribution to the scholarly
literature on the politics of demographic change by improving the arsenal of data and meth-
ods used to answer these substantive questions, both in their own right and as they inform




1.2.1 The Impact of Mexican Immigration on White Attitudes
and on Public Policy in the U.S. States, 1980-2000
How do white Americans react politically to mass demographic change due to immigration?
Does immigration result in policy changes that constrict the size of the welfare state?
The first essay re-examines the claim that immigration caused a long-run, aggregate-level
white backlash against immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities, and that it led to a racial
realignment with whites becoming more closely attached to the Republican Party as a result
of immigration. Specifically, I examine these questions with respect to Mexican immigration
to the U.S. states between 1980 and 2000. Prior work on the topic is challenged by endogene-
ity threatening causal inference and challenges measuring subgroup opinion. I address these
concerns by using an identification strategy, developed by Chalfin and Levy (2013), which
instruments for Mexican immigration inflows using lagged fertility shocks a ecting Mexico-
to-US emigration patterns and by applying multilevel regression and poststratification to
estimate a time series of white political attitudes in the states.
Challenging major arguments in the literature that mass immigration from Mexico gener-
ally causes a political backlash and a growing a nity for the Republican Party among whites,
I find that the long-run e ects of Mexican immigration on white political attitudes at the
aggregate level occur only during the 1980s and not during the 1990s. In the 1980s, Mexi-
can immigration led to increased support for the Republican Party among whites, increased
levels of conservatism among whites, and increased support for greater federal spending on
crime and education among whites. In terms of policy outcomes, Mexican immigration de-
creased states’ average level of per capita spending on health and public welfare and states’
average level of per pupil spending on public education in the 1980s.
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1.2.2 How Do Legislator Identities A ect Substantive Minority
Representation? Evidence from Hispanic Representation in
the States
In the second essay, I reassess a classic question in the study of minority politics on the link
between descriptive and substantive minority representation, using an original dataset and
tools for causal inference. How does electing a political candidate belonging to a historically
underrepresented minority group, instead of a counterfactual non-minority candidate, a ects
the behavior of the elected legislator toward the minority group? I answer this question using
the case of close state legislative races between a Hispanic and a non-Hispanic candidate. This
paper contributes an extensive novel dataset of state legislative voting and bill sponsorship
behavior combined with data on state legislative election returns and new data on candidate
ethnicity in five U.S. statehouses during the 21-year period between 1993 and 2014.
Using a regression discontinuity design, I show that the conventional belief that descrip-
tive representation leads to substantive representation is not true in this context. Instead,
I find that the net behavior of Hispanic legislators is more complicated than is suggested
by existing research. There is no robust positive relationship between electing a Hispanic
legislator and roll call voting behavior on Hispanic-interest bills. I also find strong suggestive
evidence that Hispanic legislators are more likely than their non-Hispanic counterparts to
sponsor both pro-Hispanic and anti-Hispanic legislation. I further show that ethnic identity
e ects are distinct from legislator party e ects: in close elections between a Democratic and
Republican candidate, electing a Democrat instead of a Republican yields a significant and
positive e ect on pro-Hispanic roll call voting behavior, but no e ect on pro- or anti-Hispanic
bill sponsorship behavior.
Taken together, the findings provide the first causal evidence that bears on competing,
dominant theories about how legislators’ partisan and ethnic identities a ect the quality
6
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of substantive representation they provide an ethnic minority group, and raise intriguing
questions for future theory building and testing on the di erences between minority and
non-minority legislators in their latitude to engage in anti-minority behavior in competitive
districts.
The identification strategy used in this essay will be increasingly useful and promising as
the share of ethnic minorities in the population, the supply of minority candidates, and the
number of close elections between minority and non-minority candidates increases over time.
One might expect increases in the incidence of close elections between an ethnic candidate
and a non-ethnic candidate to be most likely in geographic areas with increases in an ethnic
minority population and where between-group segregation is low, such that concentrations
of ethnic minorities are not easily redistricted into a majority-ethnic district. With the
prospect of additional cases over time, the application of this method will provide leverage
to produce increasingly precise estimates of the e ect of electing an ethnic candidate, instead
of a counterfactual non-ethnic candidate, on substantive minority representation.
1.2.3 Occupational Stratification, Selection, and the Undersupply
of Minority Political Candidates
The third essay mimics the arc of the development of a new research agenda by assessing
whether and how intergroup economic inequalities might lead to intergroup inequalities in
descriptive representation. Potential causal links between intergroup economic inequalities
and political inequalities in descriptive representation are often alluded to in existing re-
search, but are generally under-theorized and under-studied empirically. Broadly, this essay
poses the following questions: What explains variation in the supply of political candidates
across ethnoracial groups and the undersupply of ethnic minority candidates in particular?
Under what conditions are ethnic minority political candidates more likely to emerge?
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I develop a theory where intergroup occupational stratification leads to both (i) between-
group di erences in levels of interest in pursuing elected political o ce as an occupation and
(ii) between-group di erences in the net expected returns from running for o ce by a ecting
how potential candidates expect voters and party elites to react to their candidacy. This
leads to di erences in the supply of political candidates across groups in equilibrium.
I then conduct an exploratory analysis that examines the plausibility of an association
between occupational stratification and the supply of minority political candidates in U.S.
House primary elections between 2006 and 2012. I find that the presence of an ethnic
candidate seems to be associated with the share of an ethnic group in certain sector-specific
occupation status groups for Latinos and Asians. Hispanic-surnamed candidates are more
likely to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level proportion of Hispanics
in low-status public sector jobs is high and when the proportion of Hispanics in high-status
public sector jobs is low, or when the proportion of Hispanics in low-status private sector jobs
is high. Asian-surnamed candidates are more likely to run for o ce in a district primary when
the state-level proportion of Asians in low-status private sector jobs is low and the proportion
of Asians in high-status private sector jobs is high. I find that black-surnamed candidates
are more likely to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level proportion of blacks
in low-status public sector jobs is high and the proportion of blacks in high-status public
sector jobs is low, but these results are not robust. Finally, implications for future theory
building and testing are discussed.
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“It’s unfair to the people who are working hard, paying taxes, educating their
children, and here we are rewarding people who enter the country illegally.”
— Governor Pete Wilson (R-CA), television campaign advertisement
Source: Los Angeles Times, “Wilson Targets Illegal Immigrants,”
September 16, 1994.
“At the heart of California’s racial politics is demographics. Whites will fall below
half of California’s population sometime between 1998 and 2002, and they fear a
commensurate loss of power. The left and the media, in California and elsewhere,
consistently underestimate the depth of this fear, which blows east like a bad Pacific
storm. Whites in California still account for eight out of 10 voters, and their anxiety
intensified after the 1992 Los Angeles riots, when [Governor Pete] Wilson started to
shed the last of his ‘moderate’ Republican label to become the cheerleader of an
electoral rebellion against ‘others.’ Last year, the state led the national movement
against immigration with the passage of the anti-Latino Proposition 187, and now it’s
going after a rmative action.”
— Dale Maharidge, Mother Jones, November/December, 1995.
“The story of SB 1070 is the story of an arrogant, out of control federal government.
The people of Arizona watched for years as our border went unenforced, as our
schools and hospitals became overwhelmed with poor, desperate illegal aliens, and
finally, as violent crime invaded our cities when the Mexican drug cartels took over
the border crossings.”
— Governor Jan Brewer (R-AZ), Scorpions for Breakfast, p. 220.
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending the best. They’re sending people
that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems. They’re bringing
drugs, they’re bringing crime. They’re rapists and some, I assume, are good people,
but I speak to border guards and they’re telling us what we’re getting.”
— Donald Trump, Republican presidential candidate, June 16, 2015
2.1 Introduction
Mass demographic change due to immigration is central to the development of contemporary
American politics. The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19651 led to
1P.L. 89 236; 79 Stat. 911; amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. This is also known
as the Hart-Celler Act of 1965.
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a surge in immigration to the United States. Since then, the foreign-born population in
the United States had rapidly grown from about 9.7 million people (or 5.4% of the U.S.
population) in 1960 to about 41.3 million people (13.1% of the U.S. population) in 2013.2
Alongside increases in the levels in the foreign-born population, the post-1965 period also
bore witness to a drastic shift in the distribution of immigrants’ source countries and, as a
consequence, changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the United States.3 In contrast
to immigration patterns prior to 1920, where nearly 90% of legal immigrants came from
Europe,4 the post-1965 period saw a disproportionate increase in mass legal immigration
from Latin America and Asia. Between 1980 and 1993, for instance, approximately 72% of
all legal immigrants to the United States came from these two regions alone.5
Historical and journalistic accounts of the politics of immigration contend that recent
immigrant inflows sparked white fears about the “invasion” of immigrants and the gradual
takeover of American politics and society by non-whites immigrants, and that Republican
politicians sought to capitalize on these fears for political gain (e.g., Maharidge, 1995). The
potential implications of immigration for democratic politics and policy development are
a primary focus among scholars of immigration politics. How do immigrant inflows alter
the social and political attitudes of Anglo whites toward immigrants and toward ethnic and
racial minorities? How does the arrival of immigrants impact the development of public
policies that a ect immigrants? Does immigration a ect whites’ partisan attachments and
2Gibson and Lennon (1999) and the American Community Survey.
3Changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the United States are not due to immigration alone,
although it is an important factor that generates a multiplier e ect. Immigrants have children in the United
States, return emigration rates to the home country do not outpace the rate of immigration and natural
births among those descended from immigrants, and the rate of natural increase (i.e., births minus deaths)
is higher among ethnic minorities, particularly Hispanics, relative to whites and blacks.
4Between 1901 and 1920, 86% of legal immigrants came from Europe, 6% came from Canada, 4% from
Asia, 3% from Latin America, and 1% from other regions of the world.
5Center for Immigration Studies analysis of data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service sta-
tistical yearbook, http://cis.org/1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration.
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if so, how?
To answer these questions, I estimate the causal e ect of immigration on white political
attitudes and on public policy, using the case of Mexican immigration to the United States.
Historically, Mexico has been the largest sending country of immigrants to the United States
in the post-1965 period, and Mexican immigration has been highly politicized, especially by
Republican politicians across all levels of government. While the case of Mexican immigration
to the United States is commonly considered to be politically important to the development
of contemporary American politics, social scientists have yet to cleanly identify its political
e ects. Using an identification strategy developed by Chalfin (2015) and Chalfin and Levy
(2013), I instrument for Mexican immigration inflows to U.S. states using variation in lagged
fertility rates in Mexican sending states, which a ect the distribution of Mexican emigration
patterns to U.S. destination states, in order to identify the local average treatment e ect
of Mexican immigration on the political attitudes of whites and on public policy in the
U.S. states. This identification strategy overcomes numerous concerns about biases arising
from unobserved heterogeneity that plague existing research on the long-run, aggregate-level
political e ects of immigration. To address the challenge of measuring the political and policy
attitudes of whites in the U.S. states, I employ multilevel regression and poststratification
to estimate subgroup opinion at the subnational level.
Challenging major arguments in the literature that mass immigration from Mexico gener-
ally causes a political backlash and a growing a nity for the Republican Party among whites,
I find that the long-run e ects of Mexican immigration on white political attitudes at the
aggregate level occurred only during the 1980s and not during the 1990s. In the 1980s, Mex-
ican immigration led to increased support for the Republican Party among whites, increased
levels of conservatism among whites, and increased support for greater federal spending on
crime and education among whites. In terms of policy outcomes, Mexican immigration de-
creased states’ average level of per capita spending on health and public welfare and states’
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average level of per pupil spending on public education in the 1980s.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review and situate the
current study within relevant scholarship on the political and policy implications of immigra-
tion. Section 3 presents background on the case of Mexican immigration to the United States
since 1980. Section 4 describes the instrumental variables identification strategy. Section
5 describes the data and measurement strategies used and presents descriptive statistics.
Results are presented in Section 6 and discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Relevant Literature
Immigration from Mexico has been politically contentious in the United States, especially
since the 1980s. Despite its political importance, surprisingly little research has examined
the impact of Mexican immigration on political and policy outcomes. Instead, political
scientists have focused primarily on the political e ects of changing demographics, such as
changes in the ethnoracial population composition or changes in the distribution of nativity
status; the political e ects of perceptions of immigration and immigrants; or the political
e ects of the salience of immigration. This section reviews extant research that broadly
relates immigration to three political outcomes of interest – social and policy attitudes,
partisanship, and policy outcomes – to illustrate why questions about the political e ects of
Mexican immigration are inadequately answered by existing empirical research.
2.2.1 Immigration and Attitudes
Scholarly interest in immigration has spawned two vast lines of research in political science on
immigration-related attitudes, one grounded in political economy and the other grounded in
political psychology.6 The bulk of existing research on the politics of immigration examines
6See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014b) for a comprehensive literature review.
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the determinants of immigration policy attitudes and intergroup attitudes among native-born
populations, and has converged on the view that perceptions and sociotropic evaluations of
immigrants are the key predictors of immigration-related attitudes.
This was not always the case. The political economy literature has long been anchored
by research arguing that perceptions of economic threat from labor market competition
lead to anti-immigrant attitudes among native populations (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001;
Mayda, 2006). However, subsequent work in political science has challenged this argument
on theoretical and empirical grounds. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) point out that the
argument erroneously assumes that native and immigrant labor are perfect substitutes and
that immigration has a negative impact on native wages. Results from economics similarly
dispute these assumptions. Empirical research estimating the impact of immigration on
native wages yield mixed results with some arguing that there are minimal e ects (Altonji
and Card, 1991; Card, 2001; Card and Lewis, 2007; Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth,
2012; Chalfin and Levy, 2013) and others arguing that there are nontrivial impacts on wages
(Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2007; Pugatch and Yang, 2011). Among those making the
case that there are minimal e ects, this is commonly attributed to a lack of substitutability
between native and immigrant labor. Peri and Sparber (2009) formally and empirically
show that immigration leads to occupational sorting by task specialization. Native-born
workers tend to specialize in jobs requiring communication-language tasks, whereas foreign-
born workers tend to specialize in jobs requiring involving manual or physical labor tasks.
This mitigates the degree of wage compression among native-born workers, particularly high-
skilled workers, in the wake of immigration inflows. Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2013) show
a lack of labor substitutability between native workers and immigrant workers in terms of
task complexity. Similarly, Raphael and Smolensky (2009) find limited evidence of labor
substitutability between native workers and immigrant workers.
Empirical research assessing the determinants of individual level attitudes yield findings
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that also cast doubt on the labor market competition thesis. Malhotra, Margalit and Mo
(2013) examine attitudes toward the expansion of H1-B visas for temporary high-skilled
workers and find that less opposition among native-born U.S. workers than among native-
born U.S. workers in the high-tech sector. Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit (2015) inves-
tigate whether U.S. native-born individuals oppose immigrants with comparable skills and
find no evidence to support this claim using evidence from a survey targeting respondents
across 12 selected industries with varying levels of foreign-born workers at baseline.
Instead, the growing consensus in the literature is that individuals’ perceptions and so-
ciotropic evaluations of immigration are highly prognostic of their attitudes toward immi-
grants and immigration-related policies. Empirical research making this argument trace
back to observational studies from the 1990s that show a lack of a link between material
self-interest and immigration attitudes. In a study of immigration attitudes in Southern Cal-
ifornia, Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) find no association between measures of economic
circumstance such as employment and income and immigration attitudes. Using nationally
representative samples from the 1992 and 1994 American National Election Study, Citrin
et al. (1997) find that negative beliefs about the national economy and anti-outgroup a ect
toward Latinos and Asian Americans are highly prognostic of restrictionist policy attitudes,
whereas “pocketbook” or personal economic circumstances are not.
There are competing accounts about whether economic or “cultural”7 sociotropic evalua-
tions matter more (or when one might matter more than the other) in explaining variation in
attitudes. On the one hand, some scholars argue that sociotropic beliefs about the economic
impact of immigration are most relevant. For instance, Dancygier and Donnelly (2013), in
an examination of attitudes across European countries between 2002 and 2009, find that
the interaction between sector-specific immigrant inflows and economic decline is positively
7The term “cultural” is poorly defined in this literature, but is employed here in the broadest sense.
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associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. On the other hand, sociotropic evaluations of the
“cultural” impact of immigration may be critical. In another study on European attitudes
toward immigration, Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012) apply a latent factor model to
data from the 2002 European Social Survey and find that individuals’ concerns about the
composition of their local communities – what they call “compositional amenities” – are
highly prognostic of attitudes toward immigration policy. Studying American attitudes to-
ward immigrants, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014a) use a conjoint analysis to show that
Americans prefer immigrants who are educated in high-status jobs and do not prefer those
who do not work, who do not assimilate, and who lack legal authorization to enter the United
States – and these preferences over immigrant types strikingly hold across levels of educa-
tional attainment, partisanship, labor market status, levels of baseline ethnocentrism, and
other characteristics. The authors infer from these results that Americans use sociotropic
evaluations of immigrants’ compliance with norms when assessing the type of immigrant
they prefer.
Perceptions and sociotropic evaluations of immigrants are central to the formation of
immigration-related attitudes. Yet surprisingly little is understood about whether immigra-
tion itself – the arrival of foreign-born individuals in a given place – has any role to play
in shaping perceptions and attitudes. Understanding the causal e ect of immigration itself
is important given the abundance of claims about the antagonizing e ect of immigration
on natives’ outgroup attitudes. These arguments trace back to theories of group conflict,
which argue that intergroup contact leads to intergroup antagonism arising from either in-
tergroup resource competition (e.g., Key, 1949; Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992) or the activation
of outgroup prejudice (e.g., Taylor, 1998).
Empirical research on immigration e ects relating demographic change to immigration-
or outgroup-related attitudes is sparse. Two notable exceptions exist among recent work.
An observational study by Hopkins (2010) argues that the negative e ect of demographic
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change from immigration on attitudes is conditional on the salience of immigration in the
national rhetoric. He develops a theory, the “politicized places” hypothesis, which argues
that the interaction between local change in the immigrant population and national rhetoric
making immigration salient leads to anti-immigrant attitudes. He finds support for this
hypothesis. Using geocoded survey data from 1992 to 2009 linked to demographic data from
the U.S. Census and measures of national issue salience, his main analysis models attitudes
toward immigrants as a function of changes in the local immigrant population, the national
salience of immigration, their interaction, and a battery of covariates. The coe cient on
the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. Post-estimation calculations
show that among areas with the highest influxes of immigrants (at the 95th percentile),
the predicted probability of pro-immigration views is lower when salience is high (at its
maximum) than when salience is low (at its minimum), but the opposite is true when the
immigrant influx level is at the 75th percentile or lower (Hopkins, 2010, Table 2). However,
a major methodological concern with this study is that the causal e ect of immigration is
not cleanly identified since the design does not address concerns about biases arising from
unobserved heterogeneity. Hopkins (2010) asserts that because “we estimate the change in a
contextual e ect given a sudden shift in salience, ongoing processes of residential selection are
e ectively held constant. Selection biases cannot explain why a context would be correlated
with attitudes at one point in time but not soon after” (p. 49, emphasis in original text). This
argument does not su ciently explain why we should assume that either immigrant in-flows
or changes in salience are exogenous. We should not assume that immigration patterns are
randomly distributed and exogenous, as it is a well established fact that patterns of ethnic in-
migration are partially a function of past ethnic immigration patterns and local conditions.
Similarly we should not assume that changes in the salience of immigration are exogenous
in light of the fact that entrepreneurial political elites strategically seek to manipulate the
media agenda to a ect mass attitudes on specific issues such as immigration.
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In a field experimental study, Enos (2014) simulates demographic change due to immigra-
tion by randomly exposing unknowing Anglo-white subjects living in ethnically homogeneous
communities in the Boston metropolitan area to Hispanics in their daily commuting routines.
He finds that exposure to Hispanics amplifies exclusionary and nativist attitudes toward im-
migrants. The novel research design is impressive since it cleanly identifies the impact of
intergroup contact on immigration- and outgroup-related attitudes. At the same time, ques-
tions remain about the extent to which the treatment adequately captures the real-world
phenomenon of immigration in-flows, whether the quantity of interest in the experiment is in
fact the substantive quantity of interest, and whether these findings replicate and generalize
beyond the study context.
Given the need for a body of credible empirical evidence on the relationship between
demographic change due to immigration and immigration-related attitudes, the first set of
quantities this paper seeks to identify is the impact of immigration inflows on immigration-
related political and social attitudes.
2.2.2 Immigration and Partisanship
A second line of research examines the impact of immigration on partisan identification and
party support by ethnicity and race. Historical accounts detail attempts by Republican
politicians to politicize white fear against non-white immigrants in contemporary American
politics to convert or mobilize whites to align with the Republican Party. A common and
key assumption made in such retrospective accounts is that white fear is primed in part by
the act of encountering “invading” non-white immigrants. Yet this assumption is not well
tested at the aggregate level; little is known about whether and how immigration a ected
the partisan attachment of whites.
This line of inquiry is couched within a broader intellectual tradition of understanding the
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determinants of ethnic bases of support among political parties and shifts in these alignments
(e.g., Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Burnham, 1970; Sundquist, 1973; Horowitz, 1985; Carmines
and Stimson, 1989; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005). In the American context, the literature
on alignments between social groups and party attachments generally argue that these as-
sociations exists and are fairly enduring. With respect to group-centric party identification,
the prevailing view in the literature is that individuals’ party attachments are “sticky” ob-
jects of social identification where individuals are more likely to identify with the political
party that descriptively matches their self-conception (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2004;
Brady and Sniderman, 1985).8 Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2004) argue that “as people
reflect on whether they are Democrats or Republicans (or neither), they call to mind some
mental image, or stereotype, of what these sorts of people are like and square these images
with their own self-conceptions. [...] What di erentiates Democrats and Republicans is how
they think of themselves in relation to ... group stereotypes. Both may associate ‘minorities’
with Democrats and not Republicans, but are ‘minorities’ an aversive or attractive group?
How one orients oneself vis-à-vis certain key social groups has a profound influence on one’s
party identification” (pp. 8, 10). Evidence of the persistence of group-centrism in party
attachments also emerge in work on group-based presidential voting, such as in the analysis
by Erikson, Lancaster and Romero (1989) documenting enduring group di erences in party
choice in the presidential vote between 1952 and 1984.
Mass changes in party loyalties by social group are possible if the social stereotypes
associated with parties and the group-centric behavior of parties change, as was arguably
the case during the New Deal realignment in the 1930s and in the aftermath of the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (e.g., Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2004, pp. 106-108). In
the case of the New Deal realignment, Erikson and Tedin (1981) find evidence that partisan
8An alternative view advanced by Abramowitz (1994) and Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) is that
ideological alignments play a more important role in mass partisan shifts than social identities.
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realignment was due to the conversion of established voters rather than the mobilization of
new voters. This finding is consistent with the claim that individuals’ partisan preferences
shifted conditional on changes in the behavior of party elites, and with common knowledge
that partisan shifts occurred along social lines.9
In the wake of mass immigration to the United States since 1965, both scholars and
pundits have sought to understand whether and how group-based partisan attachments might
change in response to demographic change. If, as many contend, intergroup contact leads
to exclusionary attitudes and one party decides to be supportive of immigrants and ethnic
minorities, would this lead Anglo whites to gradually become more supportive of the other
party? And what portion of this shift, if any, is attributed specifically to immigration versus
other non-immigration forms of demographic change? The empirical literature answering
these questions is sparse.10
In their book-length treatment exploring the bases of white backlash against immigrants,
Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) document correlations between attitudes toward immigration
and attitudes toward the Democratic and Republican Parties at the individual level, as well
as correlations between lagged attitudes toward immigration and future partisan attitudes at
both individual and aggregate levels. Another line of work has focused on group di erences
in response to anti-immigrant ballot initiatives during the 1990s. For example, Bowler,
Nicholson and Segura (2006) assess whether changing partisan issue agendas relating to
immigration and race – in the form of Republican endorsements of Propositions 187, 209,
and 22711 – led to mass partisan shifts by race in California. Analyzing data from the
9Blacks and Jews, for instance, were Republican in the 1920s but became Democratic after the New Deal
realignment.
10This is part because most work in racial and ethnic politics dealing with partisanship and immigration
examines the determinants and development of party identification and partisan preferences among Latino
and Asian Americans immigrants and their o spring (e.g., Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner, 1991; de la Garza,
Garcia and DeSipio, 1992; DeSipio, 1996; Wong, 2000; Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla, 2003; Segura, 2012;
Garcia and de la Garza, 1977).
11California’s Proposition 187 (1994) sought to establish a citizenship screening system and prohibit
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California Field Poll using an interrupted time series design, they argue that among registered
voters, the probability of identifying as a Republican decreased among both Latinos and non-
Hispanic whites after the passage of each ballot initiative.12
Beyond historical and descriptive accounts detailing attitudinal correlates of partisanship
among whites and mass responses to elite e orts to politicize immigration, there is a general
lack of rigorous social scientific scholarship on the impact of immigration on the social bases
of partisan attachments. Thus, to answer a first order question relevant to this line of
inquiry, the second set of quantities this paper seeks to identify is the impact of immigration
on the party attachments – both party identification and party preferences (in terms of the
presidential vote) – of non-Hispanic whites.
2.2.3 Immigration and Policy Outcomes
In addition to restrictionist and antagonistic policy attitudes, immigration inflows could also
trigger anti-immigrant policy outcomes, which include policies that control and constrict
immigration and policies that restrict immigrants’ access to public services provided by the
welfare state.13 This may be due to opposition among non-immigrant voters to a perceived
net “fiscal burden” that immigrants impose on the state, which is then passed onto taxpayers
(e.g., Campbell, Wong and Citrin, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hanson, Scheve and
Slaughter, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009)14 or due to anti-immigrant or anti-outgroup
illegal aliens from using public services such as public education and health care. Proposition 209 (1996) was
a constitutional amendment that would eliminate a rmative action and prohibit public institutions from
discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity, and sex. Proposition 227 (1998) sought to eliminate bilingual
education for students classified as “Limited English Proficient.”
12This finding is disputed by Dyck, Johnson and Wasson (2012), who show that the negative associa-
tion between post-passage periods and Republican party identification for non-Hispanic whites is no longer
statistically significant under an alternative model specification.
13For a historical overview of the politics of immigration-related policies in the United States, see Tichenor
(2002).
14But see Crepaz and Damron (2009), who suggest the causal arrow could move in the other direction and
document a positive association between larger welfare states and lower levels of nativist opposition against
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prejudice more generally that a ects beliefs about which social groups deserve the support
of the welfare state (e.g., Sears, Sidanius and Bobo, 2000; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Gilens,
1999; Kinder and Kam, 2009, Ch. 9).
Few empirical studies directly assess the relationship between immigration and policy
outcomes.15 Hero and Preuhs (2007) leverage cross-sectional variation across states to assess
the association between the non-citizen immigrant population in the state and the degree
to which immigrants are eligible for welfare program receipt in state-specific welfare reform
policies developed after the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). They find no such correlation; the degree to which
immigrants are eligible to receive welfare benefits in post-PRWORA state welfare regimes
is instead predicted by citizen ideology, education, and the existing size of the state-level
welfare state (measured using the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families caseload as a
proxy). Hopkins (2010) uses a case-control strategy to examine the association between
changes in the local immigrant population between 1990 and 2000 and the incidence of
local anti-immigrant ordinances, and estimates that an 8 percentage point increase in the
proportion of immigrants, given a 0% baseline, is associated with a 14.5 percentage point
increase in the probability of considering an anti-immigrant proposal (from about 34% to
65%). This is a striking finding, but one that may be sensitive to the construction of
the comparison group using matching methods, which could potentially introduce bias or
immigrants in a cross-national analysis.
15Other related empirical research examines “context e ects” or aggregate-level correlations assessing
how measures of ethnic or racial composition predict policy outcomes. Writing in the context of California’s
direct democracy process in which policy outcomes are decided at the ballot box, Campbell, Wong and Citrin
(2006) estimate a multilevel model predicting white preferences toward Propositions 187, 209, and 227 as a
function of individual and county-level contextual factors. They found that local ethnic and racial context
was prognostic of white votes only on Proposition 187 (citizenship screening and prohibiting illegal aliens
from using public services). Soss et al. (2001) examine the case of state-level welfare policy development in
response to the passage of PRWORA in 1996, and find that the proportion of blacks and Hispanics on the
welfare rolls in a state is positively correlated with the probability the state adopts stricter welfare reform
policies. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) document a negative association between ethnic fragmentation
and the share of spending on productive public goods in U.S. cities.
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generate nonsensical results (Arceneaux, Gerber and Green, 2010).16
To address the literature’s need for a body of credible research on the impact of immi-
gration on policy outcomes, the third set of quantities this paper identifies are the e ects
of immigration on policy – specifically levels of state spending on social policies such as
education, public welfare, and health.
2.3 Mexican Immigration to the United States since
1980
I focus on the e ects of Mexican immigration to the United States because immigration
from Mexico constitutes a substantively significant share of all immigration to the United
States. Between 1961 and 2000, the sending country with the largest levels of individuals
immigrating to the United States was Mexico.17 Figure 2.1 shows the historical trajectory
of Mexican immigration to the United States over time in terms of the absolute number of
Mexican-born immigrants (solid line) and in terms of the Mexican-born percentage of all
immigrants (dotted line) in the United States. There is a sharp rise in the number and share
of Mexican-born immigrants beginning in the 1970s through the 2000s. I focus in particular
on the period 1980 to 2000, during which the “dosage” of immigration in-flows from Mexico
to the United States is the greatest.
The empirical strategy pursued in this paper involves exploiting cross-sectional varia-
tion in Mexican immigration patterns across U.S. states to identify the e ects of Mexican
immigration on political outcomes at the state level.18 Thus a key concern is whether any
16Hopkins (2010) assesses the robustness of this finding by using a multilevel logistic regression instead
of the logistic regression specified in the main model, but the robustness check is inadequate because it still
relies on the comparison group constructed using the genetic matching algorithm.
17U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1997, p. 15, Chart B)
18Research on immigration e ects in economics typically uses the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
23
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION ON WHITE


























































Number of Mexican−Born Immigrants
Percent Mexican−Born of All Immigrants
Figure 2.1: Mexican Foreign-Born Population in the United States over Time. Source:
Reproduction of figure from Migration Policy Institute analysis of data from IPUMS, the
American Community Survey, and the U.S. Census Bureau (Migration Policy Institute,
2015).
cross-sectional variation in changes exists during this period. Figure 2.2 presents maps show-
ing the Mexican foreign-born population as a share of the total population by state from each
U.S. Decennial Census between 1980 and 2010. These maps show both cross-sectional and
temporal variation in the distribution of Mexican immigration patterns. In 1980, Mexican
as the geographic unit of analysis, primarily because they are interested in explaining variation in aggregate-
level economic outcomes at the labor market level and MSAs are typically used by economists to describe
regional labor markets. I use the state as the geographic unit of analysis for two major reasons. First, the
political and policy outcomes of interest should be measured at the level of a politically-relevant geographic
unit. States have played a major role in the politicization of immigration and are the location of political
and policy conflict relating to immigration, and thus are a sensible choice. It may be the case that political
attitudes are sensitive to changes in labor markets – but one could push back against that by pointing
to a growing body of empirical economic research that argues there are minimal immigration e ects on
native-born labor market outcomes. Second, there are data limitations that make it di cult to conduct this
analysis at the MSA level. The measurement strategy used to estimate dependent variables in this paper
– multilevel regression and poststratification – requires the use of data from polls with comparable survey
questions, enough survey respondents for each MSA, and MSA-level geographic identifiers. Most publicly
available survey data for this period do not have that information.
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Figure 2.2: Percent Mexican Foreign-Born of the Total Population in U.S. States, 1980-
2010. Data are from the United States Decennial Census years in the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS).
foreign-born populations are concentrated primarily in southwestern U.S. states – with the
highest populations in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Lower concentrations
of Mexican-born immigrants also reside in other western states and in Illinois. By 1990, the
share of the Mexican foreign-born population has increased throughout southwestern states
where their presence was already fairly pronounced in 1980. We also observe growth in
the Mexican-born immigrant population across states in the Pacific Northwest, the Moun-
tain West; and the emergence of Mexican-born immigrants in the lower Great Plains, the
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Southeast, and around the New York City metropolitan area. Growth in the Mexican-born
immigrant population continues between 1990 and 2000, and Mexican immigration spreads
to states with previously negligible Mexican immigrant populations in the Midwest, the
South, the Mid-Atlantic region, and the Northeast. The geographic dispersion of Mexican-
born immigrants across states stays relatively similar between 2000 and 2010, with continued
growth in some states as shown by the deeper shading in the 2010 map relative to the 2000
map.
2.4 Identification Strategy
Identifying the causal e ect of demographic change due to immigration in-flows is challenging
because the migration patterns and residential selection choices of immigrants are endogenous
to objective and perceived local economic conditions a ecting employment opportunities
and to the presence of networked co-ethnic immigrants and communities, both of which
may be partially determined by prior political attitudes and policy outcomes. Achieving the
experimental gold standard is infeasible in this case. Developing and randomly assigning
realistic dosages and forms of mass demographic change due to immigration across locales
are seemingly impossible, cost-prohibitive, and arguably unethical endeavours.
As an alternative strategy, I rely on an instrumental variable approach developed by
Chalfin (2015) and Chalfin and Levy (2013) that isolates variation in immigration influxes
due to plausibly exogenous variation in the timing and destination in the migration flows
from areas in the sending country to areas in the destination country. The approach by
Chalfin and Levy (2013) builds o  a long-standing literature in labor economics tracing
back to work by Altonji and Card (1991) that instruments for demographic changes due
to immigration, with the added advantage of addressing endogeneity concerns plaguging
prior instruments. I briefly review prior instrumental variables strategies employed in labor
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economics before introducing the Chalfin (2015) and Chalfin and Levy (2013) instrument,
which is adapted for use in this paper.
Altonji and Card (1991) developed what is known as the “network” instrument for immi-
gration inflows, which has been used widely in applied econometric research on the impact
of immigration on native wages (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001; Card and Lewis, 2007;
Peri and Sparber, 2009). For any given sending country, this approach instruments for the
geographic distribution of contemporaneous immigration inflows across areas in a destination
country using the initial proportion of immigrants across destination areas. This approach
builds on the stylized fact that geographic patterns of ethnic immigration endure over time.19
Immigrants from a sending country are more likely than not to settle in places where eth-
nic enclaves established by prior immigrants from that country settled; hence immigration
patterns are probabalistically “networked.” The initial geographic distribution of immigrant
settlements – and whatever bundle of factors led to that initial distribution – in a prior
period are a force that “pulls” subsequent immigration and therefore serves as a reasonable
predictor of later immigration patterns.
Identifying o  variation in immigration inflows attributed only to the “pull” factors of
initial immigration patterns requires the exclusion restriction to be satisfied: initial immi-
gration patterns cannot be correlated with outcomes and cannot a ect outcomes through an
alternative pathway than through its e ect on contemporaneous immigration inflows. There
are several reasons why the exclusion restriction could be threatened. First, initial immigra-
tion patterns could a ect subsequent political attitudes and outcomes by causing internal
migration patterns via an alternative pathway: political sorting and segregation occurring
in response to immigration inflows. Recent research documents the geographic sorting of the
American electorate along political lines, and partisan relocation is highly correlated with
19See, for example, Bartel (1989)
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factors associated with immigration patterns such as racial composition, income, and popu-
lation density (Cho, Gimpel and Hui, 2013). Descriptive analyses of historical data have also
documented white flight in response to immigrant influxes (e.g., White and Liang, 1998),
generating racial and political segregation reproduced through discriminatory interactions
in housing market transactions and through discriminatory housing policies (e.g., Besbris
et al., 2015; Massey and Denton, 1993; Hillier, 2003). Second, if the factors driving initial
immigration flows to a given destination are serially correlated over time, then contempora-
neous immigration may be driven by a combination of both past and present factors, which
would yield an inconsistent estimate of contemporaneous immigration e ects due to initial
immigration patterns. For example, where immigrants choose to live may be endogenous to
the political conditions in destination locales, which may be serially correlated if political
attitudes and public policies toward immigrants do not change much over time.
To address the endogeneity of the “pull” instrument, Chalfin and Levy (2013) draw on
work by Pugatch and Yang (2011) to develop an alternative instrument that isolates variation
in contemporaneous immigration shocks attributable to variation in “push” factors – that is,
plausibly exogenous variation in factors inducing emigration from the source country. Chalfin
and Levy (2013) argue that a large portion of the plausibly exogenous source of variation
in out-migration from Mexico is a function of the size of lagged birth cohorts that, when
interacted with “historically determined migration networks” to U.S. destinations, isolates
quasi-random variation in Mexican immigration across destination U.S. areas (p. 5).
For the “push” of Mexican fertility shocks to serve as a plausibly exogenous source of
variation in immigration patterns, it is necessary to show that (i) changes in the size of lagged
birth cohorts are associated with emigration rates and that (ii) local Mexican to U.S. migra-
tion utilize the same networks over time and are not a ected by contemporaneous outcomes.
Research in economic demography support these claims specifically in the case of Mexican
emigration to the United States during the time period of interest. Hanson and McIntosh
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(2010) find that a sizable share of Mexican emigration to the United States between 1960 and
2000 is associated with a combination of Mexican fertility shocks a ecting the size of lagged
birth cohorts and the relative size of the Mexican labor supply relative to that in the United
States. Their baseline OLS analysis of the relationship between national birth cohorts and
net migration show that a 10% increase in the relative size of a Mexican birth cohort over
a decade is associated with an 0.3 percentage point increase in the decadal emigration rate
to the U.S.; this estimate of the decadal labor supply elasticity of net migration is twice as
large when using instrumental variable estimates are used to address measurement error or
endogeneity (p. 804, Table 3). Recognizing that there is considerable variation in fertility
shocks across Mexican states due to regional di erences in economic conditions, growth, and
demography (Chiquiar, 2005), Hanson and McIntosh (2010) examine the relationship be-
tween state birth cohorts and net migration and find similar, statistically significant results:
the IV specification finds that a 10% increase in the base size of a Mexican cohort results in a
1.3% increase in decadal emigration (p. 805, Table 4). Finally, Hanson and McIntosh (2010)
relax the assumption that the estimated elasticity is constant across regions of Mexico and
assess whether pre-existing migration networks predict later migration patterns. Consistent
with others, they find evidence supporting this claim: the association between the logged
Mexican-to-US cohort size ratio and the decadal change in net migration rate increases in
the state’s pre-existing migration rate in 1924, and decreases in the distance of a Mexican
state to the location of a critical railroad connecting Mexico to the U.S. that was used to
find and transport Mexican migrant labor to the U.S. (p. 806, Table 5). The plausibility of
a strong first stage is made even more credible by the fact that the timing of the Mexican
baby boom lasted two decades longer than the U.S. baby boom (1940-1980 for Mexico versus
1940-1960 for the U.S.) which led to a change in the ratio of Mexican to U.S. cohorts from
4:1 in 1960 to 2:1 in 1980, an oversupply of Mexican labor relative to U.S. labor, and an
incentive for Mexicans to emigrate due to downward pressure on relative wages (Hatton and
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Williamson, 2005; Hanson and McIntosh, 2010, p. 798).
To compare the networked birth cohorts instrument to the network instrument and to
clearly specify the instrument used in this analysis, I now o er a formal explication of the
instruments as they pertain to the present application before presenting the econometric
specification.20 This section draws heavily on but also adapts and modifies the exposition
provided by Chalfin (2015) and by Chalfin and Levy (2013).
To characterize migration patterns, I first define sending and destination geographic
areas as states in Mexico21 and states in the United States of America, respectively. Let the




Mjt ◊ Pij (2.1)
where i indexes destination U.S. states, j indexes sending Mexican states, t indexes years,
Mjt is the number of immigrants from Mexican state j living in the U.S. in year t, and Pij is
a matrix of conditional probabilities that a migrant goes from Mexican state j to U.S. state
i. The network instrument predicts the number of migrants in a destination state i in year
t as a function of the sum, across all sending states j, of the number of migrants from each
Mexican sending state state j weighted by the probability that they travel to the destination
U.S. state i.
In developing the networked birth cohorts instrument, Chalfin and Levy (2013) make the
assumption that Mjt, the number of people from each Mexican state j who emigrate in year
t, can be decomposed as the product of the available supply of Mexicans eligible to emigrate,
Njt, and the conditional probability „t an individual emigrates to the U.S. in year t. In other
20Whereas Chalfin and Levy (2013) examine immigration between Mexican states and U.S. cities/MSAs,
I am examining immigration between Mexican states and U.S. states.
21By Mexican “state,” I am referring to one of the 32 Mexican federal entities (entidades federativas),
which includes 31 states and the Federal District.
30
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION ON WHITE
ATTITUDES AND ON PUBLIC POLICY IN THE U.S. STATES, 1980-2000
words, we can rewrite Mjt = Njt ◊„t. But because Njt and „t are unknown, it is necessary to
proxy for these quantities. Chalfin and Levy (2013) proxy for Njt using state-year births Bjt
(which they call “migration-eligible” births) and assert that the conditional probability of
emigration „t should either be proxied for such that it is not a function of contemporaneous
factors in destination states or excluded as it does not contribute to the plausibly exogenous
portion of variation in immigration inflows. This is potentially problematic since the „t term
is endogenous and asserting its non-existence is arguably unsound. In the present analysis,
I proxy the entire term Njt ◊ „t with Bjt, and future analyses should attempt to model
„t explicitly. Substituting into (2.1) and excluding „t following Chalfin (2015) we get the








Pijt ◊ Bjt (2.2)
which is the predicted number of Mexican immigrants to U.S. state i in year t modeled as
a function of the sum, across all possible sending states j, of the migrant-eligible births at
time t from sending state j weighted by the probability of emigrating to destination state i
in the U.S.
In Chalfin (2015) and Chalfin and Levy (2013), migration-eligible births and the lag were
defined such that a person was eligible to migrate from Mexico to the United States if they
were 18 years old at time t. In other words, at time t a person in Mexico would need to
have been born at least 17 years prior to t in order to be considered part of the potential
emigration out of Mexico and to the United States at time t. Defining the lag in this way is
theoretically motivated by the fact that economists are primarily interested in immigration
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in-flows limited to working age immigrants that a ect the composition of the labor market.22
For the present analysis, I care about immigration in general and not immigration among the
civilian labor force population.23 To define the appropriate lag, I use data from the Mexican
Migration Project (MMP) person-level file to examine the empirical distribution of ages at
which Mexican-born migrants report their first migration from Mexico to the United States.
Figure 2.3 presents this distribution. This histogram shows that most Mexican migrants to
Age of first migration from Mexico to the United States
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Figure 2.3: Age of first migration from Mexico to the United States. Data are from the
Mexican Migration Project’s person-level file.
the United States are relatively young. The mean age at which Mexican-born individuals
first migrate to the United States is 22.85, the median age is 21, and the standard deviation
is 9.13. The age of first migration at the 5th percentile is 11 and the age of first migration
at the 95th percentile is 40. Strikingly, the distribution shows that omitting Mexican births
occurring less than 17 years prior to time t would exclude about the bottom 20 percent of
22It is nonetheless odd to think that immigrant workers must be at least 18 to be in the workforce, given
that the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics begins to count individuals as young as 16 as part of the civilian
labor force, and in reality migrant workers are very likely to be younger than 16.
23In the appendix to the paper, I present supplementary analyses assessing the sensitivity of results to
the alternative measure used by economists.
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the data since the 20th percentile age of first migration is 17. I therefore define the window
of “migrant-eligible births” as births occurring between 1 and 40 years prior to time t, such
that those who are considered eligible to migrate to the U.S. would be between the 1st and
95th percentiles of migration age.
With this operationalization of the lag in birth cohorts defined, we can write the net-











In (2.3) we see that the decadal change in the Mexican foreign-born population for a U.S.
state i is a function of the sum of Mexican migrant-eligible lagged births across Mexican states
from the last 40 years weighted by the probability a migrant from each sending Mexican state
j goes to the destination U.S. state of interest i.
Rewriting the first term on the right hand side of (2.3) scaled by the start-of-decade total








, I specify a stylized set of estimating
equations where the main model specification is:
 Zit = –0 + –1Zúit + –kXit + flt + Áit (2.4)
 Yit = —0 + —1 Zit + —kXit + “t + ‹it (2.5)
where (2.4) is the first stage regression and (2.5) is the second stage regression,  Zit is the
decadal change in the Mexican foreign-born population in a U.S. state, Zúit is the networked
birth cohorts instrument,  Yit is the decadal change in the political outcome of interest,
Xit is a set of time-varying covariates that includes the start-of-decade foreign-born share of
the state population and the start-of-decade unemployment rate, flt and “t are decade fixed
e ects for the stacked first di erence specifications, and Áit and ‹it are error terms.
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I estimate these equations using two-stage least squares. Models are unweighted because
the present analysis is an aggregate-level analysis where state polities are the units of anal-
ysis.24 Robust standard errors are clustered at the state and census division levels. The
main coe cient of interest is the IV estimate of —1, interpreted as the estimated change in
the outcome variable associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the Mexican foreign-
born population in a U.S. state due to lagged Mexican fertility shocks a ecting Mexican
emigration to the United States.
2.5 Data and Measures
I assemble data from several sources to create the measures used in the analysis.
2.5.1 Networked Birth Cohort Instrument
First, to construct the networked birth cohort instrument, I follow Chalfin (2015) and collect
natality data on the number of live births in Mexican states for each year between 1921 and
2012. These data are from the Anuarios estadísticos de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
which are annual yearbooks published by the Mexican government’s Instituto Nacional de
Estadística y Geografía.25 Figure 2.4 graphs the number of recorded live births between
1890 and 2010, and shows that during the period of interest (roughly 1940 to 1999, there is
considerable temporal and cross-sectional variation in fertility shocks in the Mexican states.
To calculate the probability an individual from a Mexican sending state migrates to a
given U.S. destination state, I use data on the migration patterns of respondents in the Mex-
24In contrast, similar applications in economic research weight state-level observations by the start-of-
decade state share of the national population because their underlying theoretical model concerns the e ects
of immigration on individual level outcome variables.
25Data for more recent years are available in a machine-readable format, but data prior to the 1990s are
only available in scanned PDF copies of the yearbooks.
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AGUASCALIENTES BAJA CALIFORNIA BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR CAMPECHE CHIAPAS CHIHUAHUA COAHUILA COLIMA
DISTRITO FEDERAL DURANGO GUANAJUATO GUERRERO HIDALGO JALISCO MEXICO MICHOACAN
MORELOS NAYARIT NUEVO LEON OAXACA PUEBLA QUERETARO QUINTANA ROO SAN LUIS POTOSI
















































































































Figure 2.4: Number of recorded live births by Mexican state, 1890-2010. Data are from the
Anuarios estadísticos de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos published by the Instituto Nacional
de Estadística y Geografía.
ican Migration Project (MMP) person-level survey file. I use information about respondents’
first migration from Mexico to the United States. For a given decade, I calculate, by Mexican
state j, the proportion of migrants originating from that state who travel to each U.S. state
k in their first migration to the United States if it occurs between 1 and 40 years prior to
the start of the decade (e.g., 1940 to 1979 for the decade starting in 1980). Let pjk denote
this proportion. For each Mexican sending state j, the sum of these proportions qk pk|j = 1.
I treat these proportions as fixed quantities describing the probability an individual from a
Mexican sending state travels to a U.S. destination state over the 63-year period prior to the
start of a decade. Figure 2.5 shows a heat map of the conditional probabilities of migrating
to U.S. destination states by Mexican sending state in 1980, which is operationalized as
the self-reported migration patterns among Mexican-born migrants who reported their first
Mexico-to-U.S. emigration occurring between 1940 and 1979 and who reported their home
state in Mexico and destination state in the US. Similar heat maps for the decades starting
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Figure 2.5: Conditional Probabilities of Migrating to U.S. Destination States by Mexican
Sending State, 1980.
networked between sending Mexican states and destination U.S. states. While California and
Texas are common destination states for individuals emigrating from most Mexican states,
we also observe variation in the distribution of destination states in the migration patterns
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of people by sending state. Almost all Mexican states have some proportion of emigrants
moving to a range of destination states other than California, Texas, and other states the
West and Southwest. There are also strong migration networks between certain Mexican-US
state dyads: for instance, most of the emigrants originating from Puebla go to New York, and
all of the emigrants originating from Quintana Roo go to California. As shown in Appendix
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3, similar patterns exist across the decades beginning in 1980, 1990,
and 2000.
Lastly, data on start-of-decade state population counts used to scale the networked birth
cohorts instrument are from the U.S. Decennial Censuses.
2.5.2 Changes in the Mexican Foreign-Born Population
Next, to calculate changes in the Mexican foreign-born population by state, I use data
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2010). I first calculate the
proportion of each state’s population who are born in Mexico in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010,
and then calculate the decadal change in the Mexican foreign-born population as percentage
point di erences.
2.5.3 Changes in State-Level Partisanship and Mass Attitudes
among Whites
The analysis requires state-level measures of social and political attitudes as outcome vari-
ables among whites. To obtain these measures, I estimate white opinion at the state level
in decennial census years using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP), before
first di erencing the values to create measures of decadal change used in the econometric
specification.
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2.5.3.1 Multilevel Regression and Poststratification
The decision to use MRP as a measurement strategy stems from its utility for estimating
relative variation in any quantity (such as opinion) at subnational levels among small demo-
graphic subgroups using relatively sparse data. Historically, measures of subnational opinion,
much less subnational opinion by population subgroup, have been di cult to come by since
surveys have long been designed to obtain nationally representative opinion estimates. The
earliest attempts to address this measurement challenge given the limits of available data
involved simulating subnational opinion as a function of states’ demographic characteristics
(Pool, Abelson and Popkin, 1965), but this approach failed to account for geographic vari-
ation across states that exists even after accounting for demographic sources of variation in
opinion (Erikson, Wright and McIver, 1993; Seidman, 1975; Weber et al., 1972). To address
this concern, Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) developed an alternative approach that
simply disaggregates the data by state. But a major drawback of the disaggregation method
especially relevant to analyses of temporal variation, such as the present analysis, is that it
requires pooling data across numerous (e.g., 10-25) years in order to have a su cient sample
size within state cells. To address this concern, Gelman and Little (1997) and Park, Gelman
and Bafumi (2004) developed a method known as multilevel regression and poststratifica-
tion (MRP) that estimates individual level opinion as a function of demographic predictors
and geographic predictors using a hierarchical model, then poststratifies predicted opinion
using population data to develop opinion estimates at subnational geographic levels.26 MRP
has since been applied in political science to estimate subnational measures of public opin-
ion in order to understand the determinants of policy responsiveness and congruence (Lax
and Phillips, 2009a,b, 2012). The method has been also been extended to estimate opin-
ion among very small population subgroups at subnational levels; relative variation in the
26MRP is a particular application of poststratification, which has long been used by applied statisticians
and survey researchers for small area or small-cell parameter estimation.
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estimated measure are then used in correlational analyses (Ghitza and Gelman, 2013; Gel-
man, Lee and Ghitza, 2010; Krimmel, Lax and Phillips, 2015, forthcoming; Tausanovitch
and Warshaw, 2013, 2014).
2.5.3.2 Data for MRP
Implementing MRP requires three sets of data: (i) individual level survey data that includes
measures of opinion, demographic predictors, and a geographic identifier (in this case, state),
(ii) state level predictors that can be linked to individual respondents in the poll data using
the geographic identifier, and (iii) population data from the census that can be used to
post-stratify predicted values (or probabilities) to the state-group level.
In order to obtain comparable measures of political and policy opinion over the decades
of interest, I use the American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File (ANES CDF)
time series.27 Specifically, I construct the following response variables from ANES survey
items in order to estimate state-level outcome variables with MRP:
Partisanship. There three classes of variables used to measure an individual’s partisan-
ship. First, I use respondents’ self-reported party identification on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1=Strong Democrat to 7=Strong Republican. Second, I use respondents’ rating of the
Democratic Party and the Republican Party on a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 to 97,
with values between 97 and 100 top-coded at 97. Third, I construct binary indicators for
whether the respondent prefers the Democratic or Republican party presidential candidate
in presidential election years. These measures of party preferences for the presidential vote
are coded only for respondents who are self-reported voters in that presidential election and
are coded as missing for respondents who are self-reported non-voters.
Ideology. To measure ideological self-identification, I use the ANES survey items that
27Appendix A.2 lists details about the original variables from the ANES CDF, how they are originally
coded, and how they are recoded for the present analysis.
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asks respondents to place themselves on a 7-point liberal to conservative scale, which ranges
from 1=Extremely liberal to 7=Extremely conservative.
Political and Policy Attitudes. I measure several political and policy attitudes that
may a ected by immigration.
First, I use the ANES survey item asking respondents about whether they think the level
of immigration to the United States should increase or decrease. Responses are on a 5-point
scale where 1=decrease a lot and 5=increase a lot.28
Second, I use the survey items asking respondents about their self-placement on three
di erent 7-point issue scales about the size and role of government. All three variables are
coded such that higher values mean increased support for greater government involvement.
The first is a scale measuring attitudes about the appropriate level of government services
and spending and asks respondents whether government should provide fewer services and
decrease spending (1) or increase services and spending (7). The second is a scale measuring
attitudes toward government’s role in guaranteeing jobs and income, and asks respondents
whether government should let each person get ahead on his own (1) or whether government
should see to a good standard of living (7). The third is a scale measuring attitudes toward
government versus private health insurance, and asks respondents whether they think med-
ical expenses should be paid using private health insurance only (1) or using government
health insurance (7).
Third, I measure respondents’ attitudes toward the level of federal spending in three
public policy domains: food stamps, public schools, and dealing with crime. Responses are
measured on a 3-point scale, where 3=spending should be increased, 2=spending should
remain at the same level, 1=spending should be decreased or eliminated.29
28This reverses the direction of the variable’s original coding, which is 1=increase a lot and 5=decrease a
lot.
29This reverses the direction of the variable’s original coding.
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Finally, I am also interested in respondents’ attitudes toward social inequalities (or, more
precisely, equality of opportunity). I create a summary index measure of the degree to which
a respondent is conservative in their views toward this issue. This index combines five survey
items from the ANES CDF that ask whether respondents believe that society should ensure
an equal opportunity to succeed, whether respondents believe that it is a big problem that
not everyone has an equal chance in life, whether respondents believe that it is not a big
problem that some have more chances in life, whether respondents think that society should
worry about how equal people are, and whether respondents believe that the U.S. would have
fewer problems if everyone were treated equally. Responses from the original survey items
are on a 5-point scale and are recoded so that more conservative views consistently take
higher values across items. For each respondent, I calculate the mean response to create the
index measure, which ranges from 1=most liberal to 5=most conservative in views toward
equality of opportunity.
Social Attitudes. I also measure social attitudes toward ethnic and racial groups using
respondents’ feeling thermometer scores toward Chicanos/Hispanics, Blacks, Whites, Asian
Americans, and illegal aliens. Like the feeling thermometers toward the political parties,
respondents can place themselves on a 0-97 scale. Feeling thermometer data for illegal aliens
and Asian Americans are only available from 1988 and 1992 onward, respectively; the other
feeling thermometer data are available from 1980 onward. With respect to white attitudes
toward other ethnic and racial minority outgroups, we are most interested in how whites
evaluate other minority groups relative to their in-group evaluation. Thus I create three
variables defined as the di erence between the feeling thermometer rating for each minority
group and the rating for whites: black-white, Hispanic-white, and Asian-white.
The ANES CDF also provides the following individual-level demographic covariates used
as predictors in the hierarchical model as part of MRP’s first stage: age, sex, race and
ethnicity, and educational attainment. These variables are recoded into a 4-level age category
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variable,30 a 2-level indicator for whether the respondent is female,31 a 5-level factor variable
classifying a respondent’s race or ethnicity,32 and a 5-level variable classifying a respondent’s
highest level of educational attainment.33
I use two state-level predictors in hierarchical model for the first stage of MRP: the
percentage of evangelicals and Mormons in a state in each decennial census year and the
Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote from the prior presidential election.
Data on the religious population share by state are from the 1980 and 1990 Churches and
Church Membership in the United States (CCMUS) surveys and from the 2000 and 2010
Religious Congregations and Membership Study (RCMS) surveys, and the proportion evan-
gelical or Mormon is calculated by summing the number of adherents in evangelical Christian
denominations and in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and dividing the sum
by the total state population in each census year.34 Data on the Democratic vote share
are from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections35 and verified using data from the
Federal Election Commission.
I create a poststratification file for each decennial census year using person-level records
from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2010). Each record in the poststratification file corresponds to
a cell defined as a unique combination of values for an individual’s state of residence, age
30Values are 1=18-29, 2=30-44, 3=45-64, 4=65+.
31Values are 0=not female, 1=female.
32Values are white, black, Hispanic, Asian, or other; factor levels that are not Hispanic are by definition
non-Hispanic.
33Values are less than high school, high school diploma or equivalent, some college, four-year college
degree, and any post-graduate education
34Whereas the 2000 and 2010 data provide state-level counts of the number of evangelical Christians used
for the numerator, the 1980 and 1990 data provide church membership counts by denomination but there
is no information in the file about whether a Christian denomination is classified as evangelical. To identify
evangelical Christian denominations in the 1980 and 1990 data, I use a list of denominations identified as
evangelical in 2000 by the RCMS and code a denomination as evangelical if the name of the denomination
is in the 2000 list, or if the name of the denomination includes the word “evangelical” or “Pentecostal.”
35http://uselectionatlas.org/
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category, sex, level of educational attainment, and race or ethnicity, where these demographic
variables take values identical to the coding in the cleaned ANES data file.36 I calculate the
population count in each cell by aggregating person weights from the IPUMS file by cell. I
then calculate the cell-specific post-stratification weight by calculating the total population
count for each state-by-ethnicity group and dividing each cell size by the corresponding
total, such that poststratification weights sum to 1 for each state-by-ethnicity group in a
given census year.
2.5.3.3 Implementation
To implement MRP in each census year, I estimate the following multilevel logistic model
for response variables that are dichotomous in the ANES file37
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36Other applications of MRP with deep interactions have used income level as a predictor (e.g., Ghitza
and Gelman, 2013). While an important predictor of political attitudes and preferences, income cannot be
used in this application since its coding cannot be standardized across the ANES (which uses percentile
ranges) and the IPUMS file (which uses absolute ranges), which is a necessary step for poststratification.
37In (2.6) and (2.7) only, the subscript i indexes individuals in the poll data.
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or the following multilevel linear model for response variables that are not dichotomous the
first line in (2.6) is instead
Y
i
= —0 + –age
a[i] + –
edu










h[i] + Êi (2.7)
where age.edu and eth.fem allow interactions between age and education and between
ethnicity and sex, respectively, and where the region variable is a 8-level factor variable de-
scribing the census region division in which a state is contained.38 Since MRP assumes that
respondents in the poll data are fairly representative of each type by cell, MRP performs best
when applied to data from a full probability sample. The ANES relies on a multistage clus-
ter sampling procedure that samples large regions, successively samples sub-regions nested
within these larger regions, and finally selects households nested within sub-regions and in-
dividuals within households. This over-represents individuals residing in selected clusters,
and could potentially lead to inaccurate estimates (Stollwerk, 2012).39 Investigating this
concern, a working paper by Stollwerk (2012) recommends including group-level predictors
and pooling data over several polls to improve the validity of MRP estimates when using
cluster-sampled polls. With respect to the latter proposal, I pool ANES data across several
waves around the year-of-interest to construct start-of-decade and end-of-decade estimates.40
I then estimate predicted probabilities that the response variable Yi = 1 for binary re-
sponse variables (or predicted values for non-binary response variables) for each demographic-
geographic combination, poststratify the predicted values by cell-specific poststratification
38Census region divisions are New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT); Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA);
East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI); West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD); South
Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SD, VA, WV); East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK,
TX); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY); and Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA).
39Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) also cite this concern when avoiding polls with cluster sampling in
their application of disaggregation, preferring the CBS/New York Times poll to the ANES.
40The 1980 estimates pool data from the 1980 to 1984 ANES waves. The 1990 estimates pool data from
the 1988 to 1992 ANES waves. The 2000 estimates pool data from the 2000 to 2004 ANES waves. The 2010
estimates pool data from the 2008 to 2012 ANES waves.
44
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION ON WHITE
ATTITUDES AND ON PUBLIC POLICY IN THE U.S. STATES, 1980-2000
weights, and sum the weighted predictions across cells to the state-ethnicity level to estimate
the mean response for each ethnic group by state. A full set of MRP estimates are presented
in Appendix A.3. A cursory glance at the MRP estimates suggest that there is fairly high
face validity in terms of their general accuracy and in terms of how they capture relative
variation in each construct. In each census year, states that are commonly known as more
liberal have higher estimates of Democratic support among whites than states commonly
considered more conservative, and vice versa for the state-subgroup estimates of Republican
support. Consistent with the reality that African Americans aligned with the Democratic
Party for much of the 20th century, estimates of black support for the Democratic Party
are consistently high across states and years. Assessing the estimates of mean subgroup
social attitudes, estimates of the mean feeling thermometer rating of a given ethnic group
is highest for the co-ethnic group relative to non co-ethnic groups, which is consistent with
social psychological research on in-group favoritism.
2.5.4 Changes in State-Level Social Policy Expenditures
To measure changes in state-level social policy expenditure levels as a policy outcome, I use
data from the Data Base on Historical Finances of State Governments published by the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Governments Division. I focus on three forms of social policy spending at
the state level: per capita total expenditures on public health, per capita total expenditure
on health and hospitals, and per pupil total expenditures on K-12 schools. All dollar amounts
are in 2012-2013 constant dollars.
2.5.5 Time-Varying Start-of-Decade Covariates
I include two time-varying start-of-decade covariates: the start-of-decade state unemploy-
ment rate, since sociotropic economic conditions partially rooted in objective economic con-
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ditions could a ect political attitudes and objective economic conditions could a ect policy
outcomes; and the start-of-decade foreign born population in a state. The state unem-
ployment rate is calculated as the number unemployed as a percentage of the civilian non-
institutional labor force. These data are from the annual average series of the employment
status of the civilian noninstitutional population, published by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics.41 The state-level measures of the foreign-born share of the total population are from
the U.S. Decennial Censuses.
2.6 The Impact of Mexican Immigration on the Polit-
ical Attitudes of Whites and on Public Policy
The results from the empirical analysis are presented in two parts. First, I present the first
stage results to establish that the correlation between the networked lagged birth cohorts
instrument and the decadal change in the Mexican foreign-born population in a state is
strong over the period 1980 to 2000. Having established this, I then turn to the 2SLS
estimates of the e ect of Mexican immigration due to Mexican fertility shocks on changes in
white political attitudes and on changes in public policy.
2.6.1 First Stage Estimates
Table 2.1 presents the estimates of the association between the networked lagged birth co-
horts instrument and the first di erenced change in the proportion of the Mexican foreign-
born population in a state. Columns (1) to (3) show estimates for the unweighted first stage
model without controls by decade (1980-90, 1990-2000, 2000-10) and column (4) shows esti-
mates for the unweighted first stage model for the stacked first di erence model pooling data
41http://www.bls.gov/lau/staadata.txt
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Table 2.1: First stage estimates
DV: % pt. change in Mexican foreign-born pop.
Without controls With controls
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 1980-2000 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 1980-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Networked birth 0.020úúú 0.029úúú 0.0003 0.025úúú 0.019úúú 0.027úúú 0.0003 0.022úúú
cohorts instrument (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 51 51 51 102 51 51 51 102
R2 0.861 0.490 0.001 0.608 0.880 0.652 0.276 0.663
Adjusted R2 0.858 0.479 ≠0.020 0.600 0.847 0.553 0.072 0.617
Residual Std. Error 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.006
F Statistic 303.862úúú 47.051úúú 0.033 76.875úúú 26.121úúú 6.630úúú 1.351 14.559úúú
Notes: Cells contain estimates from first di erence models regressing the change in a U.S. state’s share of the Mexican foreign-
born population on the change in the predicted share of foreign-born Mexicans in a U.S. state, which is defined as the number
of migration-eligible lagged births in network-linked Mexican states scaled by the start-of-decade U.S. state population. Results
from models estimated by decade are shown in columns (1) to (3) without controls and in columns (5) to (7) with controls. Results
from a stacked first di erence model with a decade fixed e ect pooling data from 1980 to 2000 are shown in column (4) without
other controls and in column (8) with controls. The control variables include census region divison fixed e ects, the start-of-
decade unemployment rate, and the start-of-decade percent foreign born of the total state population. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses.
úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01.
across 1980-2000 with decade fixed e ect. The pooled model excludes 2000-2010 since the
first stage relationship is nonexistent during this decade. Columns (5) through (8) are the
same as columns (1) through (4) but also control for the start-of-decade state unemployment
rate and the start-of-decade foreign-born share of the total state population. These relation-
ships are also shown graphically in Figure 2.6, which presents bivariate scatterplots of the
first stage relationship by decade. As the table and figures show, the first stage relationship
is extremely strong in 1980-1990 and in 1990-2000. A one-unit increase in the networked
lagged births instrument is associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the state’s Mex-
ican foreign-born population in 1980-1990, and with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the
state’s Mexican foreign-born population in 1990-2000. Both of these correlations are very
precisely estimated (p < 0.01). However, the networked birth cohorts instrument is a weak
instrument during 2000-2010, as evidenced by the fact that there is virtually no association
between the birth cohorts instrument and the change in the Mexican foreign-born population
in 2000-2010. These patterns hold even after controls are added. The weakness of the first
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(c) 2000 to 2010













Migration−eligible Mexican births scaled by

































































































(d) 1980 to 2000, pooled
Figure 2.6: First stage relationships, by decade and for the stacked first di erence model
pooling 1980-2000. Fitted lines in blue are based on unweighted first stage models without
controls.
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stage relationship in 2000-2010 is likely due to a drastic attenuation in the level of change
in the Mexican foreign-born population across states during this decade. The decrease in
Mexican immigration levels during this period has been linked to multiple factors including a
decline in work opportunities in the U.S. during the recession in the late 2000s and improving
economic conditions in Mexico, which yields less of an economic incentive to immigrate to
the U.S.; more stringent border enforcement and deportation e orts by the United States;
and increased violence in northern Mexican states containing key migration routes (Passel,
Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012; Nájar, 2012).
2.6.2 E ects on Partisanship and Ideology among Whites
Table 2.2 presents the 2SLS estimates of the e ect of Mexican immigration due to lagged
Mexican fertility shocks on the mean partisanship and ideology among whites at the state
level. These estimates are from the main 2SLS model specification shown in (2.4) and
(2.5) that includes the full set of specified covariates. The top two panels of the table
present estimates from decade-specific first di erence models for 1980-1990 and 1990-2000,
respectively; the bottom panel presents estimates from the stacked first di erence model.
Did Mexican immigration between 1980 and 2000 lead to mass shifts in partisanship
among whites, as some scholars have suggested? Mexican immigration led to statistically
significant increases in Republican Party identification, Republican presidential candidate
support, and increases in conservatism among whites at the state level, but only in the
1980s. In contrast, we observe no impact of Mexican immigration on white partisanship
or ideology during the 1990s. In the stacked first di erence model, we similarly observe
no statistically significant impact of Mexican immigration on white partisanship, but there
Mexican immigration does lead to a 1.85 point increase in the mean level of conservatism
among whites at the state level; this is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.2: 2SLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Partisanship and Ideology among Whites
PID Pres. Pref. Therm. Ideology
D R D R D R Lib-Cons
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠2.513 2.699úúú ≠1.901ú 2.473úúú 0.290 53.109 4.891úú
(1.527) (0.989) (1.105) (0.364) (52.615) (75.541) (2.081)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.035 0.059 0.032 0.071 0.047 ≠0.005
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠0.242 ≠0.706 ≠0.265 ≠0.156 ≠39.234 ≠61.900 0.007
(0.548) (0.798) (0.337) (0.648) (26.380) (57.920) (1.602)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.100 0.267 0.142 0.331 0.206 ≠0.043
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠1.084 0.694 ≠0.903 0.909 ≠17.375 ≠12.987 1.852ú
(0.771) (0.724) (0.698) (0.576) (21.940) (45.095) (1.016)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.118 0.124 0.642 0.057 0.122 0.394
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least squares models. Models are
unweighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state unemployment rate, the start-of-decade
foreign-born population share, and a decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in paren-
theses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
2.6.3 E ects on Social Attitudes and Attitudes about Immigration
Levels among Whites
I now turn to the impact of Mexican immigration between 1980 and 2000 on changes in
whites’ social attitudes toward di erent ethnic and racial groups and toward immigrants
during this period. How did mass Mexican immigration to the U.S. due to Mexican fertility
shocks impact the attitudes of whites toward ethnic outgroups, toward illegal aliens, and
toward the appropriate level of immigration to the U.S.?
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Table 2.3: 2SLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in




  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠4.965 ≠15.053
(22.430) (58.452)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.090
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 19.586 9.161
(47.821) (39.312)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.108
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 9.036 ≠4.611
(19.462) (17.005)
Observations 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.446
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted
two-stage least squares models. Models are unweighted.
Covariates include the start-of-decade state unemployment
rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and
a decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region
and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
Table 2.3 shows the impact of Mexican immigration on the state-level mean social at-
titudes of whites toward blacks and toward Hispanics relative to whites, measured as the
di erence between whites’ feeling thermometer rating of an ethnoracial minority group and
their ratings of whites. There is no statistically significant impact of Mexican immigration on
changes in these attitudinal outcomes. In the 1980s, Mexican immigration decreases whites’
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mean rating of blacks relative to whites by 4.97 points and decreases whites’ mean rating of
Hispanics relative to whites by 15.05 points, but these are both imprecisely estimated. In
contrast, in the 1990s, Mexican immigration increases whites’ mean rating of blacks and His-
panics relative to whites by 19.59 and 9.16 points, respectively, but these are also imprecisely
estimated.
Table 2.4: 2SLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Social Attitudes toward Asian Americans, Illegal Immigrants, and Immigration Levels among
Whites
Di . in Therm. Therm. Rating Opinion: Increase
Asian-White Illegal Aliens Immigration Level
1990-2000, Census Region Fixed E ects
  Mexican Foreign-Born 31.788 42.685ú 2.909
(42.653) (25.363) (2.063)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.034 ≠0.066 0.048
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least squares
models. Models are unweighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state un-
employment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a decade
fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
Table 2.4 presents the 2SLS estimates of the impact of Mexican immigration on changes
in whites’ social attitudes toward illegal aliens and toward Asian Americans and on changes
in whites’ mean opinion on whether immigration levels should change. These models are
only estimated for the 1990-2000 decade, since these survey items were not asked in prior
waves of the ANES to construct the first di erence outcome measures for the 1980-1990
decade. Mexican immigration seems to increase whites’ feeling thermometer ratings of Asian
Americans relative to whites by 31.8 points, whites’ thermometer ratings of illegal aliens by
42.7 points, and whites’ opinion about the appropriate level of immigration on a 5-point scale
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by 2.9 points. Only the impact on whites’ thermometer ratings of illegal aliens is precisely
estimated at the 10% level.
2.6.4 E ects on Attitudes toward the Size and Role of Govern-
ment among Whites
Next, I examine the estimated impact of mass Mexican immigration from fertility shocks on
the mean change in whites’ policy attitudes toward the size and role of government in Table
2.5. The outcomes examined are the decadal change in whites’ mean opinion on the level of
Table 2.5: 2SLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Policy Attitudes toward the Role and Size of Government among Whites
Increase Fed. Spending Support Gov. Role Conservatism
Crime Education Food Stamps Health Ins. Spending Guarantee Jobs toward Inequality
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born 2.425úú 2.305úúú ≠1.562 3.003 ≠1.901 0.546 0.528
(0.986) (0.399) (1.329) (5.112) (1.836) (3.454) (0.820)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.092 ≠0.007 ≠0.028 0.092 ≠0.026 0.035 0.108
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠0.848 ≠0.187 0.696 4.873 0.007 0.077 ≠0.892
(0.976) (0.753) (0.994) (3.378) (1.364) (2.683) (0.815)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 ≠0.001 0.015 0.003 0.085 0.044 ≠0.050 0.344
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 0.417 0.759úú ≠0.282 3.491ú ≠0.764 0.350 ≠0.254
(0.394) (0.355) (0.648) (1.970) (0.856) (1.740) (0.605)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.289 ≠0.025 0.521 ≠0.018 0.007 0.509
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least squares models. Models are unweighted. Covariates
include the start-of-decade state unemployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a decade fixed
e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are
shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
federal spending on crime, public education, and food stamps (Columns 1-3, respectively)
measured on a 3-point scale where higher values mean preferences for increased spending; the
decadal change in whites’ mean self-placement on three issue scales on the size of government
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in providing health insurance, in spending and services, and in guaranteeing jobs, where
higher values mean support for a larger government role; and the decadal change in whites’
mean level of conservatism in their views toward inequalities in opportunity, measured using
an index score ranging from 1 to 5 where 5 means most conservative.
In the 1980s, Mexican immigration led to an increase in support for more federal spending
to deal with crime by 2.4 points, an increase in support for more federal spending on public
education by 2.3 points, and a decrease in support for federal spending on food stamps by 1.56
points. The estimated impacts of Mexican immigration on federal spending levels on crime
and education are statistically significant, whereas the impact on white preferences for federal
spending on food stamps is imprecisely estimated. During the 1980s, we also observe no
statistically significant impact of Mexican immigration on whites’ attitudes toward the role
of government in providing health insurance, toward the role of government in guaranteeing
jobs and income, and toward the level of government spending and services generally. In
the 1990s, there are no statistically significant impacts of Mexican immigration any of these
policy attitudes among whites.
2.6.5 E ects on Public Policy
Lastly, did Mexican immigration impact policy outcomes? Table 2.6 presents the 2SLS
estimates of the e ect of a one percentage point increase in Mexican immigration due to
Mexican fertility shocks on the decadal change in state-level per capita spending on public
welfare, the change in state-level per capita spending on health and hospitals, and the change
in state-level per pupil public education spending. All dollar amounts are expressed in 2012-
2013 constant U.S. dollars.
During the 1980s, a one percentage point increase in Mexican immigration decreases
state-level public welfare spending per capita by approximately $5,857, decreases state-level
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Table 2.6: 2SLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
State-Level Policy Outcomes
Per Capita Per Capita Per Pupil
Public Welfare Health Education
Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠5,856.973úú ≠3,785.887ú ≠89,658.980úú
(2,213.208) (2,020.045) (35,606.310)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.049 0.099
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠411.984 1,889.785ú 34,320.830
(1,585.654) (1,060.755) (25,791.650)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 ≠0.025 ≠0.044 0.075
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠2,512.282úúú ≠434.204 ≠17,511.840
(955.468) (980.190) (20,797.400)
Observations 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.338 0.020 0.056
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least
squares models. Models are unweighted. Outcome measures are in 2012-
2013 constant dollars. Covariates include the start-of-decade state unem-
ployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a
decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown
in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
health spending per capita by approximately $3,786, and decreases state-level per pupil
spending on public education by approximately $89,659. These estimated e ects are statis-
tically significant at the 5%, 10%, and 5% levels, respectively. In the 1990s, a one percentage
point increase in Mexican immigration increases per capita health spending on by approx-
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imately $1,890, an estimate significant at the 10% level, but has no statistically significant
impact on per capita public welfare spending or per pupil education spending.
2.7 Discussion
Using an instrumental variable strategy, this paper identifies the long-run impact of Mexican
immigration to U.S. states attributed to variation in Mexican emigration patterns resulting
from fertility shocks in Mexican states. Methodologically, the identification strategy is an
improvement over empirical strategies in past work since it is able to address concerns about
bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity and from errors-in-variables.42
Substantively, the findings challenge a prominent argument advanced by some scholars
and media commentators that Mexican immigrant influxes generally cause aggregate-level
shifts in Anglo whites’ partisanship, ideology, social attitudes, and political attitudes. The
results provide a more nuanced understanding of the conditions under which Mexican immi-
gration caused a political backlash among whites, refine our understanding of which types
of reactions occur (and which do not), and situate this relationship within a specific his-
torical moment in contemporary American political development. I fail to find evidence of
a general relationship between Mexican immigrant inflows and a political backlash among
whites. Instead, I find significant e ects only during the 1980s and not during the 1990s. In
the 1980s, Mexican immigration led to increased support for the Republican Party among
whites, increased levels of conservatism among whites, and increased support for greater
federal spending on crime and education among whites. However, there is no impact of
Mexican immigration on the average stated social attitudes of whites toward ethnoracial mi-
nority outgroups.43 Policy outcomes are also a ected: Mexican immigration decreases states’
42Appendix A.6 shows OLS estimates of the first di erence models and shows that the OLS results are
biased when compared to the 2SLS estimates from the main analysis.
43See Appendix A.7 for selected placebo analyses.
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average level of per capita spending on health and public welfare and states’ average level
of per pupil spending on public education. These findings are not sensitive to an alternative
method of constructing the instrument commonly employed in economic research.44
Were the politics of immigration distinctive in the 1980s as compared to the 1990s,
and if so why? I answer the first question – whether the 1980s were distinctive – by re-
estimating the stacked first di erence models and including an interaction term between
the treatment variable (the decadal percentage point change in the Mexican foreign-born
share of the state population) and a decade dummy coded 1 for the 1990s and 0 for the
1980s. I then test the null hypothesis that the coe cient on the interaction is zero. The
results of this analysis are presented in Appendix A.5 and generally show that the impact of
Mexican immigration during the 1980s was, in fact, distinctive from the impact of Mexican
immigration during the 1990s. As shown in Appendix Table A.8, the interaction term
is statistically significant for all models predicting white partisanship and ideology except
the change in white thermometer ratings of the Democratic Party. The interaction is not
statistically significant in the 2SLS models predicting whites’ social attitudes toward blacks
and Hispanics, as shown in Appendix Table A.9. Appendix Table A.10 shows the estimated
interaction e ects for 2SLS models predicting whites’ policy attitudes. Here, the interaction
term is significant and negative when predicting whites’ opinion on federal spending levels to
address crime, and significant and positive when predicting whites’ conservatism on matters
relating to inequality of opportunity. Finally, Appendix Table A.11 shows that the coe cient
on the interaction is positive and both substantively and statistically significant for the
models predicting per capita health expenditures and per pupil education expenditures, and
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What might explain the distinctiveness of the 1980s as compared to the 1990s? Why
did Mexican immigration cause shifts in white partisanship and ideology and shifts in white
policy attitudes and actual policy outcomes only during the 1980s? Several speculative
explanations emerge from prior research and o er a guide to direct future work on these
questions. One possible explanation is that the most antagonistic reactions among native-
born whites are triggered by the initial arrival of outgroups; as in-migration continues over
time, the degree of backlash decreases (e.g., Schildkraut, 2001). For many areas in the United
States, the 1980s was the period during which previously homogeneous white communities
experienced their first waves of Mexican in-migration. Another potential explanation is that
anti-immigrant attitudes and policies are most likely to result from Mexican in-migration
when the salience of outgroup threat – not just the salience of immigration per se – is also
high (e.g., Green, Strolovitch and Wong, 1998; Sears and Allen, 1984). Future research
could evaluate whether this explanation is plausible by examining whether the perception of
outgroup threat from Mexican immigrants was more salient during the 1980s than the 1990s,
the processes leading to the formation of these perceptions, and the role of salient perceptions
of outgroup threat in the causal relationship between Mexican immigration on the one hand
and white attitudes and public policy on the other. It may also be the case that the degree
to which immigrant inflows is associated with an outgroup threat depends on the type of
immigration that is occurring, where the association is more likely to form when people
perceive illegal immigration to be prevalent. Figure 2.7 graphs time series of the number of
migrants from Mexico by migration type – legal, illegal, and temporary – using data from the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security assembled by Massey and Pren (2012). In the early
1980s, illegal immigration is the predominant form of migration from Mexico. Beginning
in the second half of the 1980s and through the 1990s, we observe a gradual increase in
legal immigration from Mexico and a gradual decrease in illegal immigration from Mexico.
This is in large part due to the passage and implementation of the Immigration Reform
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Figure 2.7: Number of Migrants from Mexico to the United States, by Migrant Type, 1955-
2010. Data are from Massey and Pren (2012), Table A1, and are based on data and estimates
from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which sought to control and restrict illegal immigration to
the United States and reform the legal immigration system. From this vantage, the e ects
observed during the 1980s may reflect a period-specific story about the political response
of whites to long-run, decadal changes in predominately illegal immigration. In contrast,
the long-run change in Mexican in-migration over the course of the 1990s was a mixture
of some illegal and mostly legal immigration, and thus may not have been accompanied
by a widespread perception of outgroup threat among whites which would yield an impact
on white partisanship, ideology, and attitudes, despite the e orts of political entrepreneurs
seeking to convert whites using the issue of immigration.
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2.8 Conclusion
Many have speculated about the long-run, aggregate-level impact of mass demographic shifts
due to immigration on the development of politics and public policy in the United States.
A common narrative put forth by scholars and lay pundits alike is that recent immigration
has caused a political backlash among whites, not least in part because Republicans sought
to exploit white fear of ethnic and racial “others” for political gain.
This article advances the empirical literature on the topic by examining the unique case
of Mexican immigration to the U.S. states between 1980 and 2000. It overcomes challenges
with causal inference and measurement that plague existing research on the topic by using an
identification strategy that instruments for Mexican immigration inflows using lagged fertility
shocks a ecting Mexico-to-US emigration patterns and by applying multilevel regression and
poststratification to estimate a time series of white political attitudes in the states.
Substantively the analysis shows that the impact of Mexican immigration on white polit-
ical views are far more limited than is commonly claimed. Challenging major arguments in
the literature that mass immigration from Mexico generally causes a political backlash and
a growing a nity for the Republican Party among whites, I find that the long-run e ects of
Mexican immigration on white political attitudes at the aggregate level occur only during the
1980s and not during the 1990s. In the 1980s, Mexican immigration led to increased support
for the Republican Party among whites, increased levels of conservatism among whites, and
increased support for greater federal spending on crime and education among whites. In
terms of policy outcomes, Mexican immigration decreased states’ average level of per capita
spending on health and public welfare and states’ average level of per pupil spending on
public education in the 1980s. Overall, the analysis points to the reality that while it was a
major force in reshaping the social and demographic composition of the United States, mass
immigration from Mexico in the last two decades of the 20th century did not generate mass
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shifts in white political attitudes and changes in policy outcomes at the scale some claim
occurred.
Methodologically, the identification and measurement strategies used in this article may
be extended to examine a range of questions about the impacts of country-specific immigra-
tion on other political and policy outcomes, immigration from multiple sending countries on
political and policy outcomes in the destination country, as well as heterogeneity in the e ects
of immigration on deeply interacted population subgroups. The approaches are portable to
the study of immigration e ects not just in the United States but also in other countries and
from a comparative approach.
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3.1 Introduction
For historically underrepresented and subordinated groups, descriptive representation is
viewed as an important step toward full enfranchisement in a democracy (Mansbridge, 1999;
Phillips, 1995). This notion has motivated a vast research program examining whether in-
creased descriptive representation begets substantive representation in both American poli-
tics1 and in comparative politics.2
In the American context, research on the link between descriptive and substantive minor-
ity representation has focused primarily on the e ects of electoral institutions, in particular
redistricting, on the composition of legislatures and policy outcomes resulting from collec-
tive decision making (e.g., Swain, 1993; Guinier, 1995; Engstrom, 1995; Cameron, Epstein
and O’Halloran, 1996; Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1999; Shotts, 2001, 2002, 2003; Friedman
and Holden, 2008; Washington, 2012). Yet relatively little is known about the degree to
which di erences in how a legislator represents the interests of an underrepresented group
are causally attributable to di erences in a legislator’s membership in that group. Existing
scholarship shows generally positive associations between legislators’ minority group mem-
bership and measures of legislative behavior relevant to minority groups, with considerable
variation in the magnitude of estimated e ects (e.g. Canon, 1999; Cobb and Jenkins, 2001;
Whitby and Krause, 2001; Tate, 2003; Grose, 2005; Gri n and Newman, 2007; Rouse, 2013).
With respect to legislators’ voting behavior, research on the substantive representation of
African Americans argues that black legislators are more supportive of black interests in roll
1In American politics, this question has been examined with respect to the representation of racial and
ethnic minorities, in particular African Americans and Hispanics (e.g., Swain, 1993; Cameron, Epstein and
O’Halloran, 1996; Lublin, 1997; Canon, 1999; Whitby, 2000; Shotts, 2002, 2003; Tate, 2003; Gri n and
Newman, 2007, 2008; Washington, 2008, 2012; Grose, 2011; Gri n, 2014), women (e.g., Carey, Niemi and
Powell, 1998; Epstein, Niemi and Powell, 2005; Dodson, 1998; Swers, 1998; Walsh, 2002; Vega and Firestone,
1995; Thomas and Welch, 1991), and underrepresented groups by socioeconomic class (e.g., Gilens, 2012;
Carnes, 2012, 2013, 2014).
2See, for example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Wangnerud (2009); Bhavnani (2009); Pande (2003).
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call voting than non-black legislators by 9 to 55 points on the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights interest group score, which ranges from 0 (least supportive) to 100 (most sup-
portive). For Hispanics, scholars present suggestive evidence of a positive association. Some
scholars posit that Hispanic legislators better represent Hispanic interests than non-Hispanic
legislators by approximately 10 points on a 0-100 (most supportive) interest group rating
score among U.S. House representatives in the 100th Congress (Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Kerr
and Miller, 1997) or between 0.14 to 0.19 points on a W-NOMINATE measure estimated
by scaling votes on Latino-interest bills for state legislators in the 2000’s (Rouse, 2013),
while a single scholar finds a null e ect when examining members of the 108th Congress
(Knoll, 2009). With respect to legislators’ bill sponsorship behavior, scholars have reported
significant di erences in the volume of minority-interest bills sponsored by racial and ethnic
minority versus non-minority legislators. Bratton and Haynie (1999) argue that black leg-
islators introduce on average 2.06 more black-interest bills than non-black legislators, and
female legislators introduce on average 1.5 more female-interest bills than male legislators
(668). Scholars have also reported significant di erences in volume of Latino-interest bill
sponsorship between Hispanic and non-Hispanic legislators ranging from 0.662 (Bratton,
2006) to 1.32 bills (Rouse, 2013).
In every existing empirical study on this question in the American context, estimation
strategies fail to address egregious sources of bias. Scholars use naive cross-sectional com-
parisons that do not account for the endogeneity of district composition, district preferences,
candidate selection, and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Estimators are suscep-
tible to omitted variable bias, and the direction of the bias is unknown ex ante without also
knowing what variables are omitted.3 Additional uncertainty is introduced when including
highly collinear covariates in the model specification. The problems with naive regressions
3I refer the reader to Greene (2011) and Clarke (2005) for concise explanations of this concern.
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are reinforced by scholars who employ these methods despite being aware of associated
methodological shortcomings. In his study of descriptive and substantive black represen-
tation, David Canon (1999) illustrates this problem while presenting the thought process
behind his empirical strategy, stating that “the general problem with [the] strong statistical
relationship between the percentage of blacks in the district and the representation of the
district by a black lawmaker is that their parameter estimates are likely to be unreliable.
Moreover, when high collinearity exists one runs the risk of accepting the null hypothesis
when in fact there is a statistically significant relationship between the dependent and inde-
pendent variables” (92). But rather than use a clean identification strategy, he and others in
the literature instead opt to embrace omitted variable bias, arguing that “the prescription
here is to drop one of the two independent variables” (Canon, 1999, 92). In sum, the esti-
mates reported by existing studies cannot be interpreted causally and existing conclusions in
the literature should not be accepted as stylized facts because uncertainties abound. Identi-
fication is further complicated by the fact that the causal variable of interest, the politician’s
group membership, is non-manipulable. As is the case with many types of groups (such
as ethnicity or race) that are defined by seemingly immutable traits, when the explanatory
factor cannot be manipulated the causal e ect cannot be identified (Holland, 1986; Cook
and Campbell, 1979; Pearl, 2000; Gelman and Hill, 2007; Sen and Wasow, 2013).
In order to appropriately engage this substantive debate, it is necessary to pose a causal
question with a testable counterfactual. I thus reframe the question and ask: How does
electing a political candidate belonging to an underrepresented group, instead of counterfac-
tual candidate not belonging to that group, a ect the quality of substantive representation
the elected o cial provides to the group?
To answer this question while addressing the shortcomings of existing empirical designs,
I apply a regression discontinuity design to the case of close state legislative races between
a Hispanic and a non-Hispanic candidate in the United States, using a new dataset linking
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election returns to an original database of state legislative behavior. By exploiting the sharp
discontinuity in the probability a Hispanic candidate is elected as a function of the vote
share garnered by the Hispanic candidate in these close elections, I estimate the di erence
between the legislative behavior of Hispanic candidates who just win and the behavior of
non-Hispanic candidates who just win as the e ect of districts “as-if” randomly electing a
Hispanic candidate instead of a non-Hispanic candidate.
Diverging substantially from established wisdom in the literature, which posits a positive
relationship between descriptive and substantive minority representation in general and a
weakly positive relationship for Hispanics in the United States, I find that the net behavior of
Hispanic legislators is more complicated than is suggested by existing research. The findings
suggest that Hispanic legislators may be more likely than their non-Hispanic counterparts
to introduce and co-sponsor both pro-Hispanic and anti-Hispanic legislation. I also fail to
find evidence of a robust positive relationship between electing a Hispanic legislator and
pro-Hispanic roll call voting behavior on Hispanic-interest bills. This paper provides the
first causal estimates answering this question in the American context and raises intriguing
new questions for the study of elite behavior toward underrepresented groups in the setting
of competitive elections.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I motivate this paper by summarizing
theoretical and empirical arguments in existing work on the causal link between descriptive
and substantive minority representation. Building on this motivation, I present the main
hypotheses investigated in this paper and define key quantities of interest. Section 3 describes
the empirical strategies used to test the main hypotheses, and Section 4 presents the main
findings. In Section 5, I discuss potential mechanisms and implications for the study of
minority political representation. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Theoretical and Empirical Expectations
Existing research o ers several theoretical perspectives about the expected causal relation-
ship between descriptive and substantive minority representation and mechanisms explaining
these predictions.
On the one hand, social psychological theories prominent in research on political inequal-
ity and identity politics argue that when a legislator and a constituency belong to the same
social group, the legislator should be more responsive to the interests of that constituency
than if the legislator had an incongruent social group membership, ceteris paribus. Thus
African American legislators will better represent African American interests than legisla-
tors who are not African American, and women will better represent female interests than
men, for example.
This claim is the dominant finding in existing empirical analyses on the link between
descriptive and substantive minority representation.4 Existing studies use cross-sectional
comparisons across legislators to show positive associations between legislators’ roll call vot-
ing behavior on legislation a ecting an ethnic or racial minority group and their membership
in that group (e.g. Canon, 1999; Cobb and Jenkins, 2001; Whitby and Krause, 2001; Tate,
2003; Gri n and Newman, 2007; Grose, 2005; Rouse, 2013). For African Americans, scholars
have made the argument that large di erences in roll call voting behavior on black-interest
legislation is attributable to di erences in a legislator’s race.5 For example, David Canon
4I focus this literature review on studies that employ outcome measures of legislative behavior on specific
legislation a ecting the underrepresented group. I do not focus on studies that use measures of legislators’
ideological consistency as outcome variables, such as NOMINATE scores and ideal points estimated by scaling
roll call votes on all legislation. This is a critical conceptual distinction because ideological consistency over
all roll call votes is not an appropriate operationalization of legislative behavior pertinent to group-specific
interests. This also has important implications for the interpretation of existing research, because several
recent studies claiming null associations rely on general ideology measures as an outcome measure (e.g.,
Casellas, 2011; Rouse, 2013).
5See Grose (2005) for a rich review of prior empirical analyses on the descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation relationship for African Americans in Congress.
67
CHAPTER 3. HOW DO LEGISLATOR IDENTITIES AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE
MINORITY REPRESENTATION? EVIDENCE FROM HISPANIC REPRESENTATION
IN THE STATES
(1999) examines di erences in Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) interest group
scores in the 103rd Congress and finds “a twenty-five point di erence in LCCR scores be-
tween black and white members of Congress (MC) in districts that are at least 25 percent
black and a seventeen-point di erence between whites and blacks overall” (177). Using
a multivariate regression analysis, Canon (1999) then argues that relative to non-African
American representatives, African American members of Congress are more supportive of
African American policy interests by 11.6 to 26.9 points on the LCCR score depending on
the political context of the MC’s election to Congress (177-78). Kenny J. Whitby (2000)
also uses multivariate regression to estimate the association between a legislator’s race and
their roll call voting behavior as measured by LCCR scores in U.S. Congresses between 1973
to 1992, and finds that the “racial identity of the member matters in congressional voting
for progressive civil rights proposals even when party and region are held constant. The
di erence in mean support scores between black and white legislators is approximately 9
percent (1977-82)” when analyzing final passage roll calls and between “5 percent (1987-92)
to 19 percent (1973-76)” when analyzing roll calls on legislative proposals during the amend-
ing process (94-96). Christian Grose (2005) fits cross-sectional data from the 104th to 106th
Congresses to multivariate linear models with random e ects and finds that LCCR scores are
on average higher for black legislators compared to non-black legislators by approximately 55
points after controlling for the legislator’s party, the black district population, and a battery
of other covariates (438).
For Hispanics, existing research finds positive associations between whether a legislator
is Hispanic and their voting behavior on Hispanic-interest bills, although scholars have quib-
bled over the statistical significance of estimated correlations. Hero and Tolbert (1995) use a
multivariate regression approach to examine the correlation between a U.S. House represen-
tative’s Hispanic identity and their interest group rating by the pro-Hispanic Southwestern
Voter Research Institute (SWVRI) in the 100th Congress (1987-1988), limiting the analysis
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to representatives in districts where Hispanics comprise at least 5% of the district popula-
tion and representatives who participate in at least 11 of the 15 roll votes that comprise
the SWVRI interest group score. Sample selection concerns aside, they find that Hispanic
representatives have higher SWVRI scores by a range of 9.88 to 10.01 points, but argue that
these correlations are not statistically significant when using a two-sided test (644). Kerr and
Miller (1997) contest the interpretation of the findings presented by Hero and Tolbert (1995),
arguing that a one-sided test is needed because a directional alternative hypothesis is appro-
priate. Examining this relationship in three U.S. statehouses6 in 2005, Stella Rouse (2013)
finds consistently negative associations between a legislator’s W-NOMINATE score scaled
using only roll call votes on Latino-interest bills and an indicator for whether the legislator
is Hispanic. The W-NOMINATE score ranges from -1 to 1, where more liberal/pro-Hispanic
positions take lower values. Thus a negative association implies a positive relationship be-
tween descriptive and substantive representation. Fitting separate multivariate OLS models
by state, Rouse (2013) finds that Hispanic legislators are found to be more pro-Hispanic
than their non-Hispanic counterparts by 0.14 points in Arizona, 0.193 points in Florida,
and 0.167 points in Texas. These are substantively large estimates but are not statistically
significant. In contrast, a single study by Benjamin Knoll (2009) argues that there is no
association between whether a legislator is Hispanic and her voting behavior. Using interest
group scores from the National Hispanic Leadership Association (NHLA) for the 108th U.S.
Congress (2003-2004), Knoll (2009) regresses the NHLA score on an indicator variable that
the MC is Hispanic plus a battery of covariates and estimates a zero e ect when including
the Latino share of the district population as a covariate and an insignificant e ect of 0.02
when excluding that covariate.
Looking beyond roll calls, scholars have also argued that a positive relationship exists
6Rouse (2013) examines Arizona, Florida, and Texas.
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between a legislator’s membership in an ethnoracial minority group and the legislator’s level
of e ort in influencing the policy agenda on behalf of that group vis-a-vis championing
and introducing legislation supporting group interests (Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Canon,
1999; Rouse, 2013). With respect to Hispanic representation, for instance, Kathleen Bratton
(2006) examines the relationship between a legislator’s Hispanic identity and the number
of Latino-interest bills the legislator sponsors in seven U.S. statehouses7 in 2001. Fitting
the data to two separate multivariate negative binomial regressions for Florida and for the
rest of the states, she finds that in all states but Florida, Hispanic legislators sponsor on
average 0.662 more Latino-interest bills than non-Hispanic legislators, and this di erence
is statistically significant. In Florida, Hispanic legislators sponsor on average 0.361 more
Latino-interest bills than non-Hispanic legislators. Stella Rouse (2013) conducts a similar
analysis using data from six statehouses8 in 2001, 2005, and 2007. Fitting the data to three
separate multivariate negative binomial models by year, she finds larger and statistically
significant associations: Hispanic legislators sponsor on average 1.27, 1.29, and 1.32 more
Latino-interest bills in 2001, 2005, and 2007, respectively.9
Two types of mechanisms have been hypothesized to these explain positive associations
between descriptive and substantive representation: group identification and between-group
7Bratton (2006) examines Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas.
8Rouse (2013) examines Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas.
9Another recent study deserves mention. Wallace (2014) fits multivariate OLS models to data from the
111th Congress and argues that whether an MC is Latino (but not Cuban) has no relationship with her
measure of their roll call voting on Latino-interest bills, but has a positive association with her measure of
their bill sponsorship behavior. Identification problems aside, the results she reports cannot be substantively
interpreted in a straightforward manner due to problems with the construction of the outcome measures.
The roll call voting measure is a summary score of the number of pro-Latino (+1) and anti-Latino (-1) roll
call votes the MC casts, but is not normalized by the number of votes cast. The bill co-sponsorship measure
is similarly constructed as a summary score of the number of pro-Latino (+1) and anti-Latino (-1) bills
sponsored. The combination of pro-Latino and anti-Latino bill sponsorship behavior into a single summary
index requires an additional – and likely implausible – theoretical assumption that the marginal pro-Latino
bill sponsored due to a change in whether an MC is Latino is comparable to the marginal anti-Latino bill
sponsored due to an opposite change in an MC’s group membership.
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information asymmetry. Group identification based explanations privilege the causal role
of an individual’s “sense of awareness of [their own group] membership,” the “sense that
this awareness is related to some value connotations,” and the sense that their behavior
toward members of a given target group is conducted in terms of group identification (Tajfel,
1982, 1-2). Within this framework, an apparent positive association between a legislator’s
membership in a minority group and how well she represents the interests of that group may
be due to (i) congruent group membership between a politician and a minority group and
in-group favoritism (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, 1982); (ii) incongruent group membership
and out-group hostility, which may result from group-specific prejudices stemming from
stereotypes attached to group-specific social categories (LaPiere, 1934; Phelps, 1972; Arrow,
1973; Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1977, 1978; Bobo, 1988; Gilens, 2000) or from generalized
prejudice against outgroups (Sumner, 1906; LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Kinder and Kam,
2010); or (iii) a combination thereof.10
Explanations emphasizing between-group information asymmetry argue that in-group
members know more about the preferences of their own group members than do outgroup
members, and in turn are better able to represent the group’s interests. This may be because
in-group members share past experiences that directly influence their preferences in similar
ways and result in within-group common knowledge about their shared experiences and
preferences (Dawson, 1994; McClain et al., 2009); because in-group peers, unlike out-group
members, share past experiences that provide them with adequate priors to accurately infer
their preferences even in the absence of their articulation;11 or because individuals are more
10I bracket the immense literature on the sources of intragroup and intergroup social attitudes for now.
Despite its theoretical importance to understanding the psychological microfoundations of intergroup prej-
udice and behavior, such a review is not directly relevant to the research question at hand.
11Mansbridge (1999) alludes to this quality when describing the representative engaging in “innovative
thinking in contexts of uncrystallized, not fully articulated interests,” exploring “the unchartered ramifi-
cations of newly presented issues,” and speaking “on those issues with a voice carrying the authority of
experience” from the perspective of the constituents they descriptively represent (628, 644).
71
CHAPTER 3. HOW DO LEGISLATOR IDENTITIES AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE
MINORITY REPRESENTATION? EVIDENCE FROM HISPANIC REPRESENTATION
IN THE STATES
networked and trusting among other in-group members than with out-group members to
communicate and learn about the needs and wants of their in-group peers (Mansbridge,
1999, 635-636). Information asymmetry based explanations do not rule out the possibility
that an individual not belonging to a minority group could learn about and represent that
group’s interests;12 rather, this argument seeks to explain relative di erences in substantive
representation due to descriptive representation and o er a plausible causal process by which
a di erence might manifest.
On the other hand, research grounded in spatial models of elite behavior argues that
a politician’s behavior toward a minority group is constrained by their perception of how
their behavior will a ect reactions from their core constituencies and their ability win the
next election (Downs, 1957; Key, 1966; Barro, 1973; Mayhew, 1974; McKelvey, 1975; Kramer,
1977; Ferejohn, 1986). The politician acts anticipating how di erent constituency groups will
react in the next election as a function of their behavior in the current period (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986; Ferejohn, 1986; Holstrom and Milgrom, 1987, 1991). In the context of close
elections, the classic Downsian model predicts that politicians will converge in their behavior.
But if politicians vary in their perceptions of which groups comprise their core re-election
constituency, what those groups want, or are satisficing in their behavior, then predictions
of elite behavior depend on the content of their perceived constraints and payo s. Generally,
politicians will be more supportive of and responsive to the minority group’s interests if that
group or another constituency preferring pro-minority policies is perceived to be pivotal to
their future re-election prospects. Analogously, a politician will be more antagonistic toward
the minority group if those they perceive to be their core re-election constituency also holds
these preferences.
Would we ever expect a minority legislator to provide worse substantive minority rep-
12This argument has been articulated by scholars including Swain (1993) and Mansbridge (1999).
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resentation than a non-minority legislator? Theory and anecdotal accounts suggest this is
not implausible. From a theoretical vantage, consider a toy model where a competitive dis-
trict contains two constituencies, an ethnic minority group constituency and a non-minority
constituency where the non-minority group prefers some anti-minority policies. Suppose the
district is represented by a legislator belonging to the minority group. The minority leg-
islator, assuming secure support among their co-ethnic base, seeks to secure the marginal
non-minority vote by taking positions on minority-interest issues that are more favorable
to the non-minority group in an attempt to eke out a victory. Now imagine a counterfac-
tual legislator belonging to the non-minority group but who is otherwise identical to the
minority legislator on all other characteristics. The non-minority counterfactual legislator
could engage in similar behavior, attempting to win the marginal minority vote to secure
victory by moving toward the minority group’s ideal point. For both the ethnic minority and
counterfactual non-minority legislator, movement toward the incongruent group’s ideal point
could result in the non-minority legislator providing better minority representation than the
minority legislator due to a similar belief that securing re-election requires appeasing voters
in the other group. For a legislator in single member districts with two candidates, the ex-
pected costs of such behavior are likely to be negligible if (i) she does not move too far from
the ideal point of her co-ethnic base such that it incurs in-group backlash (e.g., in the form
of depressed turnout a ecting her probability of re-election), or if (ii) the movement toward
the outgroup’s ideal point is not traceable by the in-group (Arnold, 1992; Kingdon, 1989).
Anecdotal accounts seem to suggest that politicians and their advisors at least consider these
strategies, especially when concerned about future electoral prospects. Reporting in 1980
on the strategies of black Congressmen in the New York Times, Steven V. Roberts notes
that “the ability to attract white votes is essential to winning seats.... As their numbers
grow, many minority Congressmen are beginning to wonder whether they should be black
representatives or representatives who happen to be black. The choice is not easy. ‘It cuts
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both ways,’ said a former Congressional aide. ‘They clearly see themselves as representing
a national black constituency, but they also don’t want to be put into a mold.”’ More re-
cently, Karl Rove remarked on the need for white Republicans to adopt similar strategies
of attracting ethnic and racial minority votes, both to win re-election and as a longer term
party-building strategy. Writing in the Wall Street Journal on June 27, 2013, he argues
that “the reality is that the nonwhite share of the vote will keep growing.... Republicans
must now do two things: turn out more white voters and improve their performance among
Hispanics, African-Americans, and Asian-Americans.”
In light of conflicting theoretical expectations and the lack of causal evidence in the
literature, this paper’s primary goal is to provide an identified answer to the research question
and to estimate the causal e ect of electing a Hispanic legislator, instead of a counterfactual
non-Hispanic legislator, on the quality of substantive Hispanic representation provided by
the elected legislator. This is a fundamental, first-order question that must be answered
before delving deeper into causal mechanisms and explanations. In addition, while not
the main focus of this paper, I begin to explore the plausibility of potential mechanisms
explaining e ects. To provide leverage to do so I conceptually distinguish elite behavior that
favors minority group interests from behavior that opposes their interests. I operationalize
the elected lawmaker’s quality of substantive Hispanic representation in terms of the degree
to which they cast pro- versus anti-minority roll call votes on bills relevant to Hispanics,
the volume of pro-Hispanic legislation they sponsor or cosponsor, and the volume of anti-
Hispanic legislation they sponsor or cosponsor. This operationalization corresponds to three
independent two-sided tests of the main null hypothesis that electing a Hispanic legislator,
instead of a non-Hispanic legislator, has no e ect on the quality of substantive Hispanic
representation provided by the elected representative.
I now turn to the empirical strategies used to estimate these quantities of interest and to
test the main hypotheses in the following section.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
When confronted with unobserved heterogeneity, experimental designs are often suggested to
obtain unbiased treatment e ects. The experimental ideal, in this case, would be impossible
since it is not feasible to randomly assign legislators to di erent racial or ethnic groups
and identities. Instead I employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, which is a quasi-
experimental identification strategy allowing unbiased estimation of treatment e ects due to
a treatment or policy change without the use of a randomized experiment (Thistlethwaite
and Campbell, 1960; Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001). The RD design requires that
a change in treatment assignment be a function of an observed pre-treatment variable known
as an forcing variable, running variable, or assignment variable.13 In a sharp RD design, all
subjects located on one side of a cutpoint on the forcing variable are assigned to treatment
and the remainder are assigned to control.
Political scientists and economists have commonly used regression discontinuity designs
exploiting discontinuities in the probability of winning an election at the threshold required
for victory to investigate the incumbency advantage (e.g., Lee, 2008; Erikson and Titiunik,
2013; Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer et al., 2011; Eggers et al., 2014); the e ects
of descriptive representation on minority political participation for females in the context
of state legislative elections (Broockman, 2014) and for African Americans in the context
of mayoral elections (Vogl, 2014); and the e ects of mayoral partisanship on city policies
(Gerber and Hopkins, 2011; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009). I extend the application of the
RD approach in this paper to study the relationship between descriptive and substantive
minority representation, an outcome variable central to the study of minority politics that
has not yet been examined closely in the context of competitive elections.
An important feature of the RD approach is that it requires researchers to redefine
13To remain consistent, I use the term “forcing variable” throughout this paper.
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the estimand from an average treatment e ect to a “local” average treatment e ect in the
neighborhood around the threshold of the forcing variable. For the present study, redefining
the estimand in this manner is not problematic and, in fact, arguably better represents
the causal quantities discussed in the literature because the local average treatment e ect
in this setting captures di erences in legislative behavior solely due to di erences in the
elected legislator’s ethnicity under the key identifying assumption that all other unobservable
confounders that could a ect potential outcomes are not discontinuous at the threshold and
do not a ect potential outcomes.
In the remainder of this section, I summarize the processes used to assemble the data
and construct the measures used in the regression discontinuity analysis, describe the set
of elections included in the analysis, present the main RD specification, and assess the
plausibility of the RD design’s identifying assumptions.
3.3.1 State Legislative Elections between Hispanic and Non-Hispanic
Candidates in the United States
To identify relevant state legislative elections between Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidates,
I first obtain general election returns data from 1967 to 2012 from the State Legislative Elec-
tion Returns (SLER) dataset (ICPSR 34297). I then subset the election returns data to
include only those elections involving one Hispanic and one non-Hispanic candidate and one
winner. To do so, I determine whether each candidate is Hispanic by matching candidates’
name identifiers to two databases: annual directories of Latino elected o cials provided by
the National Association of Latino Elected O cials (NALEO) from 1984 to 2013, which
contain information about Latino elected o cials at all levels of government,14 and the
2000 United States Decennial Census’s list of frequently occurring surnames, which contains
14The NALEO directories include Latino elected o cials serving in Congress, statewide o ces, state
legislatures, county governments, municipal governments, and special administrative districts.
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information about the distribution of racial and ethnic identities associated with each sur-
name. Two record linkage procedures are implemented. First, candidates are matched to
the NALEO directories by their full name and state. Exact matches from this record linkage
procedure are flagged as Hispanic candidates. Second, candidates are matched by surname
to the census surname list. Each surname in the census file is tagged with information on
the ethnoracial distribution associated with a given surname. If at least 50% of the indi-
viduals in the census who have a given surname identify as Hispanic or Latino, then they
are flagged as “Hispanic” for the purpose of this analysis. For candidates who are flagged as
Hispanic in the second matching procedure using census surname lists but are not flagged
as Hispanic in first matching procedure using the NALEO directories, I then manually vali-
date whether they are Hispanic by checking media and newspaper archives. Of the 120,041
general elections for state legislative o ce between 1967 and 2012, there are 1,994 general
elections between a Hispanic candidate and a non-Hispanic candidate.
3.3.2 Measuring Substantive Hispanic Representation
To construct the outcome variables, data on the behavior of elected state legislators are
first collected from each state legislature’s website using web-based queries, report extract
tools, and scripts written to scrape data directly from the web. Bill information for all
states covering available years between 2007 and 2014 are also collected from the Sunlight
Foundation’s Open States API. Appendix Table B.1 summarizes the availability of any bill
information via state legislative websites or the Open States API, by state.
Next, I define the set of bills that are relevant to Hispanic interests. To do so, I construct
databases of all bills and resolutions introduced into each state legislative chamber. These
databases include information about the bill number and usually a short bill description if
not the full bill text. I then flag bills where the bill description or bill text contains key
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words or phrases suggesting the bill might pertain to the following policy areas relevant
to Hispanics: immigration, state-sanctioned foreign language accommodation and access,
voting rights, cultural competence in the provision of social programs, initiatives targeting
Hispanic civic organizations and businesses, and any other symbolic legislation referencing
Hispanic populations.15 These policy domains are not intended to be exhaustive, but are
meant to represent a set of substantive policy areas and symbolic legislation specifically
pertinent to the interests of Hispanics.
After this first step, I manually check the relevance of each flagged bill to ensure that each
bill used for measure construction is, in fact, pertinent to Hispanic interests. This is done by
assessing the bill contents by reading bill descriptions, bill text, and bill analyses, if publicly
available. Non-substantive bills that only make technical changes to existing legislation are
dropped, since there is often no variation in legislators’ revealed preferences on these bills.
For relevant bills that remain in the sample of bills, the legislation’s intent is coded to
map roll call vote positions to pro-Hispanic, anti-Hispanic, and neutral positions. Available
data on bill sponsorship, co-sponsorship, and roll call voting are collected for relevant bills.16
Then, based on the text of the bill (or a bill summary if the full bill text is not available),
each bill is manually coded as a pro- or anti-Hispanic bill based on its legislative intent.17
If the intent of the bill is di cult to determine, I cross-referenced publicly available bill
15The search terms used were: IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRANT, E-VERIFY, EVERIFY, I.D.,
IDENTIFICATION, DRIVER, DRIVER’S LICENSE, SPANISH, LATINO, LATINA, CHICANO, CHICANA,
HISPANIC, BILINGUAL, ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNER, ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS, VOTER, VOTER
IDENTIFICATION, VOTING RIGHTS, LANGUAGE ACCESS, LANGUAGE ASSISTANCE, FOREIGN LANGUAGE,
UNDOCUMENTED, ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, ALIEN, VOTER REGISTRATION, XICANO,
XICANA, DREAM ACT, MINORITY, MINORITIES, DIVERSITY, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, CULTURALLY
COMPETENT, CULTURAL COMPETENCY, CIVIL RIGHTS, CITIZEN, CITIZENSHIP, NONCITIZEN, and
NON-CITIZEN.
16The availability of bill sponsorship and roll call voting data varies by each state legislative data source,
and do not necessarily span the full period for which bill lists are available. As such, sample definitions and
sample sizes will vary by outcome variable examined.
17For future analyses, I plan to use multiple experts to code bills.
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endorsements and platforms published by Hispanic interest groups to determine whether the
bill contents are pro- or anti-Hispanic. Using these data, I then construct three behavioral
outcome measures corresponding to the three operationalizations of substantive Hispanic
representation.
1. Pro-Hispanic bill/resolution sponsorship or co-sponsorship: This measure counts the
number of pro-Hispanic bills sponsored or co-sponsored by the elected legislator in the
legislative sessions following the close election but prior to the next election.
2. Anti-Hispanic bill/resolution sponsorship or co-sponsorship: This measure counts the
number of anti-Hispanic bills sponsored or co-sponsored by the elected legislator in the
legislative sessions following the close election but prior to the next election.
3. Roll call voting score: This is a summary index measure describing the rate of pro-
versus anti-Hispanic roll call voting by the elected legislator on bills and resolutions
relevant to Hispanics in the legislative sessions following the legislator’s election and
prior to her following electoral race. Each legislator’s roll call vote on a relevant bill
or resolution is coded +1 if she takes a pro-Hispanic position, 1 if she takes an anti-
Hispanic position, and 0 if she does not vote or marks herself as present. The summary
score is computed as the simple average of these indicators, ranging from +1 (100%
pro-Hispanic) to -1 (100% anti-Hispanic).
3.3.3 Covariates
Finally, I collect available data on the following candidate- and district-level baseline covari-
ates to test the plausibility of the RD design: whether the Hispanic candidate is a Democrat
or a Republican, whether the non-Hispanic candidate is a Democrat or a Republican, whether
the Hispanic candidate is the incumbent, whether the incumbent is a Democrat, whether the
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election is an open election, the number of previous terms the Hispanic and non-Hispanic
candidates served in the chamber, and the number of years of experience the Hispanic and
non-Hispanic candidates have serving in the chamber.18
3.3.4 Sample Definition
The samples used for the analysis of e ects includes general election data linked to available
legislative behavior outcome data for five states among the most number of elections between
Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidates: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, and New
Mexico. To my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive dataset assembled to-date that
has been used to analyze the link between descriptive and substantive representation in the
states. It spans the most number of legislative sessions across chambers in multiple states,
containing state legislative elections between Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidates between
1992 and 2012, and information on legislative behavior in statehouses from 1993 through
2014.19
Figure 3.1 summarizes the number of observations in the general election samples by
outcome variable type and bandwidth specification, and Table 3.1 further breaks down the
number of observations by state. The samples used to analyze sponsorship outcomes contain
460 elections, of which 301 (65.4%) are elections where the Hispanic candidate wins and 159
(34.6%) are elections where the non-Hispanic candidate wins. Within a 5 point bandwidth,
this sample contains 98 elections, of which 60 (61.2%) are elections where the Hispanic
18At the time of writing, additional covariates on the district’s Democratic vote margin for gubernato-
rial and presidential elections and on the demographic and economic composition of the district are being
collected and aggregated to the state legislative district level using precinct-to-district and tract-to-district
crosswalk files.
19The years included in the dataset vary by state, depending on the availability of outcome data. In
Arizona, bill sponsorship and roll cal data are available 1997-2014. In California, bill sponsorship and roll
call data are available 1993-2014. In Colorado, bill sponsorship data are available 1997-2014 and roll call
data are avialable 1998-2014. In Florida, bill sponsorship and roll call data are available 1998-2014. In New
Mexico, bill sponsorship data are available 1996-2014 and roll call data are available 2009-2014. Please refer
to the Online Appendix to view the list of Hispanic-interest bills included in the analysis.
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Figure 3.1: Number of observations by outcome variable type and bandwidth specification.
candidate wins and 38 (38.8%) are elections where the non-Hispanic candidate wins. The
sample used to analyze roll call voting outcomes contains 340 elections, of which 220 (64.7%)
are elections where the Hispanic candidate wins and 120 (35.3%) are elections where the
non-Hispanic candidate wins. Within a 5 point bandwidth, the sample contains 64 elections,
of which 36 (56.3%) are elections where the Hispanic candidate wins and 28 (43.8%) are
elections where the non-Hispanic candidates win. The discrepancy between the sizes of the
two samples is due to the unavailability of roll call data prior to 2009 in New Mexico via
state government websites, and due to the lack of floor votes on Hispanic-relevant legislation
in selected legislative sessions across states.
We can conceptualize the mechanism assigning districts to treatment like a weighted coin,
since observations are not equally distributed across treatment and control conditions. As I
discuss later in Sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6, this is not a concern since the RD design does not
presuppose equal assignment probabilities between treatment and control over all elections
in the sample; it only requires the density of the forcing variable to be continuous at the
threshold.
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Treatment Control
All Observations (Hispanic Win) (Hispanic Loss)
Bandwidth 1 2 5 10 All 1 2 5 10 All 1 2 5 10 All
A. Outcomes: Sponsorship Measures
All 23 44 98 168 460 17 26 60 100 301 6 18 38 68 159
By state:
AZ 5 7 17 20 36 3 3 9 9 19 2 4 8 11 17
CA 6 11 18 37 162 3 6 10 22 113 3 5 8 15 49
CO 2 4 8 19 48 2 3 5 13 31 0 1 3 6 17
FL 1 3 10 22 52 0 2 5 7 25 1 1 5 15 27
NM 9 19 45 70 162 9 12 31 49 113 0 7 14 21 49
B. Outcome: Roll Call Voting Measures
All 17 31 64 114 340 11 18 36 63 220 6 13 28 51 120
By state:
AZ 5 7 17 20 35 3 3 9 9 19 2 4 8 11 16
CA 6 11 18 36 160 3 6 10 21 111 3 5 8 15 49
CO 2 4 8 19 48 2 3 5 13 31 0 1 3 6 17
FL 1 3 9 21 50 0 2 4 6 24 1 1 5 15 26
NM 3 6 12 18 47 3 4 8 14 35 0 2 4 4 12
Table 3.1: Number of observations by outcome variable type, bandwidth, treatment status,
and state
3.3.5 Regression Discontinuity Specification and Estimation Strat-
egy
I now specify the regression discontinuity design.20 In this sharp RD design, let Z œ [0, 1]
denote the forcing variable, the Hispanic candidate’s vote share of the two-candidate vote;
let D denote the treatment variable, equal to 1 if the Hispanic candidate wins the election
when her vote share of the two-candidate vote is at least c = .5, and 0 if the non-Hispanic
candidate wins the election; and let Y denote the outcome variable of the elected legislator’s
20For more detailed overviews of regression discontinuity designs, please refer to Lee and Lemieux (2010),
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001).
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behavior. Then let:





1 if Z Ø c
0 if Z < c
Z = X”2 + ‹
where · is the treatment e ect, c is the threshold in the forcing variable and is equal to
0.5, X is a matrix of predetermined and observable characteristics that may impact Y or
Z, ”1 and ”2 are vectors of coe cients on X, and Á and ‹ are stochastic errors in Y and Z,
respectively.
Given this framework, we can formally write out the causal quantity of interest. At the
discontinuity, the treatment e ect is defined as · © E[Yi(1)≠Yi(0)|Zi = c] © E[Yi(1)|Zi = c]≠
E[Yi(0)|Zi = c] where i indexes subjects. By design it is impossible to observe E[Yi(1)|Zi = c]
or E[Yi(0)|Zi = c] so the RD requires us to estimate these quantities in the limit. Evoking
the smoothness assumption that E[Yi(d)|Zi = z] is continuous in Z for d œ {0, 1}, we can
estimate E[Yi(0)|Zi = c] as limzøc E[Yi|Zi = z] and E[Yi(1)|Zi = c] as limz¿c E[Yi|Zi = z].
Thus the causal quantity of interest is limz¿c E[Yi|Zi = z] ≠ limzøc E[Yi|Zi = z], or the local
average treatment e ect in the neighborhood of the threshold Z = c.
I identify this quantity by estimating the model:
Yit = – + ·Dit + f(Zit) + ”Xit + Áit
where f is a function whose functional form is flexible. The primary specification of f is a
local linear specification estimated on each side of the threshold, with a triangular (edge)
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kernel.21 To account for systematic measurement error in the outcome variables, I include
state-chamber-session fixed e ects in all model specifications.
Because the RD estimates the discontinuity in the neighborhood of the threshold, it
is necessary to specify what “local” means. The general procedure involves choosing a
bandwidth “ and restricting data to keep observations for which values of zi fall in the
range [c ≠ “, c + “]. A key methodological concern is how to define the bandwidth because
this directly a ects the causal quantity of interest and the estimator used for identification.
Bandwidth selection requires researchers to make a tradeo  between bias and variance. With
smaller bandwidths, estimators have less bias but greater variance. In contrast, with larger
bandwidths, estimators have more bias but less variance.
For the local linear specification, I employ a 5 percentage point bandwidth as the main
bandwidth specification and also produce estimates using 1, 2, and 3 percentage points
bandwidths.22 As a sensitivity analysis, I also use the plug-in bandwidth estimator developed
by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), hereafter referred to as the IK bandwidth, which
seeks to address the bias-variance tradeo  by minimizing the asymptotic expansion of the
mean squared error around the cutpoint. While estimates using the IK bandwidth are
included in part because it is conventional to do so among empirical social scientists, the
calculated IK bandwidths are extremely large and over-weight data far from the threshold.
Results corresponding to ad hoc bandwidths up to 5 percentage points are substantively more
meaningful since the elections in within a 5 percentage point bandwidth have greater face
validity as close elections. Finally, I also assess the sensitivity of estimates across di erent
ad hoc bandwidth specifications ranging from 0.01 to 0.3 in 0.01 intervals.
21While many economic applications of the regression discontinuity design recommend using a higher-order
polynomial specification, the local linear regression specification is preferred because high order polynomial
specifications implicitly weight the data in unreliable ways and estimates may be misleading (Gelman and
Imbens, 2014).
22Using bandwidths of 1, 2, and 5 percentage points with local linear specifications is standard in the
literature employing RD designs with close elections. See, for example, Eggers et al. (2014) for a review.
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I calculate robust standard errors clustered at the jurisdiction-redistricting decade level,
but report the maximum of conventional and cluster robust standard errors due to the
potential downward bias of robust standard errors in small samples.23
3.3.6 RD Design Checks
Before presenting results, I first verify that the identifying assumptions for the RD are plau-
sible. Two identifying assumptions must hold. The first of these assumptions, unconfound-
edness, posits that the density of the forcing variable Z conditional on observed covariates
must be continuous, which in turn yields local randomization around the threshold, c. This
occurs when subjects have no control over the forcing variable, Z, and do not precisely ma-
nipulate their location on the forcing variable to sort into treatment or into control. A key
implication of the unconfoundedness assumption is that the distributions of all observed and
unobserved covariates will be identical on both sides of the threshold, in the limit, as the
definition of the bandwidth around the threshold narrows. The second key assumption is the
continuity assumption, which states that all other factors determining Y must be evolving
continuously with respect to Z such that discontinuities in the outcome variable Y are only
attributable to discontinuities in D as a function of Z, and not to discontinuities in any other
factors at the threshold. This assumption amounts to an exclusion restriction needed to rule
out alternative backdoor paths between the forcing variable Z and the outcome variable Y .
First, to evaluate the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption, I employ the
McCrary test (McCrary, 2008), which is a test of the null hypothesis that the di erence
in the log heights of the density of the forcing variable at the threshold (◊) is zero, and
a graphical analysis to assess balance in the density of observations around the threshold.
These checks are conducted separately for each type of outcome variable – bill sponsorship
23See Angrist and Pischke (2009, 2010) for an explanation of this concern.
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measures and roll call voting measures – since sample sizes di er according to outcome types
due to varying data availability. For both the sponsorship analysis and the roll call voting
analyses, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the di erence in the log heights of the
density of the forcing variable at the threshold is zero (for sponsorship: ◊ = 0.34, p = 0.16;
for roll call voting: ◊ = 0.16, p = 0.59).
Second, I evaluate the continuity assumption by checking that covariates are not discon-
tinuous at the threshold. I conduct non-parametric permutation tests to assess covariate
imbalance near the threshold, following the procedure outlined in Caughey and Sekhon
(2011) but using a 5 percentage point bandwidth. I also conduct placebo RD analyses using
pre-treatment covariates as the “outcome” variable to assess whether there are discontinu-
ities in covariates at the threshold and the sensitivity of covariate imbalance to bandwidth
specification.
Figure 3.2 presents the nonparametric balance test results by outcome variable. In the
samples used to analyze sponsorship outcome data, I find that Hispanic candidates who
are incumbents and who have more experience in the chamber (as measured by number of
previous terms served and the number of previous years served) are more likely to just win
election than just lose election. Similar patterns exist in the sample used to analyze roll call
voting data, where we observe statistically significant imbalances between treatment and
control in the number of previous terms and the number of years of experience held by the
Hispanic candidate at baseline.
The results from the placebo RD analysis using covariates as “outcome” variables are
presented in Appendix Figures B.2, B.3, and B.4. These figures show, for each covariate
examined, plots of the estimated discontinuity in covariates at the threshold estimated using
a local linear specification against the bandwidth specification, with 95% confidence inter-
vals. Across samples, consistent with the findings from the nonparametric balance tests,
we find statistically significant imbalance in the Hispanic candidate’s prior experience and
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Dem. Hispanic 98 0.83 0.79 ●
Dem. Non−Hispanic 98 0.25 0.42 ●
Rep. Hispanic 98 0.17 0.21 ●
Rep. Non−Hispanic 98 0.75 0.58 ●
Inc. Hispanic 98 0.52 0.26 ●
Inc. Democrat 98 0.57 0.53
Open Election 98 0.32 0.39 ●
Prev Terms, Hisp. 98 1.2 0.32
Prev Terms, Non−Hisp. 98 0.12 0.18
Years Exp., Hisp. 98 2.9 0.68
Years Exp., Non−Hisp. 98 0.23 0.47











Dem. Hispanic 64 0.78 0.79 ●
Dem. Non−Hispanic 64 0.36 0.50 ●
Rep. Hispanic 64 0.22 0.21 ●
Rep. Non−Hispanic 64 0.64 0.50 ●
Inc. Hispanic 64 0.42 0.25 ●
Inc. Democrat 64 0.53 0.54
Open Election 64 0.42 0.43 ●
Prev Terms, Hisp. 64 0.69 0.21
Prev Terms, Non−Hisp. 64 0.08 0.21
Years Exp., Hisp. 64 1.9 0.50
Years Exp., Non−Hisp. 64 0.17 0.57
0 .05 .1 1
p−value
(b) Roll call voting score
Figure 3.2: Covariate balance between treatment (Hispanic win) and control (Hispanic loss)
within a 5 percentage point bandwidth, by outcome variable. Circles denote two-sided p-
values from Fisher’s exact test, which are used for dichotomous variables. Diamonds denote
two-sided p-values from exact Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which are used or continuous and
ordinal variables.
whether they are an incumbent, but these di erences are only statistically significant at the
0.05 level at larger bandwidths greater than approximately 0.2. Additionally we find imbal-
ance in whether the non-Hispanic candidate is a Democrat or Republican; these imbalances
are only statistically significant at a 0.05 level given bandwidth specifications ranging from
approximately 0.05 to 0.15. Among treated units the the non-Hispanic candidate is approx-
imately 20 to 40 percent more likely to be a Republican and less likely to be a Democrat.
Discontinuities of the same magnitude but in the opposite direction are observed for the
Hispanic candidate, but the magnitude of these discontinuities are smaller in size and the
di erences are not statistically significant at any bandwidth.
Imbalances in the party a liation of non-Hispanic candidates and the experience of the
Hispanic candidate are potentially problematic since the lack of statistical significance in
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small bandwidths are likely due to the small sample size. Short of acquiring an adequately
large sample size and re-testing the continuity assumption, I address concerns about covariate
imbalance by estimating models for the general election analysis including covariates and
assess the sensitivity of estimates to covariate adjustment.
3.4 Does Electing a Hispanic Candidate Lead to More
Pro-Hispanic Legislative Behavior?
In the context of close elections, I find that the “as-if” random election of a Hispanic can-
didate, instead of a non-Hispanic candidate, has suggestive positive e ects on the number
of pro-Hispanic and anti-Hispanic bills sponsored by the elected lawmaker. I also fail to
find evidence of a robust positive relationship between electing a Hispanic legislator and
pro-Hispanic roll call voting behavior on Hispanic-interest bills.




































Figure 3.3: Number of pro-Hispanic bills sponsored and Hispanic candidate vote share. Gray
dots show the raw data, circles are binned data where the radius increases in the number of
observations in the bin, and the solid line is the local linear fit.
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Figure 3.4: Number of anti-Hispanic bills sponsored and Hispanic candidate vote share. Gray
dots show the raw data, circles are binned data where the radius increases in the number of
observations in the bin, and the solid line is the local linear fit.


































Figure 3.5: Roll call voting score on Hispanic-interest bills and Hispanic candidate vote
share. Gray dots show the raw data, circles are binned data where the radius increases in
the number of observations in the bin, and the solid line is the local linear fit.
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Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the raw data using a scatterplot of the bivariate relation-
ship between the outcome variables – the number of pro- and anti-Hispanic bills sponsored
and the voting record on Hispanic-interest bills – and the forcing variable, respectively. In
the figures, the gray markers show the raw data, the circles show binned data with radii
increasing in the number of observations in each bin, and the solid line shows the local linear
fit. In the neighborhood of the threshold, the average number of pro-Hispanic bills spon-
sored and the average number of anti-Hispanic bills sponsored appears to be lower among
Hispanic candidates just elected to o ce as compared to non-Hispanic candidates just elected
to o ce. The magnitude of the unadjusted di erence appears to be larger with respect to
pro-Hispanic bill sponsorship as compared to anti-Hispanic bill sponsorship. Both magni-
tudes appear to be arguably small in substantive terms. The average roll call voting score
on Hispanic-interest bills appears to be higher among Hispanic candidates just elected to
o ce as compared to the voting records of non-Hispanic candidates just elected to o ce.
Table 3.2 summarizes, for di erent bandwidth specifications, estimates of the e ect of
electing a Hispanic candidate, instead of a non-Hispanic candidate, on each outcome measure
of substantive Hispanic representation provided by the elected legislator during the sessions
after their close election and prior to their next election. These estimates correspond to the
main RD specification using a local linear regression with state-chamber-session fixed e ects.
By column, estimates correspond to 2, 3, and 5 percentage point bandwidths and the IK
bandwidth. Results corresponding to the 1 percentage point bandwidth are not displayed
due to insu cient sample size in that bandwidth. I report the maximum of conventional and
robust standard errors clustered by jursidiction-redistricting decade. I focus primarily on the
estimates within a 5 point bandwidth since the IK bandwidth estimates, which range between
0.171 and 0.213, constitute fairly wide intervals that arguably overweight information from
districts far from the threshold that have a low ex ante probability of being a “close” election.
As shown in Panel A of Table 3.2, electing a Hispanic candidate instead of a non-Hispanic
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Specification Local Linear
Bandwidth 2 3 5 IK
A. Outcome: Number of Pro-Hispanic Bills Sponsored
(IK Bandwidth = 0.213 )
Elect Hispanic 3.414** 1.585* 0.506 0.199
(1.248) (0.886) (0.445) (0.182)
N Observations 44 66 98 369
N Districts 35 50 72 255
B. Outcome: Number of Anti-Hispanic Bills Sponsored
(IK Bandwidth = 0.186 )
Elect Hispanic 1.625*** 1.117*** 0.33 -0.142
(0.513) (0.325) (0.226) (0.14)
N Observations 44 66 98 332
N Districts 35 50 72 233
C. Outcome: Hispanic Roll Call Voting Score
(IK Bandwidth = 0.171 )
Elect Hispanic -0.419 -0.768 -0.179 0.402***
(1.3) (0.838) (0.513) (0.147)
N Observations 31 45 64 224
N Districts 24 35 51 167
Table 3.2: Local linear regression estimates of the e ect of electing a Hispanic candidate,
instead of a non-Hispanic candidate, on indicators of the quality of substantive Hispanic
representation provided by the elected legislator. Estimation models include state-chamber-
session fixed e ects. The maximum of robust standard errors clustered at the district-
redistricting decade level and conventional standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Estimates corresponding to di erent bandwidth specifications are displayed by column. Es-
timates corresponding to a 1 percentage point bandwidth are omitted due to insu cient
sample size. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
candidate increases the number of pro-Hispanic bills the elected legislator sponsors or co-
sponsors by between 0.2 and 3.4 more bills. This e ect appears to increase in size as the
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bandwidth narrows but is only statistically significant at the 0.05 level when restricting data
to a 2 percentage point bandwidth (estimate=3.414, SE=1.248, p=0.016) and at the 0.1
level when restricting data to a 5 percentage point bandwidth (estimate=1.585, SE=0.886,
p=0.084).
Panel B shows considerable variation in estimates of the e ect of electing a Hispanic
candidate on the number of anti-Hispanic bills sponsored by the elected legislator, which
range from -0.142 to 1.625. Estimates corresponding to narrower bandwidths are posi-
tive and statistically significant. Within a 5 percentage point bandwidth, the local linear
estimates are positive, ranging between 0.33 and 1.625, and the estimated e ect is signif-
icant at the 0.01 level when restricting the data to a 2 percentage point bandwidth (es-
timate=1.625, SE=0.513, p=0.007) or a 3 percentage point bandwidth (estimate=1.117,
SE=0.325, p=0.002). However, the estimated e ect corresponding to the IK bandwidth of
0.186 suggests a negative but statistically insignificant e ect (estimate=-0.142, SE=0.14,
p=0.31).
Similarly, as shown in Panel C, we observe variation in the estimated e ect of electing
a Hispanic candidate on pro-Hispanic roll call voting behavior across specifications. The
evidence suggests a null e ect among close elections. Local linear regression estimates corre-
sponding to narrow bandwidths up to 5 percentage points estimate negative but statistically
insignificant e ects on roll call voting ranging from a 0.179 to 0.768 point decrease in the rate
of pro-Hispanic voting during legislative sessions between the close election and the following
election. The inclusion of state-chamber-session fixed e ects substantively alters the point
estimates, suggesting that the results are sensitive to chamber-session level factors and may
be in part an artifact of having inadequate observations near the threshold.
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To evaluate the sensitivity of the main findings to discretion in the selection of measurement
strategies and model specification, I conduct the following four sets of sensitivity analyses and
demonstrate that the main results are qualitatively similar across these ancillary analyses.
3.5.1.1 Sensitivity to Functional Form Specification and Bandwidth Specifica-
tions
First, I assess the sensitivity of estimated e ects to functional form specifications by estimat-
ing cubic and quartic polynomial models using all of the data. I also assess the sensitivity
of estimated e ects to bandwidth specifications by replicating these analyses at bandwidths
ranging from 0.01 to 0.5 in increments of 0.01. A graphical summary of these analyses is
shown in Figure 3.6 where I plot, for each outcome variable and model specification, the ef-
fect by bandwidth specification with 95% confidence intervals in dotted lines. The columns
correspond to local linear, cubic polynomial, and quartic polynomial specifications. The
rows correspond to di erent outcome measures: pro-Hispanic bill sponsorship, anti-Hispanic
bill sponsorship, and the Hispanic roll call voting score.24
The sensitivity analysis to varying bandwidths tells us how the RD estimate, which may
be interpreted as a weighted average treatment e ect of electing a Hispanic candidate, varies
by the weight placed on the relative ex ante probability that the Hispanic candidate’s vote
share is close to 50%.25 Observations outside a specified bandwidth are given no weight
and therefore contribute no information to the estimate of the weighted average treatment
24Appendix Table B.2 summarizes the estimates from the cubic and quartic polynomial specifications
alongside the local linear regression estimates.
25I refer the reader to Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a detailed discussion of the interpretation of the RD
estimand as a weighted average treatment e ect.
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Figure 3.6: Sensitivity of Estimates Using Local Linear, Cubic Polynomial, and Quartic
Polynomial Specifications, and Varying Bandwidths. For each outcome (row) and model
specification (column), the graphs plot the estimated e ect (solid line) with 95% confidence
intervals (dotted lines) by bandwidth specification. E ects are estimated at bandwidths
ranging from 0.01 to 0.5 in 0.01 intervals. Confidence intervals are calculated using the max-
imum of conventional and robust standard errors clustered at the jurisdiction-redistricting
decade level.
e ect. At larger bandwidths, observations further from the threshold associated with safer
districts have greater relative weight. Researchers may discount estimates associated with
large bandwidths on the basis that they believe ex ante that districts far from the threshold on
the forcing variable should not contribute any information to the weighted average treatment
e ect because these observations do not constitute “close” elections.
With this in mind, the sensitivity analyses presented in Figure 3.6 show that for all
outcome measures, the RD estimate is qualitatively di erent depending on the bandwidth
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specified. A distinct pattern is that at narrow bandwidths, there is suggestive evidence that
electing a Hispanic candidate increases the volume of pro- and anti-Hispanic bills sponsored
by the elected legislator because the mean estimates generally appear to be positive across
the three functional form specifications (with the exception of the cubic polynomial spec-
ification for the pro-Hispanic bill sponsorship outcome) but is only statistically significant
when using a local linear specification. In contrast, at larger bandwidth specifications we
observe a null e ect of electing a Hispanic candidate on the volume of pro- and anti-Hispanic
bills sponsored by the elected legislator in subsequent sessions prior to their next election.
Similarly, when examining the sensitivity analyses using the roll call voting score as an out-
come, we observe a null (and sometimes negative but statistically insignificant) mean e ect
at narrow bandwidths but positive mean e ects at larger bandwidths.
3.5.1.2 Sensitivity to Covariate Adjustment
I then assess the sensitivity of e ect estimates to the inclusion of pre-treatment covariates.
When comparing the covariate adjusted estimates presented in Figure 3.7 to the unadjusted
estimates presented in Figure 3.6, we observe results that are qualitatively similar on the
whole, with minor di erences. For bill sponsorship outcomes, the mean e ects by bandwidth
across outcomes and functional form specifications are similar even after covariate adjust-
ment. The estimated mean e ects on Hispanic roll call voting become weakly positive after
covariate adjustment. The e ects on roll call voting become more e cient at large band-
widths across specifications and the e ects on the volume of pro-Hispanic bill sponsorship
loses statistical significance at narrow bandwidths.
3.5.1.3 Sensitivity to Method of Coding Candidate Ethnicity
Next, I assess the sensitivity of estimates to di erent methods of coding whether a candidate
is a Hispanic or Latino. This a ects both the set of district-elections included in the sample
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Figure 3.7: Sensitivity of Estimates to Covariate Adjustment. For each outcome (row)
and model specification (column), the graphs plot the estimated e ect (solid line) with
95% confidence intervals (dotted lines) by bandwidth specification. E ects are estimated at
bandwidths ranging from 0.01 to 0.5 in 0.01 intervals. Confidence intervals are calculated
using the maximum of conventional and robust standard errors clustered at the jurisdiction-
redistricting decade level.
definition as well as the definition of the treatment variable. I replicate the main RD analysis
but vary the matching criteria used to determine candidate ethnicity. Specifically, I specify
Hispanic or Latino candidates using the following alternative methods:
• Only the surname match method at 60, 70, 80, and 90% thresholds, where the threshold
is the percentage of individuals in the 2000 Census with that surname who self-identify
as Hispanic or Latino. I examine thresholds greater than the one used in the main anal-
ysis at 50% to impose more conservative tests of which surnames “count” as Hispanic
or Latino
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• The surname match method at each of the threshold or the NALEO directory match
method
• Only the NALEO directory matching method
As shown in Appendix B.1, the treatment e ect estimates are qualitatively similar re-
gardless of the method used to code whether a candidate is Hispanic or Latino, with the
caveat that using stricter matching criteria yields smaller sample sizes with larger uncertainty
estimates and less statistical power.
3.5.1.4 Sensitivity to Inclusion of Florida
Finally, I assess the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of Florida by replicating the
main RD analysis but excluding district-elections in Florida. The reason for doing so is
the concern that Cuban American Latinos predominant in Florida are qualitatively di erent
than other Latinos due to their close a liation with the Republican Party. The potential
empirical implications of this concern are twofold. First, failure to account for this di erence
yields a treatment variable whose e ect cannot be easily interpreted. Second, one might
speculate that any adverse e ects of electing a Hispanic legislator may be driven by the
election of Republican Cuban Americans in Florida. As shown in Appendix B.2, these
concerns do not alter the main substantive findings: the main RD results are una ected
when district-elections in Florida are excluded from the analysis.
3.5.2 Do Hispanics Do Better Under Democratic Legislators?
Given the close connection between ethnic minorities and party a liation in the contempo-
rary period, a concern is that legislator ethnic identity e ects are confounded by party e ects.
I demonstrate that ethnic identity e ects are distinct from party e ects in the present case of
Hispanic descriptive representation. To do so, I conduct a separate regression discontinuity
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analysis of close state legislative elections between Democratic and Republican candidates
in the same set of states during the same period. As shown in Figures 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10,
we find suggestive evidence that ethnic e ects are therefore qualitatively distinctive from
party e ects. In close elections electing a Democratic candidate instead of a counterfactual
Republican candidate has a positive e ect on pro-Hispanic roll call voting but no e ect on
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Figure 3.8: E ect of Electing a Democrat (vs. Republican) on Pro-Hispanic Roll Call Voting.
Estimates are local linear regression estimates with 95% confidence intervals in dotted lines.
3.5.3 Implications, Potential Mechanisms, and Future Research
Taken together, the findings presented in this paper have two major implications for our
understanding of the causal relationship between descriptive and substantive representation
with respect to Hispanics in contemporary U.S. statehouses. In close elections, I fail to find
a robust positive e ect of electing a Hispanic candidate on the elected legislator’s roll call
voting behavior on Hispanic-interest bills. While the current design is unable to distinguish
between causal mechanisms explaining the lack of a di erence between Hispanic and non-
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Figure 3.9: E ect of Electing a Democrat (vs. Republican) on Pro-Hispanic Bill Sponsorship.
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Figure 3.10: E ect of Electing a Democrat (vs. Republican) on Anti-Hispanic Bill Sponsor-
ship. Estimates are local linear regression estimates with 95% confidence intervals in dotted
lines.
Hispanic legislators in their voting behavior on Hispanic-interest bills, this is an important
causal finding that pushes back against a vast empirical and theoretical literature suggesting
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a positive e ect in general and a weakly positive e ect for Hispanics in the United States.
I also find intriguing suggestive evidence that electing a Hispanic candidate instead of a
non-Hispanic candidate yields an increase in the number of pro-Hispanic and anti-Hispanic
bills sponsored by the elected legislator. What might explain this pattern? One possibility
is that Hispanic legislators seek to mollify and attract the marginal votes of non-Hispanic
constituencies who hold some anti-Hispanic positions to bu er against a loss in the next
election, given the competitiveness of the district.
Another potential explanation could be that Hispanic candidates who just win election
are more racially conservative than their non-Hispanic counterparts who just win election.
While data do not exist on the ex ante racial conservatism of candidates, we can look to
di erences in partisanship among Hispanic and non-Hispanic legislators who just win as an
imperfect but nonetheless informative proxy. The results from the placebo RD analyses
using covariates as “outcome” measures shown in Appendix Figures B.2 and B.3 suggest
that this explanation is unlikely. Non-Hispanic candidates who just win are more likely to
be Republicans than Hispanic candidates who just win, and Hispanic candidates who just
win are more likely than non-Hispanic candidates who just win to be Democrats.
The results from the RD analysis also illuminate new questions for future research.
First, the suggestive finding that electing a Hispanic candidate increases both pro- and
anti-Hispanic bill sponsorship raises questions about di erences in the behavior of minority
versus non-minority legislators seeking re-election in a competitive electoral setting and dif-
ferences in the motivations and constraints driving their behavior. Do Hispanic legislators
who just win in competitive elections have more leeway than non-Hispanic legislators who
just win to engage in a combination of pro-Hispanic and anti-Hispanic behavior? Second, the
fact that we observe di erent e ects across outcome measures of substantive representation
raise questions about group di erences in the perceived costs associated with di erent types
of pro- and anti-minority legislative behavior.
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Finally, future work can utilize alternative RD designs that provide cleaner tests of the
causal e ect of an elected legislator’s membership in an underrepresented group and, more
generally, group identification theories of elite political behavior. The current design only
provides leverage to recover the reduced form relationship of electing a Hispanic candidate
instead of a counterfactual non-Hispanic candidate. This is a di erent quantity than the
causal e ect of a legislator’s ethnicity or race. One possible design that makes progress
in this direction involves restricting the RD sample to close primary elections between a
Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidate who share the same party identification in safe districts
for the political party to which the candidates belong.26 This design would then allow us
to identify the conditional e ects of electing a minority candidate by party. This design is
attractive because among political elites in the United States, a candidate’s racial or ethnic
group membership is viewed as being collinear with partisanship. African Americans have
strongly identified with the Democratic Party in the wake of the civil rights movement (e.g.,
Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Hetherington, 2001; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009) and growing
associations between restrictionist, anti-immigrant policy positions and the Republican Party
have emerged since 1994 that has moved Hispanic political elites (with the general exception
of Cuban Americans in Florida) closer to the Democratic Party (Tichenor, 2002). Thus an
analysis of conditional e ects by party would allow us to “net out” any potential confounding
e ects of candidate partisanship that might interact with the treatment variable in the
current design of electing a Hispanic candidate.
For the case of Hispanic representation, the ability to make informative inferences from
such a design is currently limited by the dearth of close elections between Hispanic and non-
Hispanic candidates sharing the same party identification in primary elections. For instance,
26Following others in the literature (cf. Hirano and Snyder, 2014), a safe state legislative (congressional)
district may be conservatively operationalized as one with at least a 20 percentage point di erence in the
average di erence of the two-party vote share in the gubernatorial (presidential) vote during the redistricting
decade. The use of the gubernatorial or presidential vote is intended to avoid post-treatment bias.
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Bandwidth 1 2 5 10 20 30 40 50
Number of Democratic Primary Elections 0 1 4 8 31 46 61 65
Number of Republican Primary Elections 0 0 1 5 11 19 23 25
Table 3.3: Number of U.S. House Primary Elections with a Hispanic Candidate and a Non-
Hispanic Candidate, by Political Party, 1966-2006.
as Table 3.3 shows for U.S. House primary elections between 1966 and 2006, there are zero
primary elections within a 1 point bandwidth, only one Democratic primary election in a
2 point bandwidth, and only four Democratic primary elections and one Republican pri-
mary election between a Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidate where the margin of victory
is within a 5 point bandwidth. A similar paucity of close primary elections between His-
panic and non-Hispanic candidates in safe districts exist at the state legislative level, in part
due to high incumbent re-election rates (Niemi et al., 2006) and a low supply of Hispanic
candidates relative to the number of contested primary elections. This limitation will grad-
ually disappear and this method will become more powerful in the future as the supply of
Hispanic candidates for legislative o ce and the number of close elections between Hispanic
and non-Hispanic candidates increase alongside Hispanic population growth.27
3.6 Conclusion
Does descriptive representation a ect the quality of substantive representation for under-
represented groups? This paper investigates this causal question using the case of Hispanic
representation in five U.S. statehouses between 1993 and 2014. By applying a regression
discontinuity design to an original dataset of elections between Hispanic and non-Hispanic
27For state legislative general elections between 1972 and 2011, the correlation between the Hispanic
population share in a state in a decennial census and the number of elections between Hispanic and non-
Hispanic candidates that occur during the following redistricting decade in that state is 0.86 for lower
chambers, and 0.8 for upper chambers.
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candidates for state legislative o ce linked to data of state legislative behavior, I identify
the causal e ect of electing a Hispanic candidate, instead of a non-Hispanic candidate, on
the quality of substantive Hispanic representation provided by the elected legislator.
In a substantial departure from dominant expectations in the literature, which posits a
positive relationship between descriptive and substantive minority representation in general
and a weakly positive relationship for Hispanics in the United States, I find that the net
behavior of Hispanic legislators is more complicated than is suggested by existing research.
Hispanic legislators may be more likely than their non-Hispanic counterparts to introduce
and co-sponsor both pro-Hispanic and anti-Hispanic legislation. I also fail to find evidence
of a robust positive relationship between electing a Hispanic legislator and pro-Hispanic roll
call voting behavior on Hispanic-interest bills.
Furthermore, when considering the findings on ethnic identity e ects alongside the results
from the regression discontinuity analysis of legislator party e ects, this paper presents the
first causal evidence bearing on competing, dominant theories about how legislators’ partisan
and ethnic identities a ect the quality of substantive representation they provide an ethnic
minority group. Whereas scholars of minority politics previously made empirical arguments
about the e ects of a legislator’s ethnicity after controlling for their party or vice versa, I
identify the main e ects of both party and ethnicity on elite behavior and show that each
has a distinctive e ect on di erent forms of legislative behavior a ecting underrepresented
minorities.
The findings illuminate new avenues of inquiry in the study of elite behavior toward
underrepresented groups in the setting of competitive elections, raising intriguing questions
for future theory building and testing on di erences between minority and non-minority
legislators in their latitude to engage in anti-minority behavior in competitive districts.
Finally, this essay makes an important methodological contribution to the literature on
descriptive and substantive minority representation. The research design used in this essay
103
CHAPTER 3. HOW DO LEGISLATOR IDENTITIES AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE
MINORITY REPRESENTATION? EVIDENCE FROM HISPANIC REPRESENTATION
IN THE STATES
will be increasingly useful and promising as the share of ethnic minorities in the population,
the supply of minority candidates, and the number of close elections between minority and
non-minority candidates increases over time. One might expect increases in the incidence of
close elections between an ethnic candidate and a non-ethnic candidate to be most likely in
geographic areas with increases in an ethnic minority population and where between-group
segregation is low, such that concentrations of ethnic minorities are not easily redistricted into
a majority-ethnic district. With the prospect of additional cases over time, the application
of this method will provide leverage to produce increasingly precise estimates of the e ect of
electing an ethnic candidate, instead of a counterfactual non-ethnic candidate, on substantive
minority representation.
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“Ambition lies at the heart of politics.”
— Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (1966), p. 1
“This innocent country set you down in a ghetto in which, in fact, it intended that
you should perish. Let me spell out precisely what I mean by that for the heart of the
matter is here and the crux of my dispute with my country. You were born where you
were born and faced the future that you faced because you were black and for no
other reason. The limits to your ambition were thus expected to be settled. You were
born into a society which spelled out with brutal clarity and in as many ways as
possible that you were a worthless human being. You were not expected to aspire to
excellence.”
— James Baldwin, “A Letter to My Nephew” (1962)
4.1 Introduction
Scholars of political inequality have long been concerned about inequalities in descriptive
representation, which are theorized to a ect between-group inequalities in mass political be-
havior and substantive political representation (Mansbridge, 1999). To explain the numerical
underrepresentation of historically marginalized social groups, scholars have sought to un-
derstand two political processes that determine whether a minority politician is elected:
factors a ecting whether minorities decide to seek elected o ce and factors a ecting the
likelihood minorities win elected o ce conditional on seeking it. This article focuses on un-
derstanding the first of these processes, endogenous group di erences in o ce seeking, which
is understudied both theoretically and empirically.
I focus in particular on ethnic and racial minorities, whose undersupply as elected o -
cials and candidates is well documented in contemporary American politics. In the 114th
Congress (2015-2016), which has been noted as the most diverse American Congress to date,
of the 535 members of Congress, 46 (8.6%) are Black, 32 (6%) are Hispanic, 11 (2.1%) are
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Asian American, and 2 (0.4%) are Native American (Krogstad, 2015). A similar pattern
exists at the subnational level. As of 2009, African American legislators comprised only 9%
of all state legislative seats despite being 13% of the population and Hispanic and Latino
legislators comprised only 4% of state legislative seats despite being 14% of the population
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2009). And as of 2012, Asian American legisla-
tors comprised only 1.3% of all state legislative seats despite being 4.8% of the population
(Bhojwani, 2014). Scholars have attributed the undersupply of minority elected o cials in
part to disproportionately low rates of running for o ce among minority groups relative
to whites (e.g., Fox and Lawless, 2005; Shah, 2014). For instance, Fox and Lawless (2005)
analyze survey data from their Citizen Political Ambition Study, which surveyed a national
sample of individuals from professional backgrounds that are most common among political
candidates,1 and find that among these respondents who are believed to be the most likely to
select into politics, individuals belonging to social groups historically excluded from politics
– blacks, Latinos, and women – are much less likely than whites and men to considering
running for o ce.
What explains variation in the supply of political candidates across ethnoracial groups
and the undersupply of ethnic minority candidates in particular? Under what conditions are
ethnic minority political candidates more likely to emerge? Descriptive accounts in recent
research suggest a seemingly obvious but under-studied link between intergroup economic
inequalities and intergroup political inequalities in the supply of candidates. Carnes (2015)
finds that racial and ethnic minority elected o cials are more likely than white elected
o cials to have working-class backgrounds, which suggests an association between group
membership and lower class status. Furthermore, pathways to elected o ce are controlled
1These professional backgrounds include law, business, education, and political/community activism,
which Fox and Lawless (2005) determine based on findings from Dolan and Ford (1997) and Moncrief,
Squire and Jewell (2001).
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by gatekeepers belonging to the political elite who strategically recruit “high quality” candi-
dates. However, there is evidence that these gatekeepers tend to systematically under-recruit
potentially good candidates who belong to historically underrepresented social groups and
who come from working class backgrounds (e.g., Broockman et al., 2014; Crowder-Meyer,
2013). Taken together, these descriptive findings raise a puzzle about whether and how po-
litical inequalities in the representation of underrepresented groups at the earliest stages of
the career pipeline to becoming a politician might be related to prior between-group social
and economic inequalities – in particular inequalities that a ect (i) the joint distribution of
potential candidates across groups who are objectively qualified and who wish to select into
politics as a vocation, (ii) perceptions of this joint distribution given the set of objectively
qualified and interested potential candidates, and (iii) the implications of these percep-
tions for between-group inequalities in whether potential candidates select into politics and
whether political gatekeepers recruit these candidates.
The bulk of recent scholarship trying to explain who selects into running for o ce has em-
phasized the important role that candidate quality plays in processes of strategic candidate
selection and recruitment (e.g., Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004; Hirano
and Snyder, 2014). Voters and party gatekeepers among the political elite tend to prefer
high quality candidates. Most candidates who select into politics and who decide to run for
o ce are, on average, of an adequately “high” candidate quality. Primary elections are a
useful mechanism to select higher quality candidates over lower quality candidates (Hirano
and Snyder, 2014). Indicators of candidate quality are often measured in terms of occupa-
tional background (Moncrief, Squire and Jewell, 2001; Dolan and Ford, 1997; Sanbonmatsu,
2002) or educational background (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008),2 which is a ready cue for “com-
petence” – the human capital one previously developed through experience that would be
2Other subjective markers of candidate quality used in the literature, such as endorsements, are arguably
outcomes of prior assessments based on other markers of candidate traits.
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relevant to a politician’s job. These markers may also be associated with stereotypes about
candidates’ personal qualities that voters might prefer.
If occupational cues are in fact critical to how voters and gatekeepers evaluate citizens as
potential candidates and if potential candidates strategically decide to run for o ce condi-
tional on how they think they will be perceived, then a logical next step in theory building
and theory testing is to consider whether and how occupational stratification between groups
– which is the correlation between occupational status and group membership – relates to
the undersupply of minority political candidates. In this paper I develop and explore the
plausibility of such a theory. In doing so, I make a key theoretical departure from past work
seeking to explain between-group inequalities in the supply of political candidates.
Theories exploring the association between intergroup economic inequalities and inter-
group political inequalities in the candidate supply are not extensively developed or tested
in the literature. Early research exploring endogenous group di erences in the supply of
political candidates were primarily group-specific theories of political participation, of which
o ce-seeking was considered a part. Much of this work was developed to explain levels of
black political participation, but these theories have been extended and tested to assess their
validity with respect to Latinos and Asians. A prominent theory is the minority empower-
ment thesis, which states that the presence of a minority group member on the ballot or the
victory of a minority candidate in an electoral race will subsequently empower individuals
belonging to that group to participate in politics at higher rates by appealing to co-racial
or co-ethnic group identification, and that this mobilizing e ect is central to understanding
turnout in majority-minority districts (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Browning, Marshall and
Tabb, 1984; Leighley, 2001; Smith, 1996; Harris, Sinclair-Chapman and McKenzie, 2005).3
Another prominent theory is the social isolation thesis, which argues that concentrated
3See de la Garza (2004), Barreto, Segura and Woods (2004), and Henderson, Sekhon and Titiunik (2014)
regarding its validity with respect to Latinos.
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poverty among racial minorities – in particular African Americans – leads to reduced par-
ticipation in social and political life (Cohen and Dawson, 1993; Dawson, 1994; Harris, 1999;
Hochschild, 1995; Wilson, 1987). At their core these theses are social psychological argu-
ments that are arguably more plausible when the outcome variable is a form of mass political
behavior that is relatively low-cost or non-strategic, such as sincere voting most likely to oc-
cur when a person is intrinsically motivated to vote (e.g., by deriving expressive benefits from
voting out of duty to one’s own group or out of habit) or because a person is intrinsically mo-
tivated to vote (e.g., in response to social pressure). However, as standalone theories, they
are less convincing when applied to the study of behavioral outcomes that involve costly
tradeo s and strategic considerations such as the decision to seek elected o ce. A closely
related second body of research concerned the strategic incentives of minority candidates
to run for o ce as a function of electoral considerations. This line of research generally
argues that candidates are strategic when deciding whether to run for o ce and that there
are between-group di erences in the types of strategic considerations potential candidates
make that lead to inequalities in the candidate supply across groups. Within this umbrella of
scholarship, one prominent research agenda argues that the presence of minority candidates
is endogenous to redistricting and that ethnic and racial minority group members are most
likely to run for o ce in “majority-minority” districts (Canon, Schousen and Sellers, 1996;
Canon, 1999; Krebs, 1999; Meier et al., 2005; Barreto, 2007; Branton, 2009; Fraga, 2014),
perhaps in part due to the mobilizing e ect of having a minority on the ballot. Another set of
scholars have sought to examine empirical correlates of the supply of minority candidates as a
function of demographic, political, electoral, and individual-level predictors (e.g., Shah, 2014;
Fox and Lawless, 2005) but as a whole this line of inquiry is generally under-theorized. A
third and nascent research agenda seeks to understand the role of psychological mechanisms
in explaining intergroup di erences in candidate emergence. Kanthak and Woon (2014),
for example, use a laboratory experiment manipulating the incentives candidates face and
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features of the electoral environment and find a higher rate of “election aversion” among
women relative to men. While substantively interesting and useful in broader debates about
mechanisms, research on psychological microfoundations conducted in the lab are limited in
their ability to compellingly explain broader, macro-level political inequalities in behavior.
This article mimics the arc of developing a new research agenda assessing the relationship
between intergroup economic inequalities and political inequalities in descriptive representa-
tion, and is organized into two parts. In the first part of the article, I propose a new theory
relating intergroup economic inequalities to intergroup inequalities in the supply of political
candidates. The general argument is structured in two parts. I build on prior work on
strategic candidate selection (as it relates to candidate quality in equilibrium) and present
a decision-theoretic model about the conditions under which any potential candidate would
choose to run for o ce. I then use the decision-theoretic model to argue that structural
economic inequalities in the form of intergroup occupational stratification a ects both (i)
between-group di erences in interest in pursuing elected political o ce as an occupation
and (ii) between-group di erences in potential candidates’ net expected returns from run-
ning for o ce, which is in part a function of how they expect party elites and voters to
respond to their candidacy. This in turn results in the underrepresentation of ethnic and
racial minorities among the supply of political candidates.
The second part of the article presents an exploratory empirical analysis and serves two
purposes: it sheds light on whether robust correlations exist between interethnic occupa-
tional inequalities and the supply of minority political candidates, which have not yet been
systematically examined in the literature, and it provides a first-cut at assessing the plausibil-
ity of the above theory and selected mechanisms in this theory. To these ends, I document
variation in occupational stratification across ethnic groups in the United States. I then
assess aggregate-level correlations between measures of occupational stratification and the
supply of putatively ethnic minority candidates. I find that black-surnamed candidates are
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more likely to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level proportion of blacks
in low occupational status4 public sector jobs is high and the proportion of blacks in high
occupational status public sector jobs is low. Hispanic-surnamed candidates are more likely
to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level proportion of Hispanics in low
occupational status public sector jobs is high and when the proportion of Hispanics in high
occupational status public sector jobs is low, or when the proportion of Hispanics in low
occupational status private sector jobs is high. Asian-surnamed candidates are more likely
to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level proportion of Asians in low occu-
pational status private sector jobs is low and the proportion of Asians in high occupational
status private sector jobs is high.
This article is the beginning of a broader research agenda on the topic of inequalities in
endogenous candidate selection across social groups. The theory presented seeks to artic-
ulate an argument about a potential causal relationship between between-group economic
inequalities in status endowments and endogenous inequalities in the supply of political can-
didates across ethnic and racial groups. It is therefore broader and more ambitious in scope
than that of the empirical analysis presented in this paper: many of the claims and possible
mechanisms presented in the theory section of this article are not tested, but the empirical
analyses presented are an important first cut at assessing the plausibility of any correlation
between the two main theoretical variables of interest: occupational stratification and the
minority candidate supply. I proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the theory. Section 3 de-
scribes the data. Section 4 provides case background and descriptive statistics illustration in
occupational stratification and the supply of minority candidates among U.S. congressional
4Here, I refer to occupations and jobs in terms of their status, a term which is more commonly used by
sociologists. Throughout the paper, the term “status” refers to occupational status. Economists sometimes
refer to this characteristic of jobs in terms of the level of technical skill required: there are high- and low-
skilled jobs. I use the term “status” instead of “skill” because the type of job one has – or has had – may be
used as a marker of social status.
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primary elections analyzed in the paper. Section 5 describes the estimation strategy for the
correlational analyses and Section 6 presents the main findings. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Theory
4.2.1 Related Literature
This theory builds on several literatures relevant to causal theories of political candidate
selection. The first of these is the “citizen-candidate” framework in political economy for
understanding candidate selection, where politicians are not assumed to be exogenous but
rather are citizens who choose to seek o ce and compete in an election and where voters
select citizens (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996).5 Citizens vary in
their policy preferences (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996), in the set of
market skills they possess, which is commonly assumed to be associated with task-specific
political skills and candidate quality (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008),
and in their interest in entering electoral politics.
Nearly all of the literature in this tradition applies price theory to develop and test
supply-side arguments about candidate quality in equilibrium. Theoretical work by Caselli
and Morelli (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004) find that in equilibrium, low quality
candidates are more likely than high quality candidates to seek o ce, either because the
opportunity cost of entering politics increases as politician salaries decrease relative to the
market wage for high quality potential candidates (Caselli and Morelli, 2004) or because high
quality potential candidates have an incentive to free-ride on the e orts of low quality politi-
cians when politician salaries are low (Messner and Polborn, 2004). Whatever the mechanism
may be, the partial equilibrium result of low politician wages relative to the market wage is
5See Besley (2005) and Ashworth (2012) for comprehensive overviews of the literature on political selec-
tion via elections, and see Fearon (1999) and Besley (2006) for seminal treatments of the topic.
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that higher quality candidates are more likely to select out of politics and lower quality can-
didates are more likely to select into politics. This result may be counterbalanced, however,
by voters’ preference for competent, high-quality politicians and high-quality politicians’ de-
cision to select into politics expecting a higher likelihood of winning (given their perception
that voters prefer high quality candidates) and the prospect of “ego rents” like financial
and in-kind benefits (above and beyond the politician’s salary) or the status-based psychic
satisfaction associated with being an elected o cial (Caselli and Morelli, 2004). Empiri-
cal political economy research on the topic focuses on testing these theoretical propositions
by exploiting cross-sectional and temporal variation in public policies regulating politician
salaries to estimate the impact of politician wage shocks on average candidate quality (e.g.,
Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Fisman et al., 2014). This literature o ers a general analytic frame-
work that is useful and easily adaptable to understand endogenous o ce-seeking choices and
endogenous distributions of candidate characteristics other than candidate quality — in this
case, the distribution of the candidate supply by candidates’ ethnic group membership.
An important caveat to this partial equilibrium result about politician wage e ects is that
it is specific to a theory explaining the endogenous distribution of candidate quality where
the decrease in average candidate quality is driven by the outflow of high quality potential
candidates (at the top of the candidate quality distribution) from the set of candidates who
would potentially seek o ce. Endogenous distributions of candidate characteristics – either
for candidate quality at locations other than the top of the distribution or for other candidate
characteristics correlated with candidate quality – may be due to inequalities in the distri-
bution of constraints and opportunity costs that correlate with these other characteristics
and political selection into or out of electoral politics by these characteristics. Focusing on
causal factors that explain endogenous inequalities in the ethnic distribution of the candi-
date supply is an important theoretical point of departure I make from the literature. From
this vantage, the undersupply of political candidates who are members of the working class
114
CHAPTER 4. OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION, AND THE
UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES
(e.g., Carnes, 2012), ethnic and racial minorities (for a comprehensive literature review see
Gri n, 2014), and females (e.g., Swers, 2002; Reingold, 2000; Center for American Women
and Politics, 2010) may be explained by structural factors that impose greater constraints
and opportunity costs on these groups relative to the upper class, whites, and men, respec-
tively. Given that the outcome of interest in the present article is the distribution of the
candidate supply across social groups, a useful application of the citizen-candidate model of
political selection would be most convincing if the set of theorized mechanisms explain not
just equilibrium results “on average” but the equilibrium results across all groups.
This theory also builds on a second literature on individuals’ use of group-centric heuris-
tics for candidate evaluation (Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock,
1993; Popkin, 1991; Conover and Feldman, 1989; Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953). Both
voters and (to a lesser extent) elites operate in relatively low-information environments.6
When evaluating an object, people use observable and accessible markers of that object to
make inferences about its qualities in order to evaluate it. With respect to both potential
and actual political candidates, a vast literature exists on how these heuristics are commonly
based on observable and accessible characteristics of the candidates themselves, such as racial
or ethnic cues (e.g., Valentino, Hutchings and White, 2002), gendered cues (e.g., Sanbon-
matsu, 2002; McDermott, 1997; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Rosenwasser and Seale, 1988),
occupational cues (e.g., Carnes and Sadin, 2015; McDermott, 2005; Hout, 2008; Manza and
Brooks, 2008; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008), or partisan cues (e.g., Rahn, 1993; Kuklinski and
6Two caveats are necessary. First, how much information elites have depends on their resource con-
straints. Political elites with more resources can make larger investments in researching the background of
potential candidates, whereas elites with fewer resources operate in an information environment that would
closely resemble the that of an average informed voter. Conditional on the return on investment in infor-
mation being high, elites would be able to act strategically in a high information environment. However
the richness of one’s information environment does not necessarily increase in the amount one invests in
obtaining information: one might spend a lot on research but obtain invalid or highly uncertain information.
The second caveat is that even if elites were in a high information environment, information search costs
may be high if cognitive capacity is constrained relative to the quantity or the uncertainty of information
available, and elites may still fall back on using heuristics to make strategic decisions.
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Hurley, 1994; Scha ner and Streb, 2002; Arceneaux, 2008). Conditional on the individual’s
group identification and social attitudes, these cues in turn activate specific group-centric
stereotypes that inform candidate evaluations (Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Tajfel, 1982).
A third literature this theory builds upon is research on the role of party elites in can-
didate recruitment and selection (e.g., Norris, 1997; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988) and their
endogenous preferences for “quality” candidates (Logan, 1996). The theory presented in this
article is distinct from prior “citizen-candidate” selection models because it explicitly con-
siders party elites as central actors and their incentives to recruit specific types of candidates
during the period leading up to a primary election. Strategic elite e orts to recruit candi-
dates for electoral o ce can in turn a ect the characteristics of the supply of candidates,
because a subset of potential candidates will strategically decide to run for o ce conditional
on receiving party support.
Recent literature on the role of parties in candidate selection focuses predominately on
the role of primary elections as a mechanism political parties use to select “high quality”
candidates. Hirano and Snyder (2014) argue, for instance, that primaries are especially
important for advantaged parties in safe districts to select high quality candidates in open-
seat elections. Primary elections may also serve as an opportunity for parties in competitive
districts to select high quality candidates who may be their best chance at winning the general
election. In safe districts, the disadvantaged party, driven by the incentive of organizational
survival, may still wish to select a “high-enough” quality candidate simply to avoid any
reputation costs associated with fielding an embarrassing joke candidate.
But in addition to the primary election as a selection mechanism, members of the party
elite may also engage in candidate recruitment e orts prior to the primary election that
influences the candidate supply in the primary election. Activists and politicians among
the party elite have an incentive to strategically recruit candidates to run for o ce, and
those recruited as candidates by party elites are bestowed the endorsements and resources
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of the party elites who back them. This argument has been advanced most forcefully by
Cohen et al. (2008) in their model of the “invisible primary” in the post-1970s era, in which
party elites recruit, select, and anoint who they consider to be viable presidential candidates
prior to each party’s primary election process. While the argument presented by Cohen
et al. (2008) is specific to presidential candidate selection, the basic argument they make
is applicable to understanding the strategic role of party elites in candidate recruitment in
elections more generally. This pre-primary selection process influences the distribution of
candidates who choose to enter the electoral race. Relative to those potential candidates
who do receive party elite support and decide to run for o ce, potential candidates who
fail to earn the backing of party elites are more likely to expect to be at a comparative
disadvantage in terms of accessing party resources and media attention. They are thus more
likely to expect a low probability of winning, which has a multiplier e ect in reducing the
expected returns from running for o ce such that they select out of the candidate pool. We
could think of this as an endogenous process of selection into a common agency arrangement
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Ferejohn, 1986; Holstrom and Milgrom, 1987, 1991) where
potential candidates choose to run for o ce because they are willing to be agents to both
party elites and voters and where party elites get the first crack at signaling their interest in
contracting with potential candidates.
An important theoretical assumption worth emphasizing is that elite preferences over
candidate types are endogenous and potential political candidates choose to seek o ce par-
tially depending on how they think elites will evaluate them. This assumption comports with
work in economic sociology and labor economics describing the job search process as one of
matching between employers and workers (Pager and Pedulla, 2015; Logan, 1996; Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). At the micro-level, employers engage
in statistical discrimination to evaluate potential workers and workers potentially alter their
job search behavior anticipating this discrimination (e.g., Arrow, 1972; Phelps, 1972; Pager,
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2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Pager and Karafin, 2009). At the macro-level, pat-
terns in the distribution of opportunities provided by employers to potential workers depend
on employers’ preferences over worker types and the distribution of workers that exist are
a function of prior structural inequalities (Logan, 1996).7 In the context of the political
candidate selection process, elites’ preferences over candidate types may be due to a range
of factors. First, party elites may simply prefer higher quality candidates to lower quality
candidates. Elites may also have systematic biases in the stereotypes they have associating
groups with candidate quality. Thus in the process of recruiting high quality candidates,
elites may systematically favor potential candidates belonging to groups associated with
high quality candidates over candidates belonging to other groups associated with low qual-
ity candidates. This may also occur in equilibrium if party elites were to select candidates
solely based on their incentive to be responsive to voters, and anticipate voters to possess the
same biased associations between group membership and candidate quality. Second, party
elites may have explicit preferences for candidates belonging to certain social groups. For
instance, elites belonging to minority groups may prefer to actively recruit minority candi-
dates in order to reverse their underrepresentation. To these ends, members of the party elite
belonging to underrepresented groups may directly recruit high quality minority candidates
7There is limited empirical research testing theories of occupational self-selection by group membership.
With respect to race, recent work by Pager and Pedulla (2015) finds that African American job seekers
adapt to the expectation of labor market discrimination not by targeting or avoiding certain job types, but
by pursuing jobs in a broader range of occupations relative to whites. These findings are specific to the
low-wage labor market, however, as the sample is from a panel of New Jersey unemployment insurance (UI)
recipients. Thus their findings may not generalize to explain the self-selection process in political o ce-
seeking where we might expect individual behavior to be responsive to higher costs of job-seeking: becoming
an elected o cial and attaining membership in the ranks of the political elite may be considered a club good;
the cost of obtaining it is fairly high in terms of time, e ort, and resources; and the expectation of having
to confront discrimination and prejudice (from voters and political elites) is greater during the job search
process than one would expect when applying to most non-political jobs (which would be relatively costless
and usually require an application and a resume). In another study, Holzer and Reaser (2000) conduct a
cross-sectional analysis of observational data to describe systematic variation in black job applications by job
and firm characteristics and find that black applicants apply for work “where their chances of being hired are
greater, indicating rationality in the self-selection process” (377). As such, there are still good theoretical
reasons to believe that self-selection is possible with respect to seeking the job of elected o ce.
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either from their own ranks (Norris, 1993, 1997; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988) or from the set
of qualified potential candidates in professional careers who are considered qualified for an
occupation in politics (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005).
4.2.2 Argument
Consider the period leading up to a district-election. Assume the district holds a primary
election and a general election. There are three types of players: citizens who comprise
the set of individuals from whom potential and actual candidates emerge; party elites who
can endorse candidates and provide endorsements and resources to candidates; and voters
who elect a party nominee during the primary election and a candidate into o ce in the
general election. Citizens – and by extension potential candidates, party elites, and voters –
belong to one of two social groups.8 This setup is similar to that in other models of strategic
candidate selection (e.g., Hirano and Snyder, 2014; Fox and Lawless, 2005) but with the
added di erence that citizens may belong to one of two social groups and all players has
preferences over candidate quality and candidates’ group membership.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the decision tree a citizen might utilize when deciding whether to
run for o ce. Conditional on being interested in politics and on being interested in pursuing
elected o ce as one’s occupation, a citizen decides to run for o ce if they perceive net
positive expected returns from doing so. The net expected returns from running for o ce
can be decomposed into the following set of expected benefits and costs:
ui = ≠(ci,t + oi,t)¸ ˚˙ ˝
expected running costs
+ ”i ◊ Pr(Wi) ◊ [(pi,t+1 + ei,t+1) ≠ (oi,t+1)]¸ ˚˙ ˝
expected returns from winning seat
where i indexes a potential candidate, t denotes the campaign period (prior to the election) in
8The logic of the argument easily generalizes to scenarios with three or more social groups.
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(1) Are you 
interested in 
politics?
(2) Are you 
interested in 
being an elected 
politician as an 
occupation?
(3) Are you 
interested in 
running for 
office in a 
district-election?





RUN FOR OFFICE 
DO NOT RUN FOR OFFICE 
DO NOT RUN FOR OFFICE 
DO NOT RUN FOR OFFICE 









Figure 4.1: A citizen’s decision to run for o ce.
the short term, t+1 denotes the period after the election. The term ui denotes the potential
candidate’s expected utility from running for o ce, which is decomposed into short-term
running costs plus the expected returns from winning the seat. The short-term running
costs are the sum of campaign costs, ci,t (time, e ort, and money needed to campaign for the
seat) and any opportunity costs associated with campaigning for o ce, oi,t, such as foregone
wages from one’s current job. The expected returns from winning the seat are equal to the
sum of expected future policy returns, pi,t+1, and expected future ego rents from winning
such as psychic or monetary benefits associated with being an elected o cial, ei,t+1, minus
120
CHAPTER 4. OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION, AND THE
UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES
expected future opportunity costs such as the wages they would hypothetically forgo from
another occupation they would have had they not won election, oi,t+1. This quantity is scaled
by the potential candidate’s probability of winning the election, Pr(Wi), which depends in
part on how they believe voters will evaluate them and how political elites will a ect voter
evaluations based on their endorsements and their allocation of resources and attention across
candidates, and by some discount factor ”i œ [0, 1] the potential candidate might apply to
future expected returns. For the sake of simplicity and because it is relatively trivial, assume
”i = 1.
At the individual level, potential candidates decide to run for o ce if ui > 0 – that is,
if they expect the net returns from winning o ce (the second term in the above equation)
to be greater than the expected campaign costs (the first term in the above equation). The
probability of running for o ce would thus decrease in ci,t, oi,t, and oi,t+1; and increase in
Pr(Wi), pi,t+1, and ei,t+1. Aggregating up to the group level, we would expect systematic
di erences between groups in the probability of running for elected o ce across groups if
there were either (i) systematic di erences between groups in levels of interest in elected
o ce as an occupation or (ii) structural social and economic di erences across groups that
created between-group di erentials in the net expected returns from running for o ce which
could occur by a ecting the expected benefits associated with winning, the expected costs
of winning, the expected probability of winning, or the expected short-term campaign costs
of running for o ce.
I o er a theory that relates structural economic inequalities in terms of interethnic occu-
pational stratification with inequalities in the supply of political candidates between ethnic
groups. Intergroup occupational stratification exists when there is a correlation between
group membership and occupational status. To illustrate this concept, consider a society
with two social groups (A and B) and two occupation status groups (high and low). As
shown in the left panel of Table 4.1, “perfect” stratification occurs when group membership
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(I) Perfect Stratification (II) Zero Stratification
Occupational Social Group Occupational Social Group
Status A B Status A B
HIGH 100% 0 HIGH 50% 50%
LOW 0 100% LOW 50% 50%
Table 4.1: Two illustrations of the concept of intergroup occupational stratification
is perfectly correlated with occupational status such that 100% of the members of one social
group are in a high-status occupation and 100% of the members of another social group are
in a low-status occupation. In contrast, the right panel of Table 4.1 shows a scenario in
which there is zero intergroup occupational stratification because there is zero correlation
between group membership and occupational status. For both social groups A and B, ex-
actly 50% of the group has a high occupational status and exactly 50% of the group has a
low occupational status.
I argue that intergroup occupational stratification leads to both (i) between-group dif-
ferences in levels of interest in pursuing elected political o ce as an occupation and (ii)
between-group di erences in the net expected returns from running for o ce by a ecting
how potential candidates expect voters and party elites to react to their candidacy. This
leads to di erences in the supply of political candidates across groups in equilibrium. The
remainder of this section presents potential mechanisms explaining these relationships.
4.2.2.1 Between-group inequalities in levels of interest in elected o ce as an
occupation
Citizens select into the pool of potential candidates if they have adequate interest in the
occupation of a politician and if they believe they have an adequate ability to do the job. In-
terethnic occupational stratification can lead to inequalities between ethnic groups in interest
in being a politician in one of two ways:
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Di erential beliefs about the e cacy of politics and government. First, in-
terethnic occupational stratification may leads to between-group inequalities in levels of
interest in seeking political o ce. Consistent with the social isolation thesis, high occupa-
tional stratification leads to high between-group income and wealth inequalities that a ect
levels of trust, interest, and participation in politics. Low occupational status ethnic groups
are more likely than high occupational status groups to experience concentrated poverty and
socioeconomic segregation. In turn, when interethnic occupational stratification is high, low
occupational status ethnic minorities may be less likely than their high occupational status
majority group counterparts to believe that formal political and government institutions
are an e cacious means through which the group can attain their desired policy outcomes
and thus be less willing to participate in formal political processes including o ce-seeking
(Weaver and Lerman, 2010; Brayne, 2014).
Informational asymmetries in identifying politics as a viable occupation of
interest and accessing viable occupational pathways. Second, selection into an occu-
pation requires a person to (i) find some congruence between her self-image and the occupa-
tion of interest, such as matching one’s beliefs about one’s own skill endowments to the skills
required for an occupation,9 and (ii) access relevant gatekeepers and processes that provide
entry into that occupation.10
Interethnic occupational stratification is associated with between-group inequalities in
task-specific skill endowments that generate constraints on economic and social mobility
9This psychological theory of occupational selection is rooted in social identity theories of behavior
which argue that individuals behave in order to maximize self-esteem conditional on their self-image. See,
for example, Ashforth and Mael (1989) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) on applications of social identity
theory in economics and sociology to explain choices such as selection into occupations and other forms of
social and economic organization.
10See Lin (1999) and Lin and Dumin (1986) for a review of the literature on the pivotal role of social
networks in status attainment and in gaining access to occupations. In the parlance of political science
research, this concerns elite e orts to recruit candidates and earlier processes of entering politics as a career
(before working one’s way up the ranks to become a politician).
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within a polarized and segmented labor market.11 This in turn can generate inequalities
between groups in the propensity to select into the potential candidate pool due to asym-
metries between high- and low occupational status groups in information about which skills
one currently possesses that are needed for an occupation as an elected politician and in
information on how to start or transition into an occupation as a politician. Relative to
individuals in low-skill, low occupational status groups, those who are in high-skill, high oc-
cupational status groups may more likely to know enough about the class of skills required
of politicians, possess these skills, and put the two together to consider an occupation as
a politician a viable career option. They may also be better connected to individuals who
are politicians than the average individual in a low-skill, low occupational status group, and
therefore would be more likely to access existing political networks via their employment
(and associated social) networks to begin or transition into an occupation as a politician.
Additionally, we may expect di erences in the association between occupational stratifi-
cation and propensity of selecting into a politician’s occupation by private or public sector.
This is possible for several reasons. First, people may make substantive distinctions between
the task-based skill endowments in public sector jobs versus public sector jobs, where higher
quality candidates are associated with experience certain occupational backgrounds in one
sector. Second, party elites may be more likely to recruit candidates from one sector over
another, and this may be a function of their own employment and political networks and per-
ceptions of the association between sector-specific occupational background and candidate
quality.12 Party elites with closer ties to public sector workers (e.g., government employees,
protective service workers like the police, unionized public sector employees) may be more
likely to recruit potential candidates from these occupations, for example. Party elites with
11See Autor and Dorn (2013) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a historical overview of skill-based labor
market polarization in the United States and its economic e ects.
12See, for example, Calvo-Armengol (2004); Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004); Montgomery (1992,
1991) on how the structure of networks a ect inequalities in access to employment opportunities.
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close ties to industry leaders may be more likely to recruit potential candidates from those
working in business or law. Third, careerist public sector employees may consider being a
politician the next step in the career ladder13 whereas this may not be the case for private
sector employees. Fourth, citizens with an interest in politics and in a career as a politician
may perceive occupation- and sector-specific pathways into politics and systematically select
into certain occupations and sectors over others.
4.2.2.2 Between-group inequalities in net expected returns from o ce-seeking
Among those in the potential candidate pool, the strategic decision to run for o ce depends
on how they believe voters and party elites will react to their candidacy as it a ects their
net expected returns from o ce-seeking.
Voter perceptions and evaluations of candidates. We assume voters are operating
in a low-information environment and rely on observable markers of candidate characteris-
tics as cues and heuristics for candidate evaluation. High levels of interethnic occupational
stratification can generate between-group status inequalities that a ect voters’ perceptions
of candidate quality. The occupational background and group membership of potential can-
didates serve as such cues for various core dimensions of candidate likeability including class
standing (Hout, 2008), class-based policy attitudes (Manza and Brooks, 2008), and can-
didate quality measured in terms of task-specific and transferable skill-based endowments
pertinent to the duties of elected o ce (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008). Furthermore, when occu-
pational stratification is high (low) and commonly perceived, stereotypes about status and
group membership will be highly (weakly or not) correlated. Moreover, when intergroup
occupational stratification is high, group-centric stereotypes reifying associations between
group membership and social status are more likely common among members of the high
13This may be true, for example, among high-level sta  working in government at any level of o ce.
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occupational status ethnic group than when occupational stratification is low. Thus voters
belonging to the high occupational status ethnic group will likely evaluate an in-group can-
didate favorably and the low occupational status outgroup unfavorably (Tajfel, 1982): high
occupational status ethnic group voters are more likely to employ these stereotypes and make
inferences that candidates belonging to high-skill, high-status occupations are high quality
candidates and that candidates belonging to low-skill, low-status occupations are low quality
candidates. Voters belonging to the low occupational status ethnic group will also evaluate
their own in-group candidate favorably due to in-group favoritism, but will form a favorable
evaluation of the high occupational status non-coethnic candidate only if they are not hostile
toward the high occupational status group and find their policy preference closest to that
candidate (versus all other candidates).
Thus potential candidates who are actually high quality candidates but who belong to a
low occupational status ethnic group may strategically choose not to enter the set of potential
candidates because they may expect voters to use ethnic and occupational cues to mis-judge
them as being a low quality candidate, which would decrease their expected probability of
winning and the expected returns from running for o ce.
Elite endorsements, resources, and attention. Party elites, like voters, similarly
use candidates’ group membership and occupational background as heuristics for candidate
evaluation. If party elites are expected to hold similar biases as voters and act on them or
if party elites strategically evaluate candidates based on how they expect voters to evalu-
ate candidates further down the game tree, then we would expect potential candidates to
anticipate similar elite and voter reactions, where a positive (negative) expected evaluation
would increase (decreasing) their expected probability of winning and increase (decrease)
their expected probability of running for o ce.
How potential candidates anticipate elite evaluations also matters because the prospect of
securing elite endorsements could simultaneously reduce the expected costs associated with
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running for o ce, ci,t (and potentially oi,t), and increase the expected benefits from winning
(by a ecting the perceived probability of winning) if the potential candidate anticipates
voters to follow elite cues when forming candidate evaluations. Increases in the expected
probability of winning would scale in the expected influence or “reach” of the endorsement
across voters and in the resources supportive party elites provide in concentrating media
attention on their anointed candidate.
Thus potential candidates heavily weight their expectations of how party elites will evalu-
ate them and other potential candidates when deciding whether to run since elite evaluations
have what is arguably the largest impact on their expectations of the returns to o ce-seeking:
it could potentially a ect both the potential candidate’s expected running costs and the ex-
pected returns from winning via the probability term. In turn, potential candidates are less
likely to seek election if the incumbent seeks re-election (given their assumed incumbent
advantage, both among voters and among elites) and, in open seat races, if party elites co-
ordinate prior to the primary to anoint a chosen candidate and have signaled this preference
to the field of potential candidates.
4.3 Data
I assemble data from several sources.
Primary Election Candidates and their Putative Ethnic Group Memmber-
ship. First, I obtain primary election candidate lists from congressional election returns
provided by the Federal Election Commission (United States Federal Election Commission,
1982–2012). Election returns data and candidate filing records do not include information
on candidate ethnicity or race.14 To code the ethnoracial group membership of each candi-
14Candidate filing data from Louisiana are the sole exception, where candidates may choose to report
their racial self-identification when filing to run for o ce. The validity and reliability of these data are
unclear, however.
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date, I match candidate surnames to the United States Census’s list of frequently occurring
surnames which indicates, for each surname from the 2000 Decennial Census that occurs
100 or more times, the distribution of racial or ethnic self-identification among individuals
with that surname (United States Census Bureau, 2014; Word et al., 2014). This provides
information about the probability an individual with a given surname has a surname that
putatively signals ethnic group membership. I use this information to create a series of bi-
nary indicators coded 1 if the candidate’s surname matches with a surname in the Census
list where the proportion of census names self-identifying with an ethnic group is at least x%,
where x œ {50, 60, 70, 80, 90}. I set a 70% match threshold as the primary specification used
in the main results. This provides a method to assess the sensitivity of results to di erent
coding decision rules given this measurement strategy. I create these indicators for whether
a candidate has a surname that is putatively African American/Black, Asian American, or
Hispanic/Latino.
There are concerns that this method is more appropriate as a way to code group mem-
bership for Hispanic/Latino and Asian candidates than Black or White candidates given the
high overlap in surnames between the latter two groups, for male candidates than female
candidates who might change their surname when they get married, and for multiracial
candidates who may have a surname that does not putatively signal their minority ethnic
or racial identity. Appendix Table C.2 presents summary statistics on all indicators coded.
To quickly check the face validity of this coding method, I compare the proportion of ob-
servations where the dependent variable is coded 1 (i.e., the proportion of district-elections
identified as having a putatively ethnic suranme) against the proportion of minorities elected
to Congress by group (referenced at the beginning of the article). By ethnic group, we would
expect the proportion of district-elections with at least one ethnic minority candidate to be
at least as large as the proportion of ethnic elected o cials. For the dependent variables
that code for the presence of putatively Hispanic/Latino and Asian candidates, the pro-
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portion of district-elections with at least one ethnic minority candidate is at least as large
as the proportion of ethnic elected o cials across districts (12% of district-elections with
a Hispanic-surnamed candidate vs. 6% members of Congress who are Hispanic, and 4% of
district-elections with an Asian-surnamed candidate vs. 4% members of Congress who are
Asian). In contrast, the dependent variable’s face validity for African Americans is arguably
low since the coded proportion of district-elections with at least one Black candidate is far
lower than the proportion of Black members of Congress (0.1% of district-elections with
an African American-surnamed candidate vs. 8.6% members of Congress who are African
American). Misclassification of a binary dependent variable is potentially problematic as it
leads to biased and inconsistent estimation (Hausman, 2001). To address this concern, in a
future version of this paper I will construct and use dependent variables that code candidate
ethnicity based on their self-identification using a combination of press releases, news media
accounts, ethnic and racial politician directories, and other publicly available archival data.
We also assess the reliability of these indicators across surname match threshold criteria and
find that they are fairly stable for the Hispanic/Latino and Asian indicator variables across
thresholds between 50 and 80, but likely to yield more false negatives than false positives
for the African American indicator variables given the drop in the mean level when moving
from 60 to 70.
Occupation Data by Ethnicity and Race. I collect state-level data15 from the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on the ethnic and racial distribution
of the work force by occupation in private industry (EEO-1 Statistical File) and in state
and local government (EEO-4 Statistical File). These data on the race/ethnic and gender
composition of public and private employers, unions, and labor organizations are collected
15EEOC employment statistics data are not publicly available at smaller geographic areas below the state
level. Private sector occupational data for Hawaii are not available prior to 2007; public sector occupational
data for Hawaii are not available for any year.
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by the EEOC as mandated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The
EEO-1 private employment data are collected annually and the EEO-4 public employment
data are collected bi-annually in odd years; aggregate-level data are provided in public data
releases.
The EEOC data define ten occupation categories in private industry which are listed here
in descending order by occupational status: management,16 professionals, technicians, sales
workers, o ce and clerical workers, craft workers, operatives, laborers, and service workers.
The public sector occupation data define eight occupation categories which are listed here
in descending order by occupational status: o cials and administrators, professionals, tech-
nicians, protective service, para-professionals, administrative support, skilled craft workers,
and service and maintenance workers. The public sector employment data are broken down
by employment situation (full time employment, part time employment, and new hires for
permanent full-time positions). For this analysis I pool public sector employment counts
across the full time and part time employment categories before calculating the ethnic dis-
tribution of employees by occupation, since the likelihood of precarious (i.e., part-time) work
is likely to increase as occupational status decreases (Kalleberg, 2011), such that only fo-
cusing on full time or part time employment data would systematically introduce unwanted
measurement error. The ordinal rankings of occupation groups by occupational status are
broadly based on Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes17 and are consistent
with multiple scales of occupational status and prestige developed by comparative economic
sociologists.18 Both the private and public sector EEOC occupation data define ethnic and
16Starting in 2007, the “management” occupation category is divided into senior management and middle
management, but prior to 2007 the two occupational categories are combined as a single “management”
category. To standardize category definitions across years, I use the combined management category.
17See http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/jobclassguide.cfm for a detailed crosswalk be-
tween occupation groups and specific job titles for private industry jobs and see http://www.eeoc.gov/
employers/eeo4survey/e4instruct.cfm for a description of the job-to-occupation equivalencies for public
sector jobs.
18See Hauser and Warren (1997) and Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) for a review of this literature and
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racial groups as white, black, Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian/Native American.19
District and District-Election Characteristics. I obtain several control variables
about district and district-election characteristics that have been shown to correlate with
the supply of minority candidates. First, I gather data from the American Community
Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) on the distribution of the district’s citizen
voting age population (CVAP) by ethnicity and race, since the share of the district electorate
comprised by an ethnic group is expected to have a positive association with the probability
an ethnic candidate runs for o ce (Fraga, 2014). As the data are originally at the Public
Use Microdata Area level, I re-aggregate these data to the congressional district level for
each Congress in session leading up to each district-election using equivalency files from the
Missouri Census Data Center’s set of Geographic Correspondence Engine websites.
Second, I collect information on whether the incumbent is running for re-election or
whether the district’s election is over an open seat. An extensive literature exists on the
incumbency advantage in U.S. congressional elections during the postwar era. When an
incumbent chooses to seek re-election, the likelihood others decide to run decreases since
their expectation of winning decreases. Some may object to specifying this as a control
variable, since the incumbent’s decision to run for re-election is arguably an outcome of
who decides to run. But in practice, incumbents usually signal their intention to run for
re-election first, before others decide to run or not. This factor is thus prior to the “play of
the game” and including it as a control is arguably justified.
Finally, I collect information on district partisanship, measured as the district-level Demo-
cratic share of the presidential vote in the last presidential election. I control for district par-
tisanship because it correlates with the electoral success of minority candidates conditional
a discussion of the methodologies used to develop these scales.
19From 2007 onward, the private sector employment data also include “Native Hawaiian” and “Two or
More Races” as ethnoracial categories.
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on being winning the party nominated (Fraga, 2014). Thus if ethnic potential candidates
are strategic, they should be more likely to select into the potential candidate pool and run
for o ce expecting higher returns to o ce-seeking in districts that are more Democratic.
4.4 Case Background and Descriptive Statistics
4.4.1 U.S. House Primary Elections, 2006-2012
The data I examine are specific to U.S. House primary elections between 2006 and 2012.
Although more political candidacy data are available before and after this period, the limited
public availability of occupation data by race and ethnicity beyond this period led to the
decision to limit the analysis to the four congressional primary elections that occurred during
this time.
4.4.2 Variation in the Presence of an Ethnic-Surnamed Minority
Candidate across Primary District-Elections
Figure 4.2 presents histograms summarizing the distribution of the dependent variable, the
presence of at least one candidate with an ethnic surname running for o ce in a primary
election at the district-election level. Histograms are shown by ethnic group (Asian, Black,
and Hispanic/Latino) along grid rows and by the surname match criterion along the grid
columns.
Across primary district-elections in the sample, the presence of an ethnic candidate is
low. Focusing on the main specification of a 70% threshold in the middle column of graphs –
that is, when candidates are flagged as having a putatively ethnic surname if their surname
is associated with at least 70% of individuals in the 2000 U.S. Census self-identifying with
that ethnic group – I observe that 1% of district-elections had at least one candidate with a
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of the presence of an ethnic-surnamed minority candidate in district-
years, by ethnic group (grid rows) and surname match threshold (grid columns).
putatively African American surname, 12% of district-elections had at least one candidate
with a putatively Hispanic or Latino surname, and 4% of district-elections had at least one
candidate with a putatively Asian surname. Across specifications, there are generally similar
proportions of district-elections with at least one ethnic-surnamed candidate.
4.4.3 Variation in the Ethnic Share of Occupation Groups
I now show that interethnic occupational stratification exists by showing a clear associa-
tion between group membership and occupational status, and document variation in this
particular form of economic inequality across state-years. I first examine variation in the
ethnic share of occupation groups by occupation status and by ethnic group. Figure 4.3
presents two sets of histograms summarizing the distribution of the ethnic share of workers
across occupations at the district-election level by ethnic group (grid rows) and by occupa-
tion category (grid columns). Occupation categories are ordered in descending occupation
status from left to right. The top panel in Figure 4.3 presents histograms for private sector
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occupation groups and the bottom panel presents histograms for public sector occupations.
In both the private and public sectors, whites comprise the largest share of workers
across all occupation categories. In the highest-status occupation categories, we observe
large distances between the marginal distribution of white workers and each of the marginal
distributions for black, Hispanic/Latino, and Asian workers. As occupational status de-
creases (i.e., moving from left to right in the figures) we see smaller distances and greater
overlap between the distribution of the proportion of workers in an occupation category who
are white and the distribution of the proportion of workers in an occupation category who
are non-white. In other words as occupational status decreases, we observe a higher mean
share of non-white workers in occupations, a lower mean share of white workers in occu-
pations, and the right- and left-skew in the marginal distributions for non-white and white
workers, respectively, become somewhat less pronounced. This pattern is most apparent
in the graphs when comparing the distribution of whites to blacks and the distribution of
whites to Hispanic/Latinos.
Next, I present a snapshot of the cross-sectional variation in the ethnic share of occupation
groups at the state-year level (instead of the district-election year level). Recall that data
on the ethnic breakdown of occupations from the EEOC is only available by state-year for
private sector occupations and every other state-year for public sector occupations, so the
state-year level is the level at which variation occurs in the data generating process. Figure
4.4 presents state-year level variation in the share of ethnic workers by occupation category.
We observe similar patterns as in the district-election level data. Across private and public
sectors and across all occupation groups, on average whites comprise the highest share of
workers. We also observe increased overlap in the distributions of white and non-white
workers as occupation status decreases, since the variance of the share of workers comprised
by all ethnic groups tends to increase as occupational status decreases. An interesting
exception to this pattern is an increase in variance of the share of Asians in private sector
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(a) Private sector occupations













































































































(b) Public sector occupations
Figure 4.3: Histograms of the proportion of occupation groups comprised by workers from
di erent ethnic groups across district-years, by ethnic group (grid rows) and occupational
categories (grid columns).
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(a) Private sector occupations

































































































(b) Public sector occupations
Figure 4.4: State-level variation in the share employed in occupations by ethnicity and
occupation status, 2006-2012
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professional and technician occupations as compared to the share of Asians in private sector
sales and o ce/clerical jobs.
To get a more detailed sense of variation in the ethnic share of workers across occupation
groups and how it illustrates di erent patterns of interethnic occupational stratification
across states, I now present descriptive statistics by state. Figures 4.5 through 4.12 show
line graphs of the proportion of each ethnic group in private and public sector occupations,
respectively, by state and year. There is one set of graphs for each ethnic group. Within
each graph, each color-coded line represents a di erent occupation category where colors
are diverging on a spectrum from red, which denote highest-status occupations, to blue,
which denote lowest-status occupations. 4.5 to 4.8 shows that among private sector jobs
in a state, the share of whites employed in a higher-status occupation category tends to
be greater than the share of whites employed in a lower-status occupation category. Across
many states with non-trivial Asian American populations, a similar but weaker pattern exists
for the Asian American workforce. The share of Asians in high occupational status private
sector professional and technician jobs is relatively high and the share of Asians in low-
status jobs is fairly low, but the share of Asians in the highest-status occupation category
(management) is low relative to other high-status occupations. The pattern is reversed for
Blacks and Latinos where the share of these groups in low-status occupations is high relative
to the share of these groups in high-status occupations.
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Figures 4.9 to 4.12 show similar graphs detailing the ethnic share of occupation groups
among public sector jobs by state and ethnicity. We observe generally similar patterns in
public sector jobs as in private sector jobs. Among whites and Asians, the share of each ethnic
group employed in higher-status occupations tends to be greater than the share of each ethnic
group employed lower-status occupations; the opposite is true among blacks and Latinos.
However, among public sector jobs there are several apparent di erences in the relationship
between occupational status and the share of ethnic workers for certain subgroups. Among
whites, the ordinal ranking of the status of occupations does not map onto the ordinal
ranking of the share of whites employed in each occupation group by status rank. We see
this in the graphs in panel (a) for states such as Arkansas, Illinois, Tennessee, and Ohio,
where the blue lines denoting the share of whites in lower-status occupations overlap and
intersect with the red lines denoting the share of whites in higher-status occupations. We
see similar patterns in the state graphs for blacks in panel (b) and for Asians in panel (d)
(see for example Washington and California), and to a much lesser extent for Latinos. This
suggests there is less interethnic occupational stratification in public sector occupations than
in private sector occupations.
While it is important to describe variation in the ethnic share of occupations using
fairly detailed occupational categories as a way to get as close to the raw data as possible,
such a detailed examination can also mask aggregate-level variation in distributions at the
middle and at the tails. To provide a more direct look at the “macro-level” distribution
of occupational stratification in the data, I create coarsened occupational strata to group
occupations into high occupational status, middle-status, and low-status occupations. Table
4.2 describes the correspondence between the original occupation codes in the EEO-1 and
EEO-4 surveys by status and the coarsened groupings (high/mid/low occupational status)
that are created. In the private sector, individuals working in management, professional
jobs, and technician jobs are coded as having high-status occupations. Individuals working
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EEO-1 Survey EEO-4 Survey
Status Private Sector Occupations Public Sector Occupations
High (1) Management (1) O cials and Administrators
(2) Professionals (2) Professionals
(3) Technicians (3) Technicians
Mid (4) Sales Workers (4) Protective Service
(5) O ce and Clerical (5) Para-Professionals
(6) Craft Workers (6) Administrative Support
Low (7) Operatives (7) Craft Workers
(8) Laborers (8) Service and Maintenance
(9) Service Workers
Table 4.2: Correspondence between coarsened high/mid/low-status occupation groups and
original occupation group and status codes in the U.S. EEOC’s EEO-1 and EEO-4 surveys
in sales, o ce and clerical jobs, and as craft workers are coded as having middle-status
occupations. Those working as operatives, laborers, and service workers are coded as having
low-status occupations. In the public sector, o cials and administrators, professionals, and
technicians are coded as having high-status occupations. Protective service workers such as
police o cers, para-professionals, and administrative support workers are coded as having
middle-status occupations. Craft workers and service and maintenance workers in the public
sector are coded as having low-status occupations. The proportion of each ethnic group in
each coarsened occupational stratum is then recalculated. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 present
distributions of the share of high, middle, and low-status occupations comprised by workers
from each ethnic group at the district-election year level and state-year level, respectively.20
Across both figures, we observe the following patterns. Across high-, mid- and low-status
occupation groups, on average Asians, Blacks, and Latinos comprise on average a lower share
20Detailed tables with summary statistics are presented in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.13: Histograms of the proportion of high/mid/low-status occupations comprised
by workers from di erent ethnic groups across district-years, by ethnic group (grid rows),
occupational status (grid columns), and sector (blue=private sector, red=public sector).
of workers than whites. As in the prior set of figures, as occupation status decreases the
overlap between the non-white distributions and the white distribution tends to increase.
There are also di erences in the ethnic share of the workforce between the public and
private sectors within the same occupational status group at the state-year level.21 Across
all occupation status groups, Asians comprise a higher share of the workforce on average in
private sector jobs than in public sector jobs. Among high-status occupations, on average 5%
of the private sector workforce are Asian as compared to 2% of the public sector workforce.
Among mid-status occupations, on average 3% of the private sector workforce are Asian
versus 1% of the public sector workforce. Among low-status occupations, on average 4%
of the private sector workforce are Asian versus 1% of the public sector workforce. Latinos
21Similar patterns exist at the district-year level.
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Figure 4.14: State-level variation in the share employed in occupational categories by eth-
nicity and occupation status (hi/mid/low), 2006-2012
similarly constitute a higher share of the workforce in private sector jobs relative to public
sector jobs. Among high-status occupations, Latinos make up on average 4% of the workforce
in both the public and private sector. In mid-status occupations, Latinos are on average 8%
of the private sector workforce versus 6% of the public sector workforce. In low-status
occupations, Latinos comprise 16% of the private sector workforce versus 7% of the public
sector workforce. African Americans are employed at higher rates in public sector jobs
than in private sector jobs among high- and mid-status occupations. Blacks make up on
average 7% of the high occupational status private sector workforce versus 11% of the high
occupational status workforce in the public sector, and 12% of the mid-status private sector
workforce compared to 15% of the mid-status workforce in the public sector. In low-status
occupations, blacks comprise 17% of the private sector workforce versus 16% of the public
sector workforce. On average, whites are employed at higher rates in public sector jobs than
in private sector jobs among mid- and low-status occupations: 75% in mid-status private
sector jobs versus 77% in mid-status public sector jobs and 60% in low occupational status
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private sector jobs versus 74% in low occupational status public sector jobs. Whites are
employed at comparable rates on average in private and public sector jobs among high-
status occupations: 82% in high occupational status private sector jobs compared to 81% in
high occupational status public sector jobs.
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Figures 4.15 through 4.22 further break down variation in the ethnic share of the work-
force by high, middle, and low-status occupation groups by state and year. In Figures 4.15
to 4.18, we clearly observe that the association between the share of an ethnic group em-
ployed in a private sector occupation category and the occupational status of that category
is pretty consistently positive for whites, negative for African Americans and Latinos, and
usually positive but sometimes (depending on the state) negative or mixed for Asians. In
Figures 4.19 to 4.22, we observe similar associations in public sector occupations, but we
also observe the lines denoting ethnic employment rates in di erent occupational statuses
converging or crossing each other within states for whites and African Americans.
4.5 Estimation Strategy
I examine the correlation between the ethnic distribution of workers by occupational status
at the state-year level and the presence of an ethnic candidate for elected o ce in U.S. House
primary elections between 2006 and 2012.
This relationship is modeled using a binary logit model:
Pr(GrpCandit = 1) = logit≠1
3
– + —1PctGrpHij[it] + —2PctGrpLoj[it] + —3Incit +
—4DemPrezit + —5PctGrpCV APit +
ÿ
t
“tY earit + Áit
4
where i indexes district-elections, j indexes state-years corresponding to a specific district-
election, and t indexes years. The variable GrpCand is a binary dependent variable coded
1 if the district-election includes a candidate with an ethnic surname corresponding to at
least 70% of the individuals in the 2000 Census with that surname self-identifying with the
ethnic group of interest. The variables PctGrpHi and PctGrpLo are the proportion of high
occupational status and low-status occupations, respectively, comprised by an ethnic group
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in a given sector. I exclude the proportion of mid-status occupations comprised by an ethnic
group since it is highly (and nearly perfectly) collinear with the ethnic proportion of the
low-status occupational workforce for that group.22 The variable Inc is a binary indicator
denoting whether an incumbent is running for re-election; DemPrez is the Democratic share
of the presidential vote at the congressional district level in the last presidential election mi-
nus 50%; and PctGrpCV AP is the proportion of the citizen voting age population comprised
by the ethnic group. I include year fixed e ects denoted by the qt “tY earit term, omitting
2006 as the base year. Standard errors are clustered at the state and district levels, since
cross-sectional variation in the “treatment” variable occurs at the state level and we would
expect serial correlation by state and by district. This relationship is modeled separately for
each of 3 ◊ 2 = 6 possible combinations of ethnic minority group (Black, Hispanic/Latino,
and Asian) and sector (public or private). Summary statistics for the variables used in the
analysis are shown in Appendix Table C.1.
Before presenting the main results, I clarify my expectations for inference given poten-
tial findings. The main coe cients of interest are —1, the partial association between the
proportion of the high-status occupation workforce comprised by the ethnic group and the
presence of an ethnic-surnamed candidate in the district primary, and —2, the partial associa-
tion between the proportion of the low-status occupation workforce comprised by the ethnic
group and the presence of an ethnic-surnamed candidate in the district primary. If we fail
to reject the null hypotheses that the associations between the ethnic share of high- or low
occupational status workers and the presence of an ethnic minority candidate are zero, then
this casts doubt on any potential link between inter-ethnic status inequality and endogenous
inequalities in the supply of minority political candidates.
If we find that —1 > 0 and —2 < 0, then this suggests that a story about ethnic minority
22Heat maps of correlation matrices between the set of variables measuring the ethnic share of occupation
groups are shown in the Appendix.
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candidates being more likely to emerge when inter-ethnic occupational stratification is lower
– regardless of ethnicity – is more plausible than not with respect to the ethnic group and
job sector of interest. It would not allow us to unambiguously make the inference that the
theory developed earlier in this paper is correct, however, due to potential ecological fallacy
problems and a lack of causal identification testing the theory, even if the relationship seems
to be consistent across ethnic groups and job sectors. Such a result would also provide
suggestive evidence that a key mechanism for any theory explaining candidate selection
and the endogenous supply of candidates involves some perceived association – that voters
and elites make and that potential candidates anticipate – between occupational status and
candidate quality.
It is not necessary for both —1 > 0 and —2 < 0 to suggest that a perceived association
between occupational status and candidate quality is relevant for explaining inequalities in
endogenous candidate selection. Either an increase in the proportion of ethnic minorities in
high-status jobs or a decrease in the proportion of ethnic minorities in low-status jobs can
decrease between-group occupational stratification. Thus it can be su cient for either —1 > 0
or —2 < 0 to suggest a plausible positive correlation between occupational stratification and
the undersupply of minority candidates. However, given the expectation that voters and
elites prefer high-quality candidates, we might expect any such correlation – if it did exist
– to be driven by increases in the share of ethnic minorities in high-status jobs, that is we
would find —1 > 0 and —2 = 0.
If instead we find that —1 < 0 and —2 > 0 or that —1 = 0 and —2 > 0, then ethnic
candidates are more likely to emerge in districts with a higher share of ethnic minorities in
low-occupation jobs. No straightforward interpretation emerges from such a finding but this
does suggest several potential explanations that serve as avenues of inquiry worth investigat-
ing in future research. First, this result might simply suggest an electoral story where ethnic
politics is basically class politics. The ethnic group is predominantly of a low socioeconomic
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standing and the emergence of an ethnic candidate is most likely in districts where there is
a sizable share of low occupational status ethnic minorities that form a strong electoral base
and potential candidate pool from which minority candidates emerge. Second, it may be
the case that perceptions of candidate quality may matter, but voters’ and elites’ notion of
high candidate quality as applied to this ethnic group may not correspond with high-status
occupations as is assumed in much of the literature on candidate quality. Third, this result
might also suggest the potential for elites to systematically recruit ethnic candidates to run
in districts with a high ethnic lower- or working-class population, where the candidate them-
selves may be descriptively similar to the demographic profile of the district (to maximize
“likeability” among voters) or may be a high occupational status co-ethnic candidate who
nonetheless appeals to the demographic in the district constituency based on sharing the
same group identification.
Finally, we may expect heterogeneous results by ethnic group and by job sector. If results
vary by ethnic group, then this suggests that the causal processes explaining endogenous
candidate supply may condition on group-specific politics.23 If results vary by job sector
for the same ethnic group, then we have suggestive evidence that the ethnic composition
of sector-specific occupations play some role in a ecting minority potential candidates’ self-
selection into politics via sector- and occupation-specific career channels or in a ecting elite
e orts to utilize sector- and occupation-specific networks to recruit minority candidates.
4.6 Findings
Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 present the main results from binary logit models predicting the
presence of a candidate with a putatively Black, Hispanic/Latino, and Asian surname in
23This is not incompatible with a general theory about endogenous inequalities in the supply of candi-
dates across groups. Which equilibrium a particular group is in may simply depend on the model-specific
parameters that are relevant to that group.
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district primary elections, respectively. In each table, the estimates shown in columns (7) and
(14) correspond to the main model specification using private and public sector occupation
predictors, respectively.
Table 4.3 shows that when controlling for whether an incumbent is running for re-election,
the district’s partisan preferences, and the district’s black share of the CVAP, there is a
negative correlation between the presence of an African American-surnamed candidate and
the state-level share of high occupational status public sector occupations comprised by
African Americans, and a positive correlation between the presence of an African American-
surnamed candidate and the share of low occupational status public sector occupations.
These correlations are statistically significant at the – = 0.01 level. There are no statistically
significant correlations between the state-level share of blacks in high- or low occupational
status private sector jobs and the presence of a candidate with a putatively African American
surname. In both main specifications predicting the presence of a black candidate in a
district-election has a high expected percent correctly predicted (ePCP) (Herron, 1999) of
97.08% in the model using private sector occupation predictors (column 7) and 97.1% in the
model using public sector occupation predictors (column 14).
Table 4.4 presents the results from binary logits predicting the presence of a Hispanic or
Latino-surnamed candidate in district primary elections. When controlling for the presence
of an incumbent seeking re-election, the district’s partisan preferences, and the district’s
Hispanic/Latino share of the CVAP, we find that the presence of a Hispanic-surnamed can-
didate in the district is positively correlated with the proportion of Hispanics in low-status
jobs in both the public and private sector at the state-year level, and these correlations are
statistically significant at the – = 0.01 level. We also find a negative partial correlation be-
tween the presence of a Hispanic-surnamed candidate in the district primary and the share of
Hispanics in high-status jobs in the public sector at the state-year level, which is statistically
significant at the – = 0.01 level. We do not find a statistically significant correlation between
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the presence of a Hispanic-surnamed candidate and the share of Hispanics in high occupa-
tional status private sector jobs is found, although the sign of that coe cient in column (7)
is in the same direction as the coe cient for the Hispanic share of high occupational status
public sector jobs variable in column (14). The expected percent correctly predicted is fairly
high at 84.5% for the main specification including private sector workforce share predictors
and 84.4% for the main specification including public sector workforce share predictors.
Table 4.5 displays results from binary logits predicting the presence of an Asian-surnamed
candidate in district primary elections. When controlling for the presence of an incumbent
seeking re-election, the district’s partisan preferences, and the district’s Asian share of the
CVAP, we find a positive association between the share of Asians working in high occupa-
tional status private sector jobs at the state-year level and the presence of Asian-surnamed
candidates in a district primary elections and a negative association between the share of
Asians working in low occupational status private sector jobs at the state-year level and the
presence of Asian-surnamed candidates in district primary elections. both of these correla-
tions are statistically significant at the – = 0.01. However, we do not observe statistically
significant correlations between the state-level Asian share of the workforce in either high or
low status public sector jobs and the presence of an Asian-surnamed candidate in district
primary elections. The expected percent correctly predicted is high at 92% for the specifi-
cation including private sector workforce predictors at 92.1% for the specification including
public sector workforce predictors.
164
CHAPTER 4. OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION, AND THE





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION, AND THE
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION, AND THE


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION, AND THE









−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Marginal Effect
Pct Black, High Status
Pct Black, Low Status
Incumbent





Models with private 
























−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Marginal Effect
Pct Black, High Status
Pct Black, Low Status
Incumbent





Models with public 









−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Marginal Effect
Pct Hisp, High Status
Pct Hisp, Low Status
Incumbent






























−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Marginal Effect
Pct Hisp, High Status
Pct Hisp, Low Status
Incumbent













−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Marginal Effect
Pct Asian, High Status
Pct Asian, Low Status
Incumbent




























−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Marginal Effect
Pct Asian, High Status
Pct Asian, Low Status
Incumbent





Figure 4.23: Estimated marginal e ects for the main binary logit model results. Graphs show
the estimated marginal e ect of a one unit increase in the relevant independent variable on
the probability of observing an ethnic-surnamed candidate in a district primary election.
95% confidence intervals are shown and are based on two-way clustered standard errors
clustered at the state and district levels.
To ease interpretation, I estimate marginal e ects at the means from the six main binary
logit specifications in order to approximate the di erence in the probability of observing
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an ethnic-surnamed candidate emerging in a district primary associated with a one-unit
di erence (increase) in the independent variable of interest. Figure 4.23 displays estimated
marginal e ects with 95% confidence intervals. The graphs clearly show that black-surnamed
candidates are more likely to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level pro-
portion of blacks in low occupational status public sector jobs are high and the proportion
of blacks in high occupational status public sector jobs are low. Hispanic-surnamed candi-
dates are more likely to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level proportion
of Hispanics in low occupational status public sector jobs is high and when the proportion
of Hispanics in high occupational status public sector jobs is low, or when the proportion
of Hispanics in low occupational status private sector jobs is high. Asian-surnamed candi-
dates are more likely to run for o ce in a district primary when the state-level proportion of
Asians in low occupational status private sector jobs is low and the proportion of Asians in
high occupational status private sector jobs is high. Table 4.6 summarizes these results and
If Statistically Significant, Estimated Sign of Coe cient on:
Private Sector Public Sector
% Ethnic in % Ethnic in % Ethnic in % Ethnic in
High-Status Jobs Low-Status Jobs High-Status Jobs Low-Status Jobs
Ethnic Group —1,private —2,private —1,public —2,public
Black n.s. n.s. — +
Hispanic/Latino n.s. + — +
Asian + — n.s. n.s.
Table 4.6: Summary of the direction of estimated statistically significant correlations across
main binary logit models. An estimated coe cient is deemed statistically significant if
p < 0.05 using a two-sided test. In the table, “n.s.” means not significant.
highlights ethnic di erences in how the likelihood of an ethnic-surnamed candidate emerging
varies by the share of the ethnic group in high (or low) status occupations, and how these
associations also partially on sector.
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I assess the sensitivity of these results to di erent surname match thresholds used to code
the putative ethnic-soundingness of candidates’ surnames. Table 4.7 summarizes the results
of these analyses and finds that the main set of results (shown in the highlighted column),
which used a ethnic surname match threshold of 70%, is robust across threshold specifications
for the models predicting the presence of a Hispanic/Latino-surnamed or Asian-surnamed
candidate in the district primary election.24 In contrast, the results for the models predicting
the emergence of black-surnamed candidates are more sensitive, which is not surprising
given previously discussed concerns about misclassification when coding whether a person is
African American simply based on the black-soundingness of their surname.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
How might economic inequalities between groups predict political inequalities in descrip-
tive representation? Existing research seeking to understand endogenous inequalities in the
supply of political candidates between social groups is sparse.
This paper proposes a theory that between-group di erences in the supply of politi-
cal candidates are associated with between-group occupational stratification. The theory
proposes several potential mechanisms. Intergroup occupational stratification may lead to
inequalities in skills and information asymmetries across groups that lead to inequalities
between groups in the propensity to be interested and active in politics and to be inter-
ested in pursuing a career as a politician. Stark di erences in average occupational status
between groups could contribute to the use of statistical discrimination by voters and elites
when evaluating potential candidates in a way that is biased against high-quality but low
occupational status minorities while over-inflating assessments of high occupational status
whites. For high-quality candidates belonging to a low occupational status ethnic group who
24Tables containing a full set of estimation results from sensitivity analyses are shown in Appendix B.
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Estimated coe cient sign
and statistical significance
Model Specification and Variable by surname match threshold
Ethnic Group Job Sector Job Status 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Black Private High —úúú —úú — — +ú
Low +úúú +úú + + —úú
Public High — —úúú —úúú —úú —
Low + +úúú +úúú +ú +
Hispanic Private High — — — — —
Low +úúú +úúú +úúú +úúú +úúú
Public High —úúú —úúú —úúú —úú —úúú
Low +úúú +úúú +úúú +úúú +úúú
Asian Private High +úúú +úúú +úúú +úúú +ú
Low —úúú —úúú —úúú —úúú —úúú
Public High + + + + +
Low — — — — —
Table 4.7: Sensitivity of the sign and statistical significance of coe cient estimates from
binary logit models to di erent dependent variable coding criteria. Cells denote the sign of
the estimated coe cient on the relevant variable by model, as indicated by the row. Columns
denote di erent thresholds at which a candidate’s surname was deemed to be putatively
ethnic-sounding; thresholds are based on the proportion of individuals in the 2000 Census
with the same surname who self-identify with a given ethnoracial group. The highlighted
column in yellow is the coding rule used for the models presented in the main set of results.
úúúp < 0.01; úúp < 0.05; úp < 0.1.
might be unfairly judged on the basis of their group- and status-membership, this could be
particularly damaging to their prospect of being recruited into politics by party elites and
to their perception of how they might be received by non co-ethnic and high occupational
status voters and elites. Anticipating this, they may be more likely to select out of the pool
of potential candidates. Additionally, between-group occupational stratification could also
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lead to highly segregated employment networks by occupational status and ethnicity, which
would make it di cult for politicians to access and recruit potential candidates outside their
immediate network.
This paper explores the plausibility of a general correlation between an ethnic group’s oc-
cupational status and the probability that group is represented among the supply of political
candidates. I assess this correlation for blacks, Hispanics/Latinos, and Asians with respect
to U.S. House primary elections between 2006 and 2010. For Latinos and Asians, I find a
robust partial correlation between the probability of putative ethnic minority candidate in
a district primary and the share of co-ethnics in the state’s workforce, even after controlling
for the share of co-ethnics in a district, whether an incumbent is running for o ce, and
the partisan preference of the district. The share of Latinos in low-status occupations in
either the public or private sector has a positive association with the presence of a Latino
candidate in congressional primary elections, and the share of Latinos in high occupational
status public sector occupations has a negative association with the presence of a Latino
candidate in congressional primary elections. The share of Asians in high occupational sta-
tus (low occupational status) private sector jobs has a positive (negative) association with
the presence of an Asian candidate in congressional primary elections.
Several lines of future research to refine and test theory emerge from this paper. First,
these correlations should be replicated at various levels of aggregation and using improved
measures of candidate ethnicity. Second, the analysis of aggregate level data introduces
the potential for ecological inference fallacies and makes inferences regarding individual-
level behavior di cult. Thus to the extent possible, future research designs should measure
behavior at the individual level. Third, future research should employ a combination of tools
for descriptive and causal inference to understand existing equilibria and to identify partial
equilibrium e ects. Fourth, the results for Asians are di erent from those for Latinos and
African Americans. Future work could explore why heterogeneous correlations exist by race.
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One possible explanation may be that political elites belonging to di erent racial minority
groups utilize di erent strategies to recruit and cultivate support for candidates, and these
strategies are correlated with the economic and demographic composition the minority group
in a locale.
Questions that could benefit from additional descriptive inquiry include: Does intergroup
occupational stratification lead to systematic di erences between groups in the objective
capabilities of seeking and holding o ce across groups? Across groups and occupations,
are there di erent proportions of citizens who choose to pursue a career as a politician?
Are between-group di erences in o ce-seeking behavior driven by di erences in capabilities,
by strategic anticipation of discrimination, or a combination of the two? Does intergroup
occupational stratification also lead to segmented employment networks that bias intergroup
perceptions and limit the ability of potential minority candidates and political gatekeepers
who recruit candidates to access one another?
These findings can allow researchers to form priors that inform the design and focus of
subsequent research that seeks to identify causal e ects. One potentially fruitful line of re-
search could involve using a descriptive model to estimate the propensity of individuals to
be interested in political activism and in politics as a career. Then, using these propensities,
one could envision a field experimental study implemented by an ethnic politics civic interest
group25 that targets “potential politicians” among an ethnic group – i.e., individuals with
a high propensity score but who are not yet involved in politics – with a targeted leader-
ship development program that cultivates greater levels of civic engagement and interest
in political careers among this subgroup. The features of the program can vary such that
di erent types of information is transmitted to subjects: information about the nuts and
bolts of political careers and of being a politician, information reducing their perception of
25One that promotes the advancement of an ethnic group in politics and civic engagement among an
ethnic group, for example.
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the costs of running for o ce, and information reducing subjects’ uncertainties regarding the
process of running for o ce. Other features of the program can vary as well, such as how
it goes about recruiting, either using di erent messaging appeals or using di erent targeting
strategies over existing types of occupational and social networks. The study would provide
leverage to assess the impact of targeted recruitment and leadership development strate-
gies on behavioral outcomes measuring levels of civic engagement and political activity and
whether minorities run for o ce; and on attitudinal outcomes measuring stated perceptions
of minorities’ considerations when deciding whether to run for o ce.
Finally, in addition to future work that could test specific pieces of the general theory
proposed in this paper, it would be interesting to investigate potential heterogeneous e ects
using principled machine learning techniques, which o er researchers an automated way
to empirically understand potentially complex interactions between electoral, political, and
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Figure A.1: Conditional Probabilities of Migrating to U.S. Destination States by Mexican
Sending State, 1980.
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Figure A.2: Conditional Probabilities of Migrating to U.S. Destination States by Mexican
Sending State, 1990.
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Figure A.3: Conditional Probabilities of Migrating to U.S. Destination States by Mexican
Sending State, 2000.
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1980-2000 pooled 18.84 0.000081
Table A.1: First Stage Models: Breusch-Pagan Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Homoscedastic
Errors
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A.3 Mean Subgroup Opinion Estimated Using MRP
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Figure A.4: Level of Democratic Party Identification
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Figure A.5: Level of Republican Party Identification
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Figure A.6: Feeling Thermometer toward Democratic Party
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Figure A.7: Feeling Thermometer toward Republican Party
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Figure A.8: Level of Support for Democratic Presidential Candidate among Voters and
Non-Voters
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Figure A.9: Level of Support for Democratic Presidential Candidate among Self-Reported
Voters Only
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Figure A.10: Level of Support for Republican Presidential Candidate among Voters and
Non-Voters
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Figure A.11: Level of Support for Republican Presidential Candidate among Self-Reported
Voters Only
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Figure A.12: Self-Placement on 7-point Liberal-Conservative Scale
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Figure A.13: Feeling Thermometer toward Chicanos/Hispanics
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Figure A.14: Feeling Thermometer toward Asian Americans
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Figure A.15: Feeling Thermometer toward Blacks
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Figure A.16: Feeling Thermometer toward Whites
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Figure A.17: Feeling Thermometer toward Illegal Aliens
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Figure A.18: Opinion on the Level of Immigration to the U.S.
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Figure A.19: Opinion on the Level of Federal Spending to Deal with Crime
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Figure A.20: Opinion on the Level of Federal Spending on Public Schools
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Figure A.21: Opinion on the Level of Federal Spending on Food Stamps
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Figure A.22: Self-Placement on Government versus Private Health Insurance Scale
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Figure A.23: Self-Placement on Government Services and Spending Scale
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Figure A.24: Self-Placement on Guaranteed Jobs and Income Scale
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Figure A.25: Conservatism toward Equality of Opportunity Index
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A.4 Sensitivity of Main 2SLS Estimates to Construc-
tion of Networked Birth Cohorts Instrument
In the main analysis I construct the networked birth cohorts instrument using lagged births
occurring in Mexican states between 1 and 40 years prior to the start of each decade. This
decision is based on two factors: (1) theoretically I am interested in the impact of Mexican
immigration in general on white attitudes, (2) empirically, based on data from the Mexican
Migration Project, up to the 95th percentile of Mexican emigrants to the United States are
age 40 and younger.
Prior economic studies using a similar networked births instrument specified the relevant
window of lagged births as occurring between 17 and 52 years prior to the start of the
decade. This is done because these economic studies have a di erent theoretical focus: they
are principally concerned with the impact of immigration on labor market outcomes and
care about “working age” immigrant inflows specifically.
As an empirical matter, I assess whether using the alternative instrument, constructed
using lagged births between 17 and 52 years prior to the start of a decade, has any material
e ect on the 2SLS estimates. As the following tables show in this section, the results remain
qualitatively similar on the whole and selected estimates are slightly stronger.
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Table A.3: Sensitivity of 2SLS Estimates to Alternative Instrument: The E ect of Mexican
Immigration on Decadal Change in Partisanship and Ideology among Whites
PID Pres. Pref. Therm. Ideology
D R D R D R Lib-Cons
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠3.733ú 2.921úúú ≠2.458 3.149úúú ≠36.475 77.404 5.003úú
(1.949) (1.049) (1.493) (0.694) (66.911) (87.653) (2.247)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.037 0.054 0.022 0.072 0.048 ≠0.006
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 0.071 ≠0.045 ≠0.128 ≠0.136 ≠35.556 ≠41.111 0.422
(0.417) (1.410) (0.792) (1.110) (35.965) (57.768) (1.628)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.083 0.274 0.141 0.339 0.183 ≠0.057
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠1.336 1.184 ≠1.024 1.189 ≠26.374 10.376 2.065ú
(0.818) (0.941) (1.074) (0.882) (31.009) (55.853) (1.139)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.105 0.117 0.634 0.052 0.094 0.390
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least squares models. Models are
unweighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state unemployment rate, the start-of-decade
foreign-born population share, and a decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in paren-
theses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.4: Sensitivity of 2SLS Estimates to Alternative Instrument: The E ect of Mexican





  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠87.799ú ≠26.232
(51.716) (50.521)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 ≠0.049 0.087
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 48.407 ≠7.298
(58.466) (43.892)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.111
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠7.928 ≠21.737
(20.123) (18.671)
Observations 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.444
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted
two-stage least squares models. Models are unweighted.
Covariates include the start-of-decade state unemployment
rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and
a decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region
and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.5: Sensitivity of 2SLS Estimates to Alternative Instrument: The E ect of Mexi-
can Immigration on Decadal Change in Social Attitudes toward Asian Americans, Illegal
Immigrants, and Immigration Levels among Whites
Di . in Therm. Therm. Rating Opinion: Increase
Asian-White Illegal Aliens Immigration Level
1990-2000, Census Region Fixed E ects
  Mexican Foreign-Born 18.446 45.306ú 1.908
(45.240) (26.470) (2.595)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.038 ≠0.073 0.096
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least squares
models. Models are unweighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state un-
employment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a decade
fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.6: Sensitivity of 2SLS Estimates to Alternative Instrument: The E ect of Mexican
Immigration on Decadal Change in Policy Attitudes toward the Role and Size of Government
among Whites
Increase Fed. Spending Support Gov. Role Conservatism
Crime Education Food Stamps Health Ins. Spending Guarantee Jobs toward Inequality
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born 2.555úú 2.665úúú ≠2.205 4.579 ≠2.548 ≠0.697 0.689
(1.119) (0.379) (2.269) (6.087) (2.462) (5.658) (0.664)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.088 ≠0.014 ≠0.042 0.081 ≠0.031 0.033 0.105
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠0.784 0.176 2.549 6.433 1.341 2.479 ≠0.604
(0.931) (0.700) (1.596) (5.843) (1.730) (4.169) (0.740)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.022 0.013 0.068 0.081 ≠0.041 0.341
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 0.468 1.086úúú 0.541 4.696ú ≠0.215 1.343 0.029
(0.434) (0.373) (0.898) (2.762) (0.749) (1.739) (0.642)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.283 0.002 0.521 0.006 0.011 0.504
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least squares models. Models are unweighted. Covariates
include the start-of-decade state unemployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a decade fixed
e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are
shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.7: Sensitivity of 2SLS Estimates to Alternative Instrument: The E ect of Mexican
Immigration on Decadal Change in State-Level Policy Outcomes
Per Capita Per Capita Per Pupil
Public Welfare Health Education
Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠2,235.441 ≠3,693.825ú ≠78,434.450úú
(3,407.205) (1,947.454) (30,459.080)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 ≠0.003 0.050 0.101
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠1,777.117 3,020.135úúú 36,713.980
(1,759.165) (637.925) (29,999.410)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 ≠0.010 ≠0.092 0.068
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠1,805.082 275.285 ≠12,453.310
(1,161.999) (760.986) (22,222.630)
Observations 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.028 0.057
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least
squares models. Models are unweighted. Outcome measures are in 2012-
2013 constant dollars. Covariates include the start-of-decade state unem-
ployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a
decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown
in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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A.5 2SLS Estimates of the Interaction between Mex-
ican Immigration and Decade, Stacked First Dif-
ference Models
Table A.8: 2SLS Estimates of Immigration-by-Decade E ects on White Partisanship and
Ideology, Stacked First Di erence Models
PID Pres. Pref. Therm. Ideology
D R D R D R Lib-Cons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Mex. Foreign-Born ≠3.601úúú 3.758úúú ≠2.790úúú 2.784úúú ≠84.753 95.576 4.300úúú
(1.338) (0.947) (1.029) (0.721) (62.480) (69.688) (1.412)
1990 (Decade Dummy) ≠0.003 ≠0.020 ≠0.041úú 0.192úúú ≠1.448 ≠0.185 ≠0.180úúú
(0.028) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (1.723) (1.222) (0.025)
  Mex. Foreign-Born ◊ 1990 4.198úúú ≠5.111úúú 3.148úúú ≠3.127úúú 112.370 ≠181.054úú ≠4.083úú
(1.219) (1.026) (1.069) (1.076) (86.894) (73.674) (1.594)
Notes: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01; two-tailed.
Cells contain 2SLS estimates from unweighted covariate-adjusted models.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state and census division levels in parentheses.
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Table A.9: 2SLS Estimates of Immigration-by-Decade E ects on Whites’ Social Attitudes,




  Mex. Foreign-Born 85.344ú 73.550
(45.331) (59.726)
1990 (Decade Dummy) 3.733úú 6.259úúú
(1.878) (1.708)
  Mex. Foreign-Born ◊ 1990 ≠127.261 ≠130.352
(76.836) (86.972)
Notes: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01; two-tailed.
Cells contain 2SLS estimates from unweighted covariate-adjusted models.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state and census division levels in parentheses.
Table A.10: 2SLS Estimates of Immigration-by-Decade E ects on Whites’ Policy Attitudes,
Stacked First Di erence Models
Increase Fed. Spending Support Gov. Role Conservatism
Crime Education Food Stamps Health Ins. Spending Guarantee Jobs toward Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Mex. Foreign-Born 2.326úúú 1.810úúú ≠1.500 6.769 ≠2.445 0.460 ≠1.514ú
(0.754) (0.652) (1.094) (4.889) (1.757) (3.100) (0.859)
1990 (Decade Dummy) ≠0.246úúú ≠0.068úúú ≠0.019ú ≠0.338úúú ≠0.025 ≠0.062 0.086úúú
(0.021) (0.024) (0.011) (0.046) (0.025) (0.053) (0.018)
  Mex. Foreign-Born ◊ 1990 ≠3.183úú ≠1.752 2.030 ≠5.467 2.803 ≠0.183 2.102úú
(1.368) (1.167) (1.673) (6.537) (2.325) (3.814) (0.946)
Notes: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01; two-tailed.
Cells contain 2SLS estimates from unweighted covariate-adjusted models.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state and census division levels in parentheses.
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Table A.11: 2SLS Estimates of Immigration-by-Decade E ects on State-Level Policy Out-
comes, Stacked First Di erence Models
Per Capita Per Capita Per Pupil
Public Welfare Health Education
Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
(1) (2) (3)
  Mex. Foreign-Born ≠3,658.317úú ≠2,678.449 ≠41,161.680
(1,762.971) (1,980.158) (33,312.440)
1990 (Decade Dummy) 268.552úúú ≠50.746úú 438.792
(59.546) (22.366) (526.627)
  Mex. Foreign-Born ◊ 1990 1,911.287 3,742.814úú 39,441.760ú
(2,789.049) (1,756.897) (21,955.320)
Notes: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01; two-tailed.
Cells contain 2SLS estimates from unweighted covariate-adjusted models.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state and census division levels in parentheses.
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A.6 2SLS versus OLS Estimates
A first-di erenced analysis estimated using OLS is equivalent to a fixed e ects model that
eliminates bias introduced by state fixed e ects that are correlated with the proportion of
Mexican foreign-born in a state and with the political attitudes of whites (or policy outcomes)
in a state.
IV/2SLS models are justified for two reasons. First, there may be unobserved heterogene-
ity biasing the estimates in the first di erenced analysis if they influence the inflow rate of
immigrants. This is possible if political or economic conditions in particular states influence
the timing and size of Mexican immigrant inflows. Second, there may be an error-in-variables
problem; the change in the Mexican foreign-born population may be mis-measured, espe-
cially if state- and local-level political and economic conditions lead to mis-reporting in the
census.
I present the results from the first di erenced analysis estimated using OLS below. In
selected models, the di erence in estimation strategy makes a qualitative di erence in the
results.
As shown in Table A.12, the OLS estimates of the impact of Mexican immigration on
white partisanship and ideology in the 1980s appear to be sharper than the 2SLS estimates;
the magnitude of the OLS estimates are upward biased for the party ID and thermometer
rating variables but downward biased for the presidential party preference and ideology
variables. When compared to the 2SLS estimates where no impact is statistically significant,
the OLS estimates for the 1990s have di erent signs for the outcome variables measuring
Democratic party identification or support and for the ideology outcome measure. The OLS
results suggest that Mexican immigration leads to decreased support for the Republican
Party and increased liberal ideology.
When examining whites’ social attitudes toward blacks and Hispanics relative to whites
in Table A.13, both OLS and 2SLS yield statistically insignificant estimates. However, it is
worth noting that the OLS point estimates also di er substantively from the 2SLS estimates
in terms of the sign of some point estimates. Counter to expectations, the OLS estimates
suggest that Mexican immigration improved whites’ views of blacks and Hispanics in the
1980s by 63.6 and 9.1 points, respectively; these are not precisely estimated, however. Using
OLS, we also observe a negative but imprecisely estimated e ect of Mexican immigration on
white attitudes toward Hispanics in the 1990s.
Table A.14 shows OLS estimates of the impact of Mexican immigration on white attitudes
toward Asian Americans, illegal aliens, and the appropriate level of immigration. OLS
estimates are downward biased when compared to 2SLS estimates, and none of the OLS
estimates are statistically significant.
Table A.15 presents the OLS estimates of the impact of Mexican immigration on whites’
policy attitudes. The substantive findings are similar for the 1980s, but the OLS estimates
are downward biased when compared to the 2SLS estimates. For the 1990s, OLS estimates
of the impact of Mexican immigration on white preferences for federal spending on food
stamps and on government spending levels in general are larger and statistically significant
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Table A.12: OLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Partisanship and Ideology among Whites
PID Pres. Pref. Therm. Ideology
D R D R D R Lib-Cons
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠2.675úú 3.228úúú ≠1.849ú 2.037úúú ≠19.840 67.435 4.040ú
(1.140) (1.089) (1.081) (0.540) (57.810) (58.037) (2.203)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.037 0.059 0.034 0.073 0.049 ≠0.003
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 0.476 ≠1.248 0.488 ≠1.310úú 1.174 ≠85.885úúú ≠1.523úú
(0.566) (0.995) (0.541) (0.566) (32.029) (27.714) (0.746)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.104 0.288 0.178 0.373 0.215 ≠0.020
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠0.100 ≠0.469 0.078 ≠0.700 ≠2.166 ≠60.146úú ≠0.409
(0.511) (0.750) (0.532) (0.537) (24.775) (27.329) (0.860)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.132 0.150 0.661 0.060 0.145 0.413
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted ordinary least squares models. Models are un-
weighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state unemployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-
born population share, and a decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
at the 10% level, compared to 2SLS estimates that are smaller in magnitude and statistically
insignificant.
Table A.16 presents OLS estimates of the impact of Mexican immigration on social policy
outcomes. The 2SLS and OLS estimates for the 1980s are qualitatively similar with the OLS
estimates biased downward relative to the 2SLS estimates. For the 1990s, the OLS estimate
of the e ect of Mexican immigration on per capita public welfare spending is large, negative,
and statistically significant (-$2888), whereas the 2SLS estimate is smaller and imprecisely
estimated (-$412). When compared to the 2SLS estimate, the OLS estimate of the e ect of
Mexican immigration on per capita health in the 1990s is smaller in magnitude and is no
longer statistically significant at the 10% level.
232
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO “THE IMPACT OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION ON
WHITE ATTITUDES AND ON PUBLIC POLICY IN THE U.S. STATES, 1980-2000”
Table A.13: OLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in




  Mexican Foreign-Born 63.555 9.131
(46.969) (62.293)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.094
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 15.427 ≠4.536
(38.617) (26.986)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.111
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 21.211 ≠3.689
(25.194) (14.224)
Observations 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.446
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted or-
dinary least squares models. Models are unweighted. Co-
variates include the start-of-decade state unemployment
rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and
a decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region
and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.14: OLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Social Attitudes toward Asian Americans, Illegal Immigrants, and Immigration Levels among
Whites
Di . in Therm. Therm. Rating Opinion: Increase
Asian-White Illegal Aliens Immigration Level
1990-2000, Census Region Fixed E ects
  Mexican Foreign-Born 15.907 8.258 0.720
(32.303) (16.978) (0.770)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.038 ≠0.025 0.116
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted ordinary least squares mod-
els. Models are unweighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state unemploy-
ment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a decade fixed
e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the census region and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.15: OLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Policy Attitudes toward the Role and Size of Government among Whites
Increase Fed. Spending Support Gov. Role Conservatism
Crime Education Food Stamps Health Ins. Spending Guarantee Jobs toward Inequality
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born 2.041ú 1.812úúú ≠1.040 1.318 ≠1.841 0.393 0.204
(1.106) (0.565) (0.958) (4.864) (1.299) (3.067) (0.742)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.097 ≠0.003 ≠0.025 0.095 ≠0.026 0.035 0.110
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠0.079 0.206 1.803ú 4.325 1.281ú 1.810 ≠0.866ú
(0.708) (0.474) (0.982) (3.096) (0.758) (1.768) (0.484)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.022 0.021 0.086 0.081 ≠0.039 0.344
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 0.335 0.545 1.299 3.887ú 0.718 1.503 ≠0.615
(0.456) (0.429) (0.826) (1.967) (0.804) (0.967) (0.472)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.290 0.010 0.521 0.022 0.011 0.511
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted ordinary least squares models. Models are unweighted. Covariates
include the start-of-decade state unemployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a decade fixed
e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are
shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.16: OLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
State-Level Policy Outcomes
Per Capita Per Capita Per Pupil
Public Welfare Health Education
Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠5,504.704úú ≠2,681.626ú ≠79,753.490úúú
(2,627.631) (1,447.332) (27,302.010)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.058 0.101
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠2,887.897úú 1,130.512 4,285.644
(1,237.949) (896.674) (16,409.830)
Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 ≠0.006 ≠0.035 0.116
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠3,485.681úú 404.343 ≠12,203.490
(1,335.401) (842.594) (13,512.740)
Observations 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.340 0.029 0.057
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted ordinary least
squares models. Models are unweighted. Outcome measures are in 2012-2013
constant dollars. Covariates include the start-of-decade state unemployment
rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a decade fixed
e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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A.7 Placebo Analyses
I conduct two placebo 2SLS analyses using outcome variables that should not be a ected by
changes in the Mexican foreign-born population at the state level: whites’ attitudes toward
gays and lesbians and whites’ preferences toward federal spending levels on environmental
protection. The results of the 2SLS placebo analyses are shown in Table A.17, with cor-
responding OLS estimates shown in Table A.18. I focus on the 2SLS estimates. In both
the 1980s and the 1990s, Mexican immigration has no significant impact on either placebo
outcome. The impact on white attitudes toward gays and lesbians appears to be substan-
tively large in magnitude and negative during the 1980s and is also negative and statistically
significant – this is likely driven by a greater sample size in the stacked model and what-
ever is happening in the 1980s. One speculative explanation is that Mexican immigration
led to greater ideological conservatism and greater support for Republicans specifically in
the 1980s, and the resulting ideological shift could have led to greater social conservatism
– which includes increased animosity toward gays and lesbians – among whites during this
period.
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Table A.17: 2SLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Placebo Attitudinal Outcomes among Whites
Thermometer Rating: Increase Fed. Spending
Gays and Lesbians Environmental Protection
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠82.418 ≠0.800
(53.546) (1.500)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.240 ≠0.039
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠8.206 ≠0.749
(36.676) (0.762)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.285 ≠0.086
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠38.724úúú ≠0.700
(12.410) (0.627)
Observations 100 100
Adjusted R2 ≠0.025 0.947
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted two-stage least squares
models. Models are unweighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state
unemployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a
decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in
parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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Table A.18: OLS Estimates of the E ect of Mexican Immigration on Decadal Change in
Placebo Attitudinal Outcomes among Whites
Thermometer Rating: Increase Fed. Spending
Gays and Lesbians Environmental Protection
A. 1980-1990
  Mexican Foreign-Born ≠98.360úúú ≠0.961
(31.412) (1.191)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.242 ≠0.038
B. 1990-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 21.195 0.975úúú
(19.809) (0.308)
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.311 ≠0.0002
C. 1980-2000
  Mexican Foreign-Born 1.852 0.581
(19.495) (0.428)
Observations 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.949
Notes: Cells contain estimates from covariate-adjusted ordinary least squares
models. Models are unweighted. Covariates include the start-of-decade state
unemployment rate, the start-of-decade foreign-born population share, and a
decade fixed e ect for the stacked first di erence models. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the census region and state levels and are shown in
parentheses.
úp < .1; úúp < .05; úúúp < .01; two-tailed.
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B.1 Supplementary Tables and Figures
Years Years Years Years Years
State Available State Available State Available State Available State Available
AK 2009-2014 HI 1999-2014 ME 1999-2014 NJ 1996-2015 SD 2010-2014
AL 2011-2014 IA 2003-2014 MI 1995-2014 NM 1996-2014 TN 1995-2014
AR 1991-2014 ID 1998-2014 MN 1999-2014 NV 1995-2014 TX 1989-2013
AZ 1997-2014 IL 1997-2014 MO 1995-2014 NY 2011-2014 UT 1997-2014
CA 1993-2014 IN 1999-2014 MS 2008-2014 OH 1983-2014 VA 1994-2014
CO 1997-2014 KS 2001-2014 MT 1999-2014 OK 2011-2014 VT 1985-2014
CT 2005-2014 KY 1998-2014 NC 2001-2013 OR 2003-2014 WA 1991-2014
DE 1995-2014 LA 1997-2014 ND 2011-2014 PA 1969-2014 WI 1995-2014
FL 1998-2014 MA 2009-2014 NE 2011-2014 RI 1998-2014 WV 1993-2014
GA 1995-2014 MD 2007-2014 NH 1989-2014 SC 2011-2014 WY 2001-2014
Table B.1: Availability of Any Bill Information via State Legislative Websites or the Sunlight
Foundation’s Open States API, by State. These years correspond to the availability of bill
lists, which include a description or the bill text and sometimes bill sponsorship information.
Machine readable files and copies of legislative journals containing roll call voting data are
typically available for fewer years than the years listed in this table.
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Figure B.1: Histograms of the forcing variable. The left panel presents histograms of the
forcing variable for sponsorship outcome data, and the right panel presents histograms of
the forcing variable for roll call voting data. The top, middle, and bottom rows correspond
to bin sizes of 0.01, 0.025, and 0.05, respectively.
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Figure B.2: Placebo Analysis: Estimated Discontinuities in Pre-Treatment Covariates by
Bandwidth (Outcome: Pro-Hispanic Bill Sponsorship). Estimates are local linear regression
estimates with 95% confidence intervals in dotted lines.
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Figure B.3: Placebo Analysis: Estimated Discontinuities in Pre-Treatment Covariates by
Bandwidth (Outcome: Anti-Hispanic Bill Sponsorship). Estimates are local linear regression
estimates with 95% confidence intervals in dotted lines.
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Figure B.4: Placebo Analysis: Estimated Discontinuities in Pre-Treatment Covariates by
Bandwidth (Outcome: Pro-Hispanic Roll Call Voting Score). Estimates are local linear
regression estimates with 95% confidence intervals in dotted lines.
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Polynomial
Specification Local Linear 3rd 4th
Bandwidth 2 3 5 IK – –
A. Outcome: Number of Pro-Hispanic Bills Sponsored (IK Bandwidth = 0.213 )
Elect Hispanic 3.414** 1.585* 0.506 0.199 0.201 0.196
(1.248) (0.886) (0.445) (0.182) (0.215) (0.228)
N Observations 44 66 98 369 460 460
N Districts 35 50 72 255 313 313
B. Outcome: Number of Anti-Hispanic Bills Sponsored (IK Bandwidth = 0.186 )
Elect Hispanic 1.625*** 1.117*** 0.33 -0.142 -0.276* -0.253*
(0.513) (0.325) (0.226) (0.14) (0.144) (0.152)
N Observations 44 66 98 332 460 460
N Districts 35 50 72 233 313 313
C. Outcome: Hispanic Roll Call Voting Score (IK Bandwidth = 0.171 )
Elect Hispanic -0.419 -0.768 -0.179 0.402*** 0.474*** 0.54***
(1.3) (0.838) (0.513) (0.147) (0.161) (0.18)
N Observations 31 45 64 224 340 340
N Districts 24 35 51 167 243 243
Table B.2: Estimated e ect of electing a Hispanic candidate, instead of a non-Hispanic
candidate, on indicators of the quality of substantive Hispanic representation provided by
the elected legislator. Estimation models include state-chamber-session fixed e ects. The
maximum of robust standard errors clustered at the district-redistricting decade level and
conventional standard errors are presented in parentheses. Estimates corresponding to dif-
ferent functional form and bandwidth specifications are displayed by column; no bandwidth
restriction exists for the polynomial model specifications as all observations are used. Es-
timates corresponding to a 1 percentage point bandwidth are omitted due to insu cient
sample size. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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B.2 Additional Analyses
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B.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis: RD Estimates using Di erent Meth-
ods of Coding Hispanic/Latino Candidate Ethnicity
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Figure B.5: Surname Match 60% Threshold and NALEO Match
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Figure B.6: Surname Match 70% Threshold and NALEO Match
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Figure B.7: Surname Match 80% Threshold and NALEO Match
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Figure B.8: Surname Match 90% Threshold and NALEO Match
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Figure B.9: Surname Match 60% Threshold Only; No NALEO Match
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Figure B.10: Surname Match 70% Threshold Only; No NALEO Match
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Figure B.11: Surname Match 80% Threshold Only; No NALEO Match
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Figure B.12: Surname Match 90% Threshold Only; No NALEO Match
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B.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: RD Estimates Excluding Florida
Figure B.13: RD estimates using sample that excludes Florida. Local linear regression
estimates, by bandwidth.
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B.2.3 Naive Analyses
The naive analyses apply estimation strategies commonly used in existing work estimating
the association between descriptive and substantive minority representation to the data in
this project. Existing work estimates OLS models for roll call voting outcomes and negative
binomial regressions for bill sponsorship outcomes. For each outcome I estimate a series of
models:
Table B.3: Naive analyses: model specifications
Model
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
Legislator Party X X X X
Legislator is Hispanic X X X X
State-Chamber-Session FE X X X
These analyses show that with the naive modeling strategy used, we are able to reproduce
the empirical conclusions commonplace in extant literature using the data.
Table B.4: Naive Analyses: OLS estimates, DV: Hispanic roll call voting
Dependent variable: Roll call voting score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Republican ≠0.565úúú ≠0.620úúú ≠0.528úúú ≠0.585úúú
(0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Independent ≠0.472 ≠0.208 ≠0.424 ≠0.167
(0.442) (0.351) (0.439) (0.348)
Hispanic 0.396úúú 0.406úúú 0.196úúú 0.200úúú
(0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022)
Intercept 0.696úúú ≠0.051 0.341úúú ≠0.464úúú 0.648úúú ≠0.076
(0.013) (0.058) (0.011) (0.065) (0.015) (0.058)
Observations 4,609 4,609 4,609 4,609 4,609 4,609
R2 0.170 0.480 0.042 0.327 0.179 0.490
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.478 0.041 0.325 0.178 0.488
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Table B.5: Naive Analyses: Negative binomial regression, DV: number of pro-Hispanic bills
sponsored
Dependent variable: Number of pro-Hispanic bills sponsored
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Republican ≠1.412úúú ≠1.421úúú ≠1.293úúú ≠1.267úúú
(0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (0.050)
Independent ≠16.356 ≠30.869 ≠17.198 ≠30.678
(1,214.377) (1,973,544.000) (2,002.169) (1,967,964.000)
Hispanic 0.850úúú 1.108úúú 0.461úúú 0.727úúú
(0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051)
Intercept 0.054ú 0.088 ≠0.644úúú ≠0.558úúú ≠0.104úúú ≠0.096
(0.028) (0.157) (0.028) (0.163) (0.033) (0.155)
Observations 5,585 5,585 5,585 5,585 5,585 5,585
Log Likelihood ≠5,723.219 ≠5,274.872 ≠5,996.317 ≠5,518.397 ≠5,687.152 ≠5,177.611
◊ 0.846úúú (0.049) 1.714úúú (0.135) 0.607úúú (0.031) 1.134úúú (0.075) 0.892úúú (0.052) 1.955úúú (0.162)
AIC 11,452.440 10,585.740 11,996.630 11,070.790 11,382.310 10,393.220
State-Chamber-Session FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table B.6: Naive Analyses: Negative binomial regression, DV: number of anti-Hispanic bills
sponsored
Dependent variable: Number of anti-Hispanic bills sponsored
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Republican 2.521úúú 2.461úúú 2.327úúú 2.377úúú
(0.094) (0.085) (0.096) (0.089)
Independent 2.676úú 3.325úúú 2.454ú 3.230úúú
(1.348) (0.774) (1.329) (0.773)
Hispanic ≠2.097úúú ≠1.701úúú ≠0.977úúú ≠0.408úúú
(0.153) (0.150) (0.155) (0.146)
Intercept ≠2.676úúú ≠0.305 ≠0.589úúú 1.764úúú ≠2.454úúú ≠0.234
(0.083) (0.194) (0.043) (0.207) (0.087) (0.195)
Observations 5,585 5,585 5,585 5,585 5,585 5,585
Log Likelihood ≠3,957.694 ≠3,113.902 ≠4,224.108 ≠3,520.407 ≠3,939.579 ≠3,109.679
◊ 0.226úúú (0.012) 1.489úúú (0.139) 0.149úúú (0.007) 0.545úúú (0.036) 0.234úúú (0.012) 1.496úúú (0.139)
AIC 7,921.389 6,263.803 8,452.217 7,074.815 7,887.158 6,257.359
State-Chamber-Session FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
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B.2.4 Di erences-in-Di erences and DDD Analyses
In this section I present di erences-in-di erences and triple-di erences estimates, which may
be of interest to those interested in disentangling the e ects of party and ethnicity and to
those interested in an identified e ect not limited to close district-elections near the threshold.
B.2.4.1 Di erences-in-Di erences
The DD estimator di erences mean outcomes between party (D/R) within ethnic groups
(Hispanic, non-Hispanic) and then di erences those di erences between ethnic groups. Iden-
tification requires a strong assumption that the counterfactual di erence between parties in
elite behavior on Hispanic-interest bills for the “treatment” (Hispanic) group is described by
the “control” (non-Hispanic) group’s behavior.
The model estimated is:
Yit = – + —1Rit + —2Iit + —3Hit + —4(Rit ú Hit) + “X + Áit
where R is a dummy for Republican and I is a dummy for independent (Democrats are
the omitted category); H is a dummy for a Hispanic legislator (non-Hispanics omitted); and
X is a matrix of state, chamber, and session fixed e ects. The DD estimate is —̂4. Data are
at the legislator-session level. There are 3 independents in the data. The main e ect on I is
estimated but due to singularities the interaction between I and H drops out of the model.
Table B.7 presents the model estimates from the DD analysis. As these results show,
Republican legislators are less likely than Democratic legislators to support pro-Hispanic
positions in roll call voting and are likely to sponsor fewer pro-Hispanic bills and more anti-
Hispanic bills. Hispanic legislators are more likely than non-Hispanic legislators to have
more pro-Hispanic voting records and are likely to sponsor more pro-Hispanic bills. Among
Republicans, Hispanic legislators are likely to sponsor on average .39 fewer anti-Hispanic
bills, a finding that is very precisely estimated.
B.2.4.2 DDD
The DDD analysis estimates the model
Yit = – + —1Rit + —2Iit + —3Hit + —4Cit + —5(Rit ú Hit) +
—6(Rit ú Cit) + —7(Hit ú Cit) + —8(Rit ú Hit ú Cit) + “X + Áit
where the variables are same as before, and C is a dummy variable denoting a close election,
coded 1 if the legislator’s margin of victory in the prior election is 5 percentage points or
less and 0 otherwise. The DDD estimate is —̂8.
260
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO “HOW DO LEGISLATOR IDENTITIES AFFECT
SUBSTANTIVE MINORITY REPRESENTATION? EVIDENCE FROM HISPANIC
REPRESENTATION IN THE STATES”
Table B.7: Di erences-in-di erences estimates
Dependent variable:
Roll call Pro bill Anti bill
voting sponsorship sponsorship
(1) (2) (3)
Republican ≠0.584úúú ≠0.674úúú 0.777úúú
(0.016) (0.033) (0.042)
Independent ≠0.166 ≠0.885 0.956
(0.348) (0.634) (0.800)
Hispanic 0.203úúú 0.616úúú ≠0.007
(0.025) (0.048) (0.060)
Rep x Hispanic ≠0.013 ≠0.135 ≠0.390úúú
(0.051) (0.100) (0.126)
Intercept ≠0.077 1.135úúú 1.736úúú
(0.058) (0.125) (0.158)
Observations 4,610 5,586 5,586
R2 0.490 0.232 0.231
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.229 0.228
Residual Std. Error 0.490 (df = 4589) 1.096 (df = 5565) 1.383 (df = 5565)
F Statistic 231.694úúú (df = 19; 4589) 88.335úúú (df = 19; 5565) 87.866úúú (df = 19; 5565)
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Table B.8: DDD Estimates
Dependent variable:
Roll call Pro bill Anti bill
voting sponsorship sponsorship
(1) (2) (3)
Republican ≠0.565úúú ≠0.621úúú 0.702úúú
(0.042) (0.074) (0.094)
Independent ≠0.176 ≠0.790 1.724úú
(0.343) (0.652) (0.828)
Hispanic 0.179úúú 0.376úúú 0.020
(0.062) (0.104) (0.132)
Close Election 0.002 ≠0.169úúú 0.003
(0.033) (0.057) (0.073)
Rep x Hispanic 0.051 0.095 ≠0.338
(0.129) (0.219) (0.277)
Rep x Close Elec ≠0.078ú 0.115 0.088
(0.047) (0.082) (0.104)
Hisp x Close Elec ≠0.043 0.055 0.077
(0.069) (0.114) (0.144)
Rep x Hisp x Close Elec ≠0.072 ≠0.174 ≠0.191
(0.149) (0.247) (0.314)
Intercept ≠0.031 0.880úúú 1.908úúú
(0.068) (0.124) (0.157)
Observations 3,116 4,037 4,037
R2 0.483 0.278 0.253
Adjusted R2 0.479 0.274 0.248
Residual Std. Error 0.483 (df = 3089) 0.919 (df = 4010) 1.167 (df = 4010)
F Statistic 125.494úúú (df = 23; 3089) 67.280úúú (df = 23; 4010) 58.923úúú (df = 23; 4010)




APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Appendix C
Appendix to “Occupational
Stratification, Selection, and the
Undersupply of Minority Political
Candidates”
263
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
C.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Dependent variables (70% surname match criterion)
Presence of Black candidate 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1750 0
Presence of Hispanic/Latino candidate 0.12 0.32 0 0 1 1750 0
Presence of Asian candidate 0.04 0.20 0 0 1 1750 0
Proportion in High-Status Private Sector Occupations
Black 0.08 0.05 0.07 0 0.23 1748 2
Hispanic/Latino 0.06 0.05 0.04 0 0.30 1748 2
Asian 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.47 1748 2
Proportion in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations
Black 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.01 0.59 1748 2
Hispanic/Latino 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.57 1748 2
Asian 0.04 0.04 0.03 0 0.53 1748 2
Proportion in High-Status Public Sector Occupations
Black 0.14 0.08 0.15 0 0.35 1742 8
Hispanic/Latino 0.07 0.08 0.03 0 0.51 1742 8
Asian 0.05 0.06 0.03 0 0.20 1742 8
Proportion in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations
Black 0.21 0.12 0.21 0 0.54 1742 8
Hispanic/Latino 0.11 0.13 0.04 0 0.66 1742 8
Asian 0.02 0.03 0.01 0 0.10 1742 8
District-Election Year Level Covariates
Democratic Presidential Vote Share Minus 50% (Last Election) 1.07 14.51 -1 -30 45 1737 13
Incumbent Seeking Re-Election 0.91 0.31 1 0 2 1750 0
Percent of CVAP: Black 0.12 0.13 0.07 0 0.65 1738 12
Percent of CVAP: Hispanic or Latino 0.10 0.14 0.05 0 0.76 1738 12
Percent of CVAP: Asian 0.04 0.06 0.02 0 0.53 1738 12
Table C.1: Summary statistics: Analysis variables
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Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Any Black Candidate: 50% Surname Match Threshold 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Black Candidate: 60% Surname Match Threshold 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Black Candidate: 70% Surname Match Threshold 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Black Candidate: 80% Surname Match Threshold 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Black Candidate: 90% Surname Match Threshold 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Hisp/Latino Candidate: 50% Surname Match Threshold 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Hisp/Latino Candidate: 60% Surname Match Threshold 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Hisp/Latino Candidate: 70% Surname Match Threshold 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Hisp/Latino Candidate: 80% Surname Match Threshold 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Hisp/Latino Candidate: 90% Surname Match Threshold 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Asian Candidate: 50% Surname Match Threshold 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Asian Candidate: 60% Surname Match Threshold 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Asian Candidate: 70% Surname Match Threshold 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Asian Candidate: 80% Surname Match Threshold 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Any Asian Candidate: 90% Surname Match Threshold 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 1750.00 0.00
Table C.2: Summary statistics: Dependent variables
Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Percent Asian: Management (V1) 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.47 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Management (V1) 0.85 0.11 0.88 0.29 0.98 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Management (V1) 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.20 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Management (V1) 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.29 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: Professionals (V2) 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.46 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Professionals (V2) 0.82 0.12 0.84 0.30 0.97 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Professionals (V2) 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.21 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Professionals (V2) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.26 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: Technicians (V3) 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.52 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Technicians (V3) 0.77 0.15 0.80 0.20 0.98 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Technicians (V3) 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.35 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Technicians (V3) 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.39 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: Sales Workers (V4) 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.50 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Sales Workers (V4) 0.75 0.15 0.80 0.20 0.97 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Sales Workers (V4) 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.47 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Sales Workers (V4) 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.47 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.53 199.00 1.00
Percent White: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.73 0.17 0.77 0.14 0.98 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.42 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.47 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: Craft Workers (V6) 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.54 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Craft Workers (V6) 0.77 0.16 0.80 0.14 0.98 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Craft Workers (V6) 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.32 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Craft Workers (V6) 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.45 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: Operatives (V7) 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.51 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Operatives (V7) 0.65 0.19 0.66 0.12 0.96 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Operatives (V7) 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.55 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Operatives (V7) 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.55 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: Laborers (V8) 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.51 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Laborers (V8) 0.54 0.20 0.52 0.10 0.93 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Laborers (V8) 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.62 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Laborers (V8) 0.23 0.16 0.21 0.01 0.71 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian: Service Workers (V9) 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.54 199.00 1.00
Percent White: Service Workers (V9) 0.60 0.19 0.60 0.15 0.94 199.00 1.00
Percent Black: Service Workers (V9) 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.62 199.00 1.00
Percent Hispanic: Service Workers (V9) 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.57 199.00 1.00
Table C.3: Summary statistics: Ethnic distribution of workers in all private sector occupation
groups, state-year level measures
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Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Percent Asian: Management (V1) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.47 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Management (V1) 0.81 0.09 0.82 0.29 0.98 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Management (V1) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.20 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Management (V1) 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.29 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: Professionals (V2) 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.46 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Professionals (V2) 0.76 0.12 0.76 0.30 0.97 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Professionals (V2) 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.21 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Professionals (V2) 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.26 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: Technicians (V3) 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.52 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Technicians (V3) 0.69 0.15 0.69 0.20 0.98 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Technicians (V3) 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.35 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Technicians (V3) 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.39 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: Sales Workers (V4) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.50 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Sales Workers (V4) 0.69 0.14 0.68 0.20 0.97 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Sales Workers (V4) 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.47 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Sales Workers (V4) 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.47 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.53 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.65 0.15 0.64 0.14 0.98 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.42 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: O ce/Clerical (V5) 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.47 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: Craft Workers (V6) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.54 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Craft Workers (V6) 0.70 0.17 0.74 0.14 0.98 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Craft Workers (V6) 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.32 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Craft Workers (V6) 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.45 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: Operatives (V7) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.51 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Operatives (V7) 0.57 0.19 0.58 0.12 0.96 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Operatives (V7) 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.55 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Operatives (V7) 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.55 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: Laborers (V8) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.51 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Laborers (V8) 0.46 0.20 0.42 0.10 0.93 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Laborers (V8) 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.01 0.62 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Laborers (V8) 0.31 0.20 0.26 0.01 0.71 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian: Service Workers (V9) 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.54 1748.00 2.00
Percent White: Service Workers (V9) 0.51 0.16 0.48 0.15 0.94 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black: Service Workers (V9) 0.23 0.13 0.23 0.01 0.62 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hispanic: Service Workers (V9) 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.57 1748.00 2.00
Table C.4: Summary statistics: Ethnic distribution of workers in all private sector occupation
groups, district-year level measures
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Percent Asian: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 196.00 4.00
Percent White: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.86 0.11 0.89 0.47 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.49 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.46 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian: Professionals (P2) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.22 196.00 4.00
Percent White: Professionals (P2) 0.81 0.13 0.82 0.44 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: Professionals (P2) 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.37 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: Professionals (P2) 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.49 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian: Technicians (P3) 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.26 196.00 4.00
Percent White: Technicians (P3) 0.81 0.14 0.84 0.33 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: Technicians (P3) 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.40 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: Technicians (P3) 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.62 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian: Protective Service (P4) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 196.00 4.00
Percent White: Protective Service (P4) 0.79 0.14 0.83 0.42 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: Protective Service (P4) 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.45 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: Protective Service (P4) 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.50 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.13 196.00 4.00
Percent White: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.72 0.19 0.76 0.25 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.74 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.61 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian: Admin Support (P6) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.14 196.00 4.00
Percent White: Admin Support (P6) 0.77 0.17 0.79 0.28 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: Admin Support (P6) 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.44 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: Admin Support (P6) 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.64 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 196.00 4.00
Percent White: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.81 0.16 0.86 0.26 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.42 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.67 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.17 196.00 4.00
Percent White: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.71 0.20 0.74 0.26 0.98 196.00 4.00
Percent Black: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.65 196.00 4.00
Percent Hispanic: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.65 196.00 4.00
Table C.5: Summary statistics: Ethnic distribution of workers in all public sector occupation
groups, state-year level measures
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Percent Asian: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.12 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.80 0.11 0.82 0.47 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.49 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: O cials/Administrators (P1) 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.46 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian: Professionals (P2) 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.22 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: Professionals (P2) 0.72 0.13 0.71 0.44 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: Professionals (P2) 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.37 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: Professionals (P2) 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.49 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian: Technicians (P3) 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.26 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: Technicians (P3) 0.72 0.15 0.71 0.33 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: Technicians (P3) 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.40 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: Technicians (P3) 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.62 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian: Protective Service (P4) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: Protective Service (P4) 0.72 0.13 0.71 0.42 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: Protective Service (P4) 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.45 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: Protective Service (P4) 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.50 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.13 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.62 0.17 0.59 0.25 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.74 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: Para-Professionals (P5) 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.61 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian: Admin Support (P6) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.14 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: Admin Support (P6) 0.67 0.17 0.65 0.28 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: Admin Support (P6) 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.44 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: Admin Support (P6) 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.64 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.09 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.73 0.15 0.71 0.26 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.42 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: Skilled Craft Workers (P7) 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.67 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.17 1742.00 8.00
Percent White: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.60 0.19 0.56 0.26 0.98 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.25 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.65 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hispanic: Service/Maintenance (P8) 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.65 1742.00 8.00
Table C.6: Summary statistics: Ethnic distribution of workers in all public sector occupation
groups, district-year level measures
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Percent Asian in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.47 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.52 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.53 199.00 1.00
Percent White in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.82 0.12 0.84 0.28 0.98 199.00 1.00
Percent White in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.75 0.16 0.78 0.17 0.97 199.00 1.00
Percent White in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.60 0.19 0.60 0.14 0.94 199.00 1.00
Percent Black in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.23 199.00 1.00
Percent Black in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.38 199.00 1.00
Percent Black in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.59 199.00 1.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.30 199.00 1.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.46 199.00 1.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.57 199.00 1.00
Percent Asian in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.20 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.11 196.00 4.00
Percent Asian in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 196.00 4.00
Percent White in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.81 0.13 0.83 0.43 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent White in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.77 0.16 0.78 0.35 0.98 196.00 4.00
Percent White in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.74 0.18 0.77 0.26 0.99 196.00 4.00
Percent Black in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.35 196.00 4.00
Percent Black in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.48 196.00 4.00
Percent Black in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.54 196.00 4.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.51 196.00 4.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.57 196.00 4.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.66 196.00 4.00
Table C.7: Summary statistics: Ethnic distribution of workers in high/middle/low-status
occupation groups by public/private sector, state-year level measures
Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Percent Asian in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.47 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.52 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.53 1748.00 2.00
Percent White in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.76 0.11 0.77 0.28 0.98 1748.00 2.00
Percent White in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.68 0.15 0.67 0.17 0.97 1748.00 2.00
Percent White in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.51 0.18 0.48 0.14 0.94 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.23 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.38 1748.00 2.00
Percent Black in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.01 0.59 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in High-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.30 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Mid-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.46 1748.00 2.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Low-Status Private Sector Occupations 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.57 1748.00 2.00
Percent Asian in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.20 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.11 1742.00 8.00
Percent Asian in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.10 1742.00 8.00
Percent White in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.73 0.13 0.73 0.43 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent White in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.68 0.15 0.64 0.35 0.98 1742.00 8.00
Percent White in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.64 0.17 0.63 0.26 0.99 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.35 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.48 1742.00 8.00
Percent Black in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.54 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in High-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.51 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Mid-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.57 1742.00 8.00
Percent Hisp/Latino in Low-Status Public Sector Occupations 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.66 1742.00 8.00
Table C.8: Summary statistics: Ethnic distribution of workers in high/middle/low-status
occupation groups by public/private sector, district-year level measures
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Mean SD Median Min Max N N Missing
Democratic Pres. Candidate Vote Share Minus 50% (Last Election) 1.07 14.51 -1.00 -30.00 45.00 1737.00 13.00
Incumbent Seeking Re-Election 0.91 0.31 1.00 0.00 2.00 1750.00 0.00
Percent of CVAP: Asian 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.53 1738.00 12.00
Percent of CVAP: Hispanic 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.76 1738.00 12.00
Percent of CVAP: Black 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.65 1738.00 12.00
Percent of CVAP: White 0.71 0.20 0.76 0.05 0.98 1738.00 12.00
Percent of CVAP: Other 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.30 1738.00 12.00
Table C.9: Summary statistics: District-year level covariates
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Percent Asian: (1) High−Status
Percent Asian: (2) Mid−Status
Percent Asian: (3) Low−Status
Percent Black: (1) High−Status
Percent Black: (2) Mid−Status
Percent Black: (3) Low−Status
Percent Hisp/Latino: (1) High−Status
Percent Hisp/Latino: (2) Mid−Status
Percent Hisp/Latino: (3) Low−Status
Percent White: (1) High−Status
Percent White: (2) Mid−Status




















































































































































































Figure C.1: Heat map of correlations between the ethnic share of private sector occupations
by ethnicity and by high/mid/low-status occupation groups
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Percent Asian: (1) High−Status
Percent Asian: (2) Mid−Status
Percent Asian: (3) Low−Status
Percent Black: (1) High−Status
Percent Black: (2) Mid−Status
Percent Black: (3) Low−Status
Percent Hisp/Latino: (1) High−Status
Percent Hisp/Latino: (2) Mid−Status
Percent Hisp/Latino: (3) Low−Status
Percent White: (1) High−Status
Percent White: (2) Mid−Status




















































































































































































Figure C.2: Heat map of correlations between the ethnic share of public sector occupations
by ethnicity and by high/mid/low-status occupation groups
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
Percent Asian: (1) High−Status Private Sector
Percent Asian: (1) High−Status Public Sector
Percent Asian: (2) Mid−Status Private Sector
Percent Asian: (2) Mid−Status Public Sector
Percent Asian: (3) Low−Status Private Sector
Percent Asian: (3) Low−Status Public Sector
Percent Black: (1) High−Status Private Sector
Percent Black: (1) High−Status Public Sector
Percent Black: (2) Mid−Status Private Sector
Percent Black: (2) Mid−Status Public Sector
Percent Black: (3) Low−Status Private Sector
Percent Black: (3) Low−Status Public Sector
Percent Hisp/Latino: (1) High−Status Private Sector
Percent Hisp/Latino: (1) High−Status Public Sector
Percent Hisp/Latino: (2) Mid−Status Private Sector
Percent Hisp/Latino: (2) Mid−Status Public Sector
Percent Hisp/Latino: (3) Low−Status Private Sector
Percent Hisp/Latino: (3) Low−Status Public Sector
Percent White: (1) High−Status Private Sector
Percent White: (1) High−Status Public Sector
Percent White: (2) Mid−Status Private Sector
Percent White: (2) Mid−Status Public Sector
Percent White: (3) Low−Status Private Sector










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.3: Heat map of correlations between the ethnic share of all occupations by ethnicity
and by high/mid/low-status occupation groups
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
C.2 Robustness Checks: Binary Logit Models using
Di erent Surname Match Criteria to Construct
Dependent Variables
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO “OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION, SELECTION,
AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF MINORITY POLITICAL CANDIDATES”
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